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Abstract
This Article completes the analysis of the first decade of the modern emerging market’s op-
eration by considering two further periods: (iv) Adolescence: March 1989 to October 1991; and
(v) Young Adulthood: October 1991 to December 1993. The primary importance of the market in
these periods, as will be discovered, lies in its promotion and facilitation of the Brady Plan.
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INTRODUCTION
The modern secondary market in the debt of less developed
countries ("LDCs"), now known as the emerging market, grew
out of the debt crisis of 1982. The first six years of the market's
development were considered in an earlier Article,1 which ana-
lyzed the evolution of the market in the following periods: (i)
Birth: 1982 to May 1985; (ii) Infancy: May 1985 to May 1987;
and (iii) Childhood: May 1987 to March 1989. The Article con-
cluded that the market's principal effects were to force a degree
of realism upon a bank's loan loss provisions, to provide an exit
from LDC lending for certain banks, and to facilitate a range of
debt exchanges including debt-equity swaps and debt buy-backs.
This Article completes the analysis of the first decade of the
market's operation by considering two further periods; (iv) Ado-
lescence: March 1989 to October 1991; and (v) Young Adult-
hood: October 1991 to December 1993.2 The primary impor-
tance of the market in these periods, as will be discovered, lies in
its promotion and faciliation of the Brady Plan.
I. THE TUMULTUOUS YEARS OF ADOLESCENCE: MARCH
1989 TO OCTOBER 1991
A. The Period's Major Events
The period between 1989 and 1991 began with increasing
political tensions in Latin America. In early March 1989, the
staid and sober pages of the Wall Street Journal rung with the
* Associate Professor of Law, Bond University, Gold Coast, 4229, Australia. Heart-
felt thanks to Ian Cameron and Michael Pettis for their helpful comments on earlier
drafts, to Jay Forder for years of patience with the laser printer, and to the Australian
Research Council which provided an ARC Small Grant to support this work. All respon-
sibility is mine.
1. Ross P. Buckley, The Transformative Potential of a Secondary Market: Emerging Mar-
kets Debt Trading from 1983 to 1989, 21 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1152 (1998).
2. The regulation of the market and the role of the Emerging Markets Traders
Association were not considered in this research.
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warning that "[w]hile the Bush administration searches for a
new U.S. policy on Third World debt, the red ink is turning to
blood."3 The article told how over 300 people had died in riots
in Venezuela protesting austerity measures imposed by the gov-
ernment at the behest of its creditors.4 Political opposition to
unrelieved debt service was growing strongly throughout the re-
gion.
Tensions were also increasing in the U.S. banking industry.
In 1988, the negotiation of rescheduling packages and their at-
tendant new money obligations had become difficult and pro-
tracted in the face of stiff bank resistance.6 Increasing numbers
of regional U.S. and European banks were simply refusing to ad-
vance fresh funds; the secondary market had provided a back
door out of the debt crisis and the banks were using it.7 For
banks with smaller exposures, the sale of loans on the market
was an attractive option.
By early 1989, the Baker Plan and its strategy of reschedul-
ing with new money was a dead letter. Banks had wearied of
forever advancing new funds.8 Countries had wearied of their
ever-rising level of indebtedness. The International Monetary
3. Walter Mossberg & Peter Truell, Another Round: Bush Aides Are Likely to Offer a
Plan Soon on Third World Debt, WALL ST. J., Mar. 9, 1989.
4. Id. The government reported 287 fatalities. Some commentators have placed
the death toll as high as 1500. See FERGUSON, VENEZUELA IN Focus - A GUIDE TO THE
PEOPLE, POLITICS, AND CULTURE 5 (1994); see also GREEN, SILENT REVOLUTION - THE RISE
OF MARKET ECONOMICS IN LATIN AMERICA 164-175 (1995).
5. Carlos Menem, the Argentine president, advocated a five-year suspension of in-
terest payments on Argentina's debt. See Alan Riding, Venezuela Seeks Unity on Latin Debt,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9, 1989, at D8. Ferdinand Collor de Mello, the Brazilian president,
advocated that maturities be extended over forty years with a fixed interest rate. See
James Brooke, Latin America Pursues Recovery on Two Fronts, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 28, 1989, at
D6. In Mexico'sJuly 1988 general election, Carlos Salinas de Gortari received only 51%
of the vote, the lowest vote ever received by a presidential candidate from the official
party, the PRI, which has dominated Mexican politics for over half a century. See Brani-
gan, Mexican Launches Election Protest Campaign: More Than 200,000 Attend Rally, N.Y.
TIMES, July 16, 1989, at Al. See generally Green, supra note 4, at 167-69 (listing riots and
protests against IMF Structural Adjustment Programs and resulting austerities).
6. Lee C. Buchheit, Whatever Became of Old New Money?, INT'L FIN. L. REv., Dec. 11,
1990, at 12.
7. Rory MacMillan, The Next Sovereign Debt Crisis, 31 STAN. J. INT'L L. 305, 328-29
(1995).
8. In the words of M. Peter McPherson, the Executive Vice President of Bank of
America, in testimony before a Senate subcommittee: "Many banks had concluded by
the Spring of 89 that their primary recourse was, in fact, to withhold new money. Each
new money exercise was harder and harder; by the time Secretary Brady proposed his
plan, new money, I believe, was about gone under the old system."
1803
1804 FORDHAMINTERNATIONALLAWJOURNAL [Vol. 21:1802
Fund's austerity programs were no longer politically tenable in
Latin America. Their continuation could have led to the over-
throw of some of the democratic governments that had come to
power during the 1980s and the return of totalitarian regimes to
the region.9 Such developments would have been against U.S.
interests. A new approach was needed from the U.S. govern-
ment. The Brady proposal was that approach. In time it would
transform the secondary market.
1. The Brady Plan
This new initiative, the Brady Plan as it came to be known,
represented a sharp departure from the Baker Plan."0 That
much, initially, was clear. However, Treasury Secretary Nicholas
Brady was deliberately vague" when he made his speech on
March 10, 1989.12 His vagueness reflected the U.S. Treasury's
incapacity "to orchestrate a full-scale 'plan' and make it work."' 3
Secretary Brady proposed (1) a series of individual market-
based transactions, (2) in which creditors would be invited to
participate voluntarily, (3) with debt relief tied into the conver-
sion of loans into collateralized bonds, (4) with debtor nations
permitted to repurchase their own discounted debt on the sec-
ondary market, and (5) with debt-equity schemes being pro-
moted. 4 The proposal was seen as an expression of increased
urgency from the U.S. government about the resolution of the
debt crisis, a strong call for the development of capital-market-
based solutions, 5 and an official acceptance that some debt for-
giveness was essential. At long last, it seemed, the calls for debt
9. Hearings on the Lesser Developed Countries' Debt Crisis Before the House
Committee on Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 332
(1989) (statement of Professor Luiz Carlos Bresser Pereira) [hereinafter Statement of
Prof. Pereira].
10. See Buckley, supra note 1.
11. Calverley & Iversen, Banks and the Brady Initiative, in THIRD WORLD DEBT - MAN-
AGING THE CONSEQUENCES 129, 133 (1989).
12. Secretary Brady delivered his speech to a joint meeting of the IMF and the
World Bank in Seoul, South Korea, on March 10, 1989. See Brady, Remarks to a Third
World Debt Conference, DEP'T OF STATE BULL., May 1989, at 53-56.
13. Calverley & Iversen, supra note 11, at 133.
14. See Lee C. Buchheit, The Background to Brady's Initiative, INT'L FIN. L. REv., April
29, 1990, at 30; Leslie Fraust, Debt Plan Spurs Interest in Securitizing LDC Loans, AM.
BANKER, Mar. 28, 1989, at 55.
15. Fraust, supra note 14, at 55.
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relief were to be heeded.1 6
The Brady proposal dealt only with debt to commercial
banks.17 As such, it offered little to African debtor nations as
their principal indebtedness was, and is, to official agencies, de-
velopment banks, and other governments. 8
As usual in these matters, Mexico was in the vanguard. Mex-
ico's strategic importance to the United States was seen as likely
to result in the most favorable precedent for other debtor na-
tions and, in 1989, Mexico was in relatively good economic
shape. 9 Negotiations began in earnest between Mexico and its
commercial bank creditors in May 1989. An agreement in prin-
ciple was announced on July 23, 1989.20 The terms sheet was
settled and distributed to banks in September 1989,21 the debt
reduction package was signed in February 1990,22 and the bonds
issued in late March 1990.23 It was a slow process dragging hun-
dreds of banks to the table when most were resisting strenuously.
Mexico's Brady scheme represented a significant departure from
Secretary Brady's proposals as it was a one-off scheme in which
creditor participation was effectively compulsory. The U.S.
16. MacMillan, supra note 7, at 313-14.
17. Missing from the Brady proposal, to the chagrin of many commercial bankers,
was any call for debt forgiveness by the official lenders. Many commercial bankers felt it
was unfair to be asked to carry the burden of debt forgiveness alone, when official
lending accounted for around 40% of total LDC loans. See Calverley & Iversen, supra
note 11, at 133. In 1990, these criticisms were met to a very limited extent when the
association of official lenders, the Paris Club, permitted debt relief in the form of prin-
cipal or interest rate reductions or very long maturities in the restructuring of the
official indebtedness of severely-indebted low income countries. These were principally
African nations. Bolivia was the only Latin American nation to be granted such relief.
See World Bank Report, 24 LATINFINANCE 12-14 (1991).
18. Africa's Unpayable Debts, ECONOMIST, Nov. 2, 1991, at 18. See generally GREENE,
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS AND FINANCIAL MARKETS - THE AMEX BANK REVIEW PRIZE Es-
SAYS 103 (1989) (discussing debt crisis in Africa in 1980s).
19. See Cohen, Give Me Equity or Give Me Debt: Avoiding a Latin American Debt Revolu-
tion, 10 U. PA.J. INT'L. Bus. L. 89, 92 (1988) (discussing U.S. interests in Latin American
political stability and economic health).
20. The Debt Agreement, MEXICO SERVICE, July 27, 1989. The resolution of the fine
details was very time consuming. See Bruce Wolfson, Paving the Paper Trail, 26 LA-
TINFINANCE 49 (1991); At Last?, ECONOMIST, Jan. 13, 1990, at 94; JONATHON HAY &
NIRMALJIT PAUL, REGULATION AND TAXATION OF COMMERCIAL BANKS DURING THE INTER-
NATIONAL DEBT CRISIS 3 (1991).
21. Hurricane Heading for Brady Plan, 794 INT'L FIN. REV., Sept. 23, 1989, at 12;
Mexico Terms Are Out, 794 INT'L FIN. REV., Sept. 23, 1989, at 24.
22. Mexico Signs Debt Reduction Package, 813 INT'L FIN. REV., Feb. 10, 1990, at 32.
23. LDC Finance - Mexico, 820 INT'L FIN. REV., Mar. 31, 1990, at 35; see Wolfson,
supra note 20, at 49; At Last?, supra note 20, at 94; HAY & PAUL, supra note 20, at 3.
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Treasury swiftly accepted the virtues of necessity and embraced
the bonds as a product of the Brady proposals. 24 Many banks
were reportedly "disgusted" with the deal but in the end had to
go along with it.25 The die had been cast for future Brady style
restructurings. The banks were offered a choice from the follow-
ing three options for their Mexican loans.2 6
1. The banks could have their loans converted into newly is-
sued 30-year bonds paying Libor plus 13/16 percent. The
principal of these bonds would be discounted thirty-five per-
cent from the loans. Repayment of principal would be guar-
anteed by zero coupon bonds issued for the purpose by the
U.S. Treasury, acquired by Mexico, and held in escrow. In
addition, there would be a rolling guarantee of eighteen
months interest.
2 7
2. The banks could have their loans converted into "par
bonds" - bonds with the same face value as the loans which
paid interest at the discounted, fixed rate of 6.25%.28 The
term and collateral for these bonds were as for the dis-
counted principal bonds considered above.
2 9
3. The banks could elect to participate in new loans to Mex-
ico in the coming four years to the extent of twenty-five per-
cent of their medium and long-term exposure to Mexico.3 0
The new money option contained a paradox. It was crucial
24. Buchheit, supra note 14, at 29.
25. Hurricane Heading for Brady Plan, supra note 21, at 12; Commercial Bankers Say
Brady Plan is a Non-Starter, 795 INT'L FIN. REv., Sept. 30, 1989, at 8.
26. As the restructuring would result in bonds being issued in the United States,
the Securities Act of 1933 would on its face apply. To avoid the complexity and expense
of complying with its strictures, counsel for Mexico obtained a no-action letter from the
Securities and Exchange Commission which provided, in effect, an exemption from
registration under the Act for the issuance of the bonds and defined the terms upon
which subsequent sales of the bonds could be made in the United States. See Letter of
March 23, 1990, from Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton on behalf of Mexico and
Shearman & Sterling on behalf of the bank advisory committee for Mexico and SEC
reply of March 28, 1990 (1990 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 572).
27. The Debt Agreement, supra note 20; Alberto Santos, Beyond Baker and Brady:
DeeperDebt Reduction for Latin American Sovereign Debtors, 66 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 66, 79 (1991).
This provision and the longer term are the only differences from the Aztec bonds of
1988 - the provenance of this proposal is clear.
28. At the time of Mexico's restructuring agreement, July 1989, LIBOR was 8.81%.
The usual interest rate on Mexico's debt was LIBOR plus 13/16th. The par bonds at
6.25%, fixed, thus represented an interest saving of nearly 3.4%. By way of comparison,
30-year U.S. Treasury bonds were yielding 8.14%.
29. The Debt Agreement, supra note 20; Santos, supra note 27, at 79.
30. The Debt Agreement, supra note 20; Santos, supra note 27, at 79.
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that sufficient banks opt for new money as it was required to
assist with the payment of interest on the above bonds and for
the continued economic growth of Mexico.3 1 However, the ex-
tension of new money eroded the debt-reduction effect of the
proposal. If too many banks opted for new money, moreover,
there may have been a net increase in Mexico's indebtedness. 3 2
This approach of offering the banks a range of restructur-
ing options was known as the "menu" approach. 3 It allowed
banks to choose the option most suited to their view on interest
rates and debtor prospects and their individual tax, regulatory,
and accounting situation? 4
The prospects of the Brady proposal were greatly enhanced
by a letter of July 14, 1989, from the Securities and Exchange
Commission ("SEC") to David Mulford, Under Secretary of the
Treasury." The letter "clarified" the application to the Mexican
Brady restructuring of Financial Accounting Standards No. 15,
"Accounting by Debtors and Creditors for Troubled Debt
Restructurings" ("FAS 15") .36 The relevant part of FAS 15 pro-
vides that if, in full settlement of a debt, a creditor receives assets
of which the fair value is less than the recorded value of the
debt, then the creditor must record the shortfall as a loss. If an
active market exists, fair value is market value. In the absence of
such a market, fair value is to be estimated based on expected
cash flows discounted for risk.37
David Mulford is commonly regarded as the Washington ar-
chitect of the Brady Plan and he had requested, and doubtless
shaped, the letter ofJuly 14, 1989, from the SEC. In the name of
applying FAS 15 to Mexico's restructuring, the SEC wrote that a
loss need not be recognized if "the total future undiscounted
31. In addition, depending upon the proportions of discount and par bonds cho-
sen, the new money may have been required to assist with the acquisition of collateral
for those bonds.
32. Because loans are usually required to fund the acquisition of collateral, the
issuance of par bonds usually results in an increase in the total stock of debt, albeit at
lower rates of interest. SeeJohn Clark, Debt Reduction and Market Reentry under the Brady
Plan, 18 FED. RESERVE BANK-NY, QUARTERLY REV. 38, 47 (1993-94).
33. See Statement of Professor Pereira, supra note 9, at 336-37; Buchheit, supra
note 14, at 30.
34. See Clark, supra note 32, at 44-45.
35. See HAY & PAUL, supra note 20, at 126.
36. Id. at 159-60.
37. Id. at 159.
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cash receipts specified by the new terms of the loan, including
receipts designated as both principal and interest, equal or ex-
ceed the book value of the loan."38 This letter is a remarkable
document.39 Upon this criteria, the banks could accept Mex-
ico's Brady Bonds in exchange for their loans without having to
recognize a loss.4 ° This would be true notwithstanding that
shortly after issue the par bonds would trade at forty-two percent
of face value and the discount bonds at sixty-three percent.4
The analysis in this SEC letter represents the apotheosis of the
popular debt crisis game of images and mirrors by treating inter-
est as principal and making the value of money in thirty years
equal to its value today. By ensuring that Brady bonds could be
accepted by banks without provisions or writedowns,42 the SEC
made the Mexican restructuring far more palatable for U.S.
banks.43 It is a pity that this end could not have been achieved
without defining black as white. The turning of water into wine
should perhaps be reserved for higher authorities than the SEC.
38. See HAY & PAUL, supra note 20, at 128 (reproducing SEC letter and attach-
ment); see also Manuel Monteagudo, The Debt Problem: The Baker Plan and the Brady Initia-
tive: A Latin American Perspective, 28 INT'L LAW. 59, 74 (1994).
39. Upon its manifestly clear meaning, FAS 15 does not mean to exclude the time
value of money from the calculations nor to treat interest as principal. Compare the
approach of the Bank of England: discount bonds were to be placed on bank books at
their face value of 65% with the loss of 35% to be charged to provisions. Par bonds, on
the other hand, could be recorded at face value provided the current provisions against
Mexican debt were otherwise adequate. See HAY & PAUL, supra note 20, at 43. Given
that discount and par bonds were designed to be of equal value and were treated by the
international banks as such, this approach, which lays great weight on the face value of
the bond and ignores the interest rate, is quite artificial, although not nearly as artificial
as the SEC's approach.
40. Monteagudo, supra note 38, at 75. The SEC was careful to point out that its
analysis of FAS 15 did not derogate from the general requirements of FAS 5 that loan
losses must be recognised when a loan (or bond) is determined to be uncollectible in
whole or part. See HAY & PAUL, supra note 20, at 129.
41. Indicative Prices for Developing Country Debt, 823 INT'L FIN. REV., Apr. 21, 1990, at
29.
42. "Banks were able to account for both the par and discount bonds issued in
Mexico's 1990 debt exchange without recognizing a restructuring loss." See Guideline:
Exposure to Designated Countries, reproduced in HAy & PAUL, supra note 20, at 114-15.
43. See HAY & PAUL, supra note 20, at 29. While the exchange of loans for Brady
bonds did not lead to writedowns for accounting purposes, an Internal Revenue Service
Ruling provided that such exchanges may lead to losses for income taxation purposes.
See Internal Revenue Service Advance Revenue Ruling 89-122, on Determination of
Amount and Recognition of Gain or Loss, Issued Nov. 3, 1989 (26 CFR 1.1001-1) repro-
duced in HAY & PAUL, supra note 20, at 141. Hence, there is the bizarre possibility that
banks recorded a loss from participating in a Brady bond exchange which reduced
their overall tax liability without providing for reserves on account of the transaction.
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This restructuring was of all of Mexico's medium and long-
term debt to the commercial banks.44 A great deal of arm-twist-
ing by regulators was required to secure the participation of all
banks.45 Many were reluctant to participate but bankers usually
find overt pressure from their home regulators difficult to resist.
Of the indebtedness, forty-one percent was converted into dis-
counted principal bonds, forty-nine percent into discounted in-
terest ('par') bonds, and the banks holding the remaining ten
percent agreed to advance new money.4 6 Of the three options,
new money was to prove by far the most lucrative and Citibank's
foresight in taking that option exclusively was richly rewarded.47
Yet, in 1990, substantial pressure was needed to make banks
holding the required ten percent of exposure agree to advance
new money.48
These overall figures mask major differences between the
banks of different countries that serve to highlight just how
much "international banks" remain influenced by the nations of
their birth.49 The following table shows the total percentage of
debt exchanged for par or discount bonds or left in place by
banks from different countries:
Bank Choices in the Mexican Restructuring
50
Par Discount New
Country Bond Bond Money
France 79% 9% 12%
United States 58% 24% 19%
Japan 18% 81% 0%
Canada 48% 52% 0%
Germany 80% 20% 0%
United Kingdom 48% 45% 6%
As the table demonstrates, there were dramatic differences
between the choices of banks from different countries. For in-
stance, Japanese banks chose to take roughly eighty percent of
44. Some US$54 billion of medium and long-term Mexican debt was restructured.
See Santos, supra note 27, at 79.
45. Interview with Professor Riordan Roette of John,; Hopkins University in Wash-
ington D.C. (April 29, 1993).
46. Testimony of William R Rhodes, Federal News Service, March 21, 1990.
47. Interview with Michael Pettis, now a Managing Director of Bear Stearns & Co.,
New York (Feb. 20, 1996) [hereinafter Pettis Interview II].
48. Id.
49. See generally WELLONS, PASSING THE BUCK - BANKS, GOVERNMENTS AND THIRD
WORLD DEBT (1987).
50. See HAY & PAUL, supra note 20, at 10.
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their loans as discount bonds and the rest as par bonds and the
German banks chose to take eighty percent of their loans as par
bonds with the rest as discount bonds. Perhaps the principal
reason for these differences is the variations in the regulatory
and taxation regimes of countries.5'
The terms of the bonds differed from the loans in a number
of respects. The bonds were negotiable instruments designed to
be traded and the sharing clause and mandatory prepayments
clause typical of syndicated bank loans were absent.5 2
The acquisition of the collateral for these bonds - the zero
coupon bonds and the rolling interest guarantee - was funded
as follows: US$1.3 billion from Mexico, US$2 billion from Ja-
pan, and US$3.7 billion from the International Monetary Fund
("IMF") and the World Bank. In committing World Bank and
IMF funds to this purpose, the United States was, for the first
time, putting taxpayers' funds into the resolution of the debt cri-
sis - a politically courageous act within domestic U.S. politics. 4
Nevertheless, the plan has been severely criticized for affording
inadequate debt relief,55 criticisms with which this author agrees.
51. Id. at 9-10.
52. Carsten Ebenroth & Rudiger Woggon, The Development of the Equal Treatment
Principle in the International Debt Crisis, 12 MICH..J. INT'L. L. 690, 717-19 (1991). Further-
more, there were some other less than usual provisions of this restructuring: (i) the
Mexican government agreed to permit US$1 billion of debt-equity conversions per an-
num for the next three years; and (ii) debt payments would be increased on discounted
principal and par bonds if after July 1996 Mexico's earnings from oil exports exceed
1989 levels in real terms or if the real price for Mexican oil after 1996 exceeds US$14
per barrel. These potential increases in debt payments were both capperl and counter-
balanced in a complex scheme. The increase in repayments due to improved oil ex-
ports is limited to 30 percent and interest rates on the par bonds are capped at 9.25%.
Furthermore, if oil prices fall below US$10 per barrel during the life of the agreement
the banks can be required to advance further new funds of up to US$800 million. The
Debt Agreement, supra note 20.
53. See The Debt Agreement, supra note 20. Depending upon the proportion of
banks taking up the various options, further funds for acquisition of collateral would
have had to come from funds advanced under the new money option. See id.
54. The U.S. Treasury issued the zero coupon bonds which Mexico acquired to
collateralize the principal payments on the Brady bonds. The extent to which the
whole Brady Plan was highly controversial within the United States is reflected in the
debate that raged for months over whether these zero coupon bonds had been sold to
Mexico at arm's length or whether Mexico had received a subsidy of up to US$192
million. See Mexico's Zeros Revisited, 840 INT'L FIN. REV., Aug. 18, 1990, at 21; Some Mathe-
matics, 840 INT'L FIN. REv., Aug. 18, 1990, at 22.
55. Santos has described the Plan as "irreparably flawed" for this and other rea-
sons. See Santos, supra note 27, at 79-80; Of Banks, Borrowers and Brady, ECONoMisT, Apr.
29, 1989, at 13 (stating that ",[c]ommercial banks must be encouraged to take the pain
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This Mexican restructuring was perceived to be a crucial
first test of the Brady initiative. Secretary Brady's proposals were
generally treated in the press as entirely novel and without pre-
cedent, but the idea had been considered for quite some time.56
Indeed, the genesis of Brady's proposal was in Latin America not
Washington: in the Aztec bonds, developed at Mexico's request,
in 1988, and in even earlier proposals by Brazil to convert its
foreign debt into 35-year bearer bonds with the same face value
as the loans and below market fixed interest rates.57 The agenda
for this restructuring was "established not in Washington, but in
Mexico City."'5 8
A crucial element of the Mexican debt negotiation strategy
was the insistence on debt reduction and interest relief. The sec-
ondary market played a major role in making these policies ac-
ceptable. "The fact that LDC debt routinely traded at large dis-
counts to par value on the secondary market gave Mexico a fun-
damental basis to argue that banks were already assuming an
eventual writedown on the debt-and thus that Mexico should
be allowed to capture part of the discount. 59
The actual savings to Mexico from its Brady restructuring
are difficult to assess. Different analysts produce very different
assessments of the savings.6 ° At the wildly optimistic end of the
of reducing third-world debt. They can afford it."). But see Brady's Bazaar, ECONOMIST,
May 12, 1990, at 81 (stating that "the bosses of most of America's big money-centre
banks bristle with rage at any mention of the Brady plan. They fume at the write-offs
they have had to make on their developing-country debt portfolios .... ); Schulman
Speaks Out, LDC DEBT REPORT, Sept. 21, 1992, at 4.
56. See Third World Debt - Watch Out Securitisation is On Its Way, 703 INT'L FIN. REV.,
Dec. 12, 1987, at 3876 (reporting that Emilio Lamar, managing director of Merrill
Lynch's International Exposure Management Group, predicted exchange of debt for
bonds during 1988); see also Brazil - Time to Securitise Its Debt, 663 INT'L FIN. REV., Mar.
7, 1987, at 763; LDC Debt Securitisation, 723 INT'L FIN. REv., May 7, 1988, at 1444.
57. LDC Debt - The Deep Discount Bushfire, 690 INT'L FIN. REV., Sept. 12, 1987, at
2947. Note, with the exception of collateral, how closely these bonds proposed by Bra-
zil resemble the par bonds ultimately issued nearly three years later in Mexico's Brady
style restructuring. See Statement of Professor Pereira, supra note 9, at 336-37.
58. The Debt Agreement, supra note 20, at 6. The receptive ear in Washington neces-
sary for Mexico's ideas to gain credence was that of David Mulford, then Assistant Secre-
tary of the Treasury. To his credit, Mulford ran with Mexico's ideas and when Nicholas
Brady became Treasury Secretary, Mulford had a superior who too was willing to listen.
Mossberg & Truell, supra note 3.
59. The Debt Agreement, supra note 20, at 6.
60. The game of images and mirrors may well have been the creation of Herman
Hesse, so enduring is its attraction, and so seductive its appeal, for academics, bankers,
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range,6 Clark calculated savings of US$21.1 billion in claims
payable to banks by Mexico, which represents some 43.5% of the
loans eligible for restructuring. 62 At the other end of the spec-
trum, some researchers claim Mexico's Brady restructuring left
its total indebtedness unchanged:6 3 the debt relief afforded by
the discount bonds was offset by the new money advanced.64
These disparate views can be reconciled. Clark's footnotes
reveal that his figure for reduction in claims payable does not
include the new money that was central to the restructuring and
that must be included in any analysis of its overall effect.65 Fur-
thermore, about sixty percent of this saving comes through
lower interest payments on the par bonds calculated at the float-
ing rates prevailing at the time of the restructuring. Floating
rates declined, however, after the restructuring and at the end of
this period interest on Mexico's debt6 6 was about the same as if
the restructurings had not occurred,6 7 i.e. declines in floating
interest rates had offset the interest rate savings from the fixed
interest par bonds.
The Brady restructuring did benefit Mexico in one way: the
nation is now more protected against interest rate rises.68 It also
corrected the major anomaly of the 1970s lending boom-the
form of credits as loans rather than bonds.
The Brady restructuring failed, however, to help Mexico at
all on one important measure. Mexico's net annual transfer to
the banks before the restructuring was US$3.24 billion. After
commentators and debtors. See generally HERMAN HESSE, THE GLASS Ba D GAME -
MAGISTER LUDI (1990).
61. Clark's calculations were described by Pettis as "totally absurd." Pettis Inter-
view II, supra note 47.
62. Clark, supra note 32, at 38 & 46.
63. Although the total outstanding debt was not reduced, the interest burden was
lessened due to the reduced fixed interest rates on the par bonds.
64. Monteagudo, supra note 38, at 80.
65. It is unclear if Clark's figures include the other loans undertaken to fund ac-
quisition of the collateral for the bonds.
66. Interest on Venezuela's debt similarly was the same as if the restructurings had
not occurred.
67. Clark, supra note 32, at 49.
68. In this regard, the restructuring corrected one of the real anomalies of the
lending boom of the 1970s-the preponderance of floating interest rates. See Peider
Konz, The Third World Debt Crisis, 12 HASTINGS INT'L & COMPAR. L. REv. 527, 528 (1989).
Floating rates left the debtor nations horribly exposed to precisely the sort of interest
rate fluctuations that the late 1970s and early 1980s brought. Ironically, interest rates
were to fall and remain low for the seven years after Mexico's Brady restructuring.
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the restructuring it was US$3.59 billion.69 This is because before
Brady, most of the interest payments were funded by new
money. Once again, however, figures do not tell the full story.
The Brady process served an important function in breaking the
upward spiral of total indebtedness and in reducing the de-
mands on the scarce time of government ministers and civil ser-
vants that arose from the periodic restructurings of the 1980s.
In Clark's words,
The Brady restructurings did not achieve significantly more
near-term cash flow relief for debtors than the previous ap-
proach. But they did provide a more stable long-run financial
framework that, in combination with structural reforms by
debtors and a favorable environment of lower global interest
rates, helped to restore market access. 70
Shortly after the Mexican restructuring, the commercial
banks negotiated agreements with the Philippines, Costa Rica, 71
Venezuela, and Morocco in that order.72
At the time, the Filipino restructuring was referred to as a
Brady scheme.73 It was not a classic Brady style restructuring,
however, as discount and par bonds were absent. 74 Banks were
offered the choice between advancing new money or selling
their current exposure back to the Philippines at around fifty
cents on the dollar. 75 This restructuring resulted in a reduction
of almost thirteen percent of the Philippines external bank
debt.76 The Philippines government had indicated that over the
following year or two there would be additional debt reduction
initiatives, such as par bonds, in a series of voluntary, market
based transactions77 - true to the original spirit of Treasury Sec-
retary Brady's proposals. When these further debt reduction ini-
69. Clark, supra note 32, at 47-48.
70. Id. at 62.
71. See Debt Buyback Takes Center Stage in Costa Rican Agreement, XIII Bank Letter,
Oct. 30, 1990, at 2 (discussing Costa Rica's restructuring); HAY & PAUL, supra note 20, at
5-6.
72. See Suk Hun Lee & Hyun Mo Sung, The Reactions of Secondary Market Prices of
Developing Country Syndicated Loans to the Brady Plan, a paper dated Jan. 15, 1993, Appen-
dix at 19 (copy on file with the Fordham International Lau, Journal).
73. See HAY & PAUL, supra note 20, at 4-5.
74. Buchheit, supra note 14, at 29, 31.
75. Id.
76. INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, ANNUAL REPORT 1990, at 28-32.
77. Buchheit, supra note 14, at 29, 31.
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tiatives were implemented, however, they were in the form of a
classic, Mexican-style, one-off Brady scheme.78 The menu of-
fered to banks included collateralized twenty-five-year interest re-
duction registered bonds,79 fifteen-year interest reduction bearer
bonds with less collateral,80 or new money.81 After the 1990 re-
structuring the Philippines had US$5.3 billion of bank debt.
The second restructuring in early 1992 reduced this by a further
US$1.5 billion.8 2
The original proposals of Secretary Brady had emphasised
that debt relief and restructuring would be voluntary and Mex-
ico's restructuring was religiously referred to by all involved as a
voluntary exercise.83 The first Filipino restructuring incorpo-
rated relatively less debt relief and more new money than Mex-
ico's. " The response to it was illuminating as "bankers eagerly
noted that the Philippine agreement is more 'voluntary' than
the Mexico settlement. '8 5 Its other interesting aspect was that
the Philippines was permitted to repurchase about US$1.3 bil-
78. The Philippines and its commercial bank creditors agreed to a Brady style debt
reduction agreement in late August, 1991. See Philippine Brady Plan, 894 INT'L FIN. REV.,
Sept. 7, 1991, at 20. The agreement was not finalized with the endorsement of the IMF,
World Bank, and the Japan Export-Import Bank (each of which was providing support
with the acquisition of the collateral) until April, 1992. The delays involved the non-
renewal of the leases on the U.S. military bases in the Philippines. This later restructur-
ing was presented as if it were the Philippine's first Brady restructuring. See JoYCE
CHANG, ET AL., REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES - CONSOLIDATING ECONOMIC REFORMS 6-7
(1992) (Salomon Brothers) (copy on file with the Fordham International Law Journal).
This would have surprised those engaged in the 1989 exercise, but was tenable because
the 1989 restructuring was such an atypical Brady restructure.
79. The 25-year bonds had full collateral for principal and a rolling guarantee of
14 months interest and a fixed coupon of 4.25% in year one, rising progressively to
6.5% in year 6 and thereafter. See CHANG, ET AL., supra note 78, at 6; Philippine Brady
Plan, supra note 78, at 20; Philippines Concludes Debt Reduction Accord, 917 INT'L FIN. REv.,
Feb. 22, 1992, at 27.
80. The 15-year bonds had a rolling guarantee of 12 months interest for the first
six years and fixed rates commencing at 4% in year one rising to 6% in year six and the
floating rate of Libor plus 13/16th % for years 7 to 15. Principal was not collateralized.
81. The new money option was to advance new money equal to 25% of a bank's
exposure. The new money would be in the form of 17-year bonds bearing interest of
Libor plus 13/16%. These bonds are eligible for conversion into equity.
82. CHANG, ET AL., supra note 78, at 6.
83. Masuda, Mexico's Debt Reduction Agreement and the New Debt Strategy, 11 ExiM RE-
VIEW 26, 30 (1991).
84. Peter Truell, Philippine Accord On Debt Reflects U.S. Strategy Shift, WALL ST. J.,
Aug. 17, 1989.
85. This response involved the game of images and mirrors again. See RAy & PAUL,
supra note 20, at 5 (stating "[t] his [Philippine] agreement was more voluntary than the
Mexican one.").
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lion of its debt for roughly the debt's secondary market price.8 6
As Peter Truell wrote, the "Philippine offer thus represents
something of an endorsement of the secondary market's valua-
tion of the Third World bank debt"., 7
Venezuela received the next Brady-style restructuring be-
cause their economic program met with U.S. approval.8 8 Argen-
tina and Brazil would have to adapt their domestic economic
policies further towards the model of the Washington techno-
crats before either would be granted a Brady style restructur-
ing.89
Venezuela's 'Brady' rescheduling was announced on June
25, 1990.90 The menu included the following five options:9"
1. The exchange of loans for thirty-year collateralized prin-
cipal discount bonds paying Libor plus 13/16%.2
2. The exchange of loans for thirty-year collateralized par
bonds paying a fixed rate of 6.75%. 3
3. The acquisition of new money bonds equal to 20% of a
bank's loans94 and conversion of those loans into debt-
86. See A Taxing Burden of Debt, ECONOMIST, Sept. 8, 1990, at 101 (analyzing debt
buy-backs as often not being in debtor's best interests).
87. Peter Truell, Philippines Offers $650 Million to Buy Debt of $1.3 Billion, WALL ST.
J., Oct. 12, 1989.
88. In the words of Barber Conable, President of the World Bank, "it's absolutely
essential to differentiate between debtors in terms of support." Mossberg & Truell,
supra note 3. The President of the World Bank is here emphasizing that support in the
form of debt relief must be reserved, and used as a reward, for those debtor countries
which toe the official line on economic policy.
89. Mossberg & Truell, supra note 3. At this time both Argentina and Brazil were
substantially in arrears on their interest payments. Peter Truell, Bolivia and Brazil Reach
Accord on Plan to Cut $300 Million of Each Other's Debt, WALL ST. J., May 11, 1990.
90. EVALUATING THE VENEZUELA 1990 FINANCING PLAN - CHOOSING AMONG THE
FINANCING OPTIONS 5 (July 1990) (Salomon Brothers) [hereinafter THE VENEZUELA
PLAN] (copy on file with the Fordham International Law Journal). The bonds were not
issued until December 18, 1990. See Vankudre, Brady Bonds, 26 LATINFINANCE 48, 53
(1991).
91. See HAY & PAUL, supra note 20, at 6; VENEZUELA PLAN, supra note 90, at 5-6;
Peter Truell, Venezuela Reaches Debt Settlement With Major BanksWall St. J., June 29, 1990.
92. The discount bonds had a face value of 70% of the amount of a bank's loans.
Principal was secured by zero coupon U.S. Treasury bonds and there was a 14 month
rolling interest guarantee.
93. These par bonds had the same collateral as the discount bonds above. Both
the par and discount bonds described above provided for higher interest rates after 6
years if oil prices exceeded US$26 per barrel.
94. That is, if a lender acquired new money bonds, its entire portfolio of loans
would be converted into bonds eligible to be swapped into equity. 40% of these new
money bonds pay interest at Libor plus 1%, the balance at Libor plus 7/8%.
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conversion bonds eligible for conversion into equity.95
4. The exchange of loans for seventeen-year temporary in-
terest reduction bonds. 96
5. The sale, in effect, of loans to Venezuela for forty-five
cents on the dollar9 7 which was roughly the secondary
market price98 for Venezuelan debt at this time.99
As is readily apparent, Venezuela's rescheduling was broadly
similar to Mexico's, one year earlier, with the addition of tempo-
rary interest reduction bonds and the option of selling loans
back to Venezuela at the secondary market price. 00
Nonetheless, the banks made very different choices in Vene-
zuela's Brady scheme than in Mexico's.'01 Discounted principal
bonds attracted only nine percent of debt (as opposed to forty-
one percent for Mexico), par bonds thirty-four percent (forty-
nine percent for Mexico), new money thirty-four percent (ten
percent for Mexico), temporary interest reduction bonds eleven
percent and, finally, the holders of nine percent of the debt sold
95. The debt-conversion bonds have a 17-year term and a coupon of Libor plus 7/
8%. Both the new money and debt-conversion bonds are bearer bonds, as opposed to
the discount and par bonds which are registered. SeeJOHN PURCELL, ET AL., DEVELOPING
COUNTRY SOVEREIGN BONDS: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN A NEW ASSET CLAss 1-2 (Septem-
ber 1991) (Salomon Brothers) (on file with the Fordham International Law Journal).
Bearer bonds are more attractive for some investors and are generally considered more
difficult to restructure. For this reason rating agencies subsequently rated bearer Brady
bonds at times more highly than registered Brady bonds.
96. The temporary interest reduction bonds paid interest at 5% for two years, 6%
for two years, 7% for one year then Libor plus 7/8% thereafter. These bonds carried a
rolling interest guarantee for the first five years.
97. This sale of loans was effected by the exchange of loans for a short-term, fully-
collateralized, 91-day note equal to 45% of the amount of a bank's loans. This global
note was collateralized by U.S. Treasury bills and was simply a different way of structur-
ing a buy-back option. There was, for obvious reasons, a cap on the amount of loans
which could be tendered under this option, which was set at US$5.5 billion, face value,
of loans.
98. Venezuela Reaches Debt Settlement With Major Banks, supra note 91.
99. Accordingly, this buy-back price (which was accepted by holders of 9% of Ven-
ezuela's debt) represents a confirmation of the secondary market's valuation of this
debt; as with the Philippines restructuring.
100. As was the case with Mexico, an effective exemption from the Securities Act
was obtained for this issuance of bonds in the U.S. See Letter of Oct. 17, 1990, from
Arnold & Porter for Venezuela and Milbank Tweed Hadley & McCoy for the bank advi-
sory committee for Venezuela to the SEC and the SEC reply of Oct. 17, 1990 (1990 SEC
No-Act. LEXIS 1193).
101. See generally Calderon & McCarthy, New Money for Old, 20 LATINFINANCE 73
(1990).
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it back to Venezuela. 102 As with Mexico's restructuring, the new
money option was to prove the most financially attractive, and
with the Mexican experience behind them, far more banks took
the risk and chose that option.
Subsequently, a Brady-style agreement was negotiated with
Uruguay which involved a buy-back of much of Uruguay's
debt.10 3 Chile's debt was also restructured but due to its rela-
tively robust economic health, no discount or par bonds were
involved. Chile's restructuring was conventional and involved
new money plus the right for debt buy-backs and debt-equity
conversions.'0 4 The assistance of a Brady-style restructuring was
not required.
Brazil's Brady scheme had a long and checkered history as
the nation's economic policies and performance failed to satisfy
the Washington-based decisionmakers at the IMF, World Bank,
and U.S. Treasury. In August 1991, Brazil proposed a menu of
options which included 30-year collateralized par bonds, 105
thirty-year collateralized discount bonds,0 6 two types of tempo-
rary interest reduction bonds, 107 and a new money option.'0 8
102. McCarthy, After Brady: the Debt Dust Settles, 24 LATINFINANCE 30 (1991); Vene-
zuela Signs Final Portion, 856 INT'L FIN. Rnv., Dec. 8, 1990, at 28. The principal partici-
pants in the buyback option were Japanese banks and market traders. McCarthy, supra
at 30.
103. Uruguay's Brady restructuring options were agreed to by the banks in Octo-
ber 1990. Banks were offered a simplified choice of 30-year par bonds with a 6.75%
coupon and the usual collateral, new money equal to 20% of current loans with the
current loans rendered eligible for conversion into equity, or a debt buyback option at
56 cents on the dollar. See Uruguay's Turn, 22 LATINFINANCE 12 (1990); HAY & PAUL,
supra note 20, at 7. In December, 1990, banks chose to convert 33% of Uruguay's
US$1.64 billion of medium and long-term debt into par bonds, sell 39% back to Uru-
guay at 56 cents on the dollar, and advance new money loans with respect to the bal-
ance of 28% of the nation's debt. See Secondary Marketplace, 24 LATINFINANCE 14 (1991);
Uruguay to Pay 56 Cents for Debt, 852 INT'L FIN. REv., Nov. 10, 1990, at 29.
104. A Curiously Insubstantial Treasury, ECONOMIST, Sept. 22, 1990, at 91; Murphy,
Moving Up, 25 LATINFINANCE 55, 62 (1991); John Clark, The Structure, Growth and Recent
Performance of the Latin American Bond Market, Federal Reserve Bank of New York Re-
search Paper #'9416, Oct. 1994 at n.4.
105. The proposal was for the par bonds to bear a coupon of 4.8% and carry a
guarantee of principal but no rolling interest guarantee, which had been the most diffi-
cult aspect of the earlier Brady bonds to price.
106. The discount bonds were to be for 62.5% of the face value of the loans.
107. The temporary interest reduction bonds were to carry reduced fixed interest
rates for the first six years and, in one case, a fixed rate of 8% for the balance of the
total term of 25 years, and in the other case an interest rate of Libor plus 13/16% for
the balance of the total term of 15 years.
108. The new money option was for a bank to advance new money to the extent of
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The announcement of the agreed terms of Brazil's restruc-
turing was eagerly anticipated from August to October 1991.
Most market participants thought, wrongly as it transpired, that
the terms of the scheme would be agreed in this period.
2. Further Loan Loss Provisions
In late 1989, another round of provisioning began among
U.S. banks partly in response to continuing declines in secon-
dary market prices and partly to strengthen the banks' position
in ongoing rescheduling negotiations with major debtors. JP
Morgan, Chase Manhattan, and Manufacturers Hanover all in-
creased LDC loan reserves in the same week.10 9 Morgan's move
was the most newsworthy as it increased its reserves by US$2 bil-
lion to 100% of its exposure to the most heavily indebted na-
tions.110 As always after a major increase in reserves, prices
dropped sharply as traders feared the extra supply of debt the
banks could now afford to put onto the market.1" Citicorp ad-
ded US$1 billion to its provisions in the fourth quarter of 1989,
but the leader in 1987 was now trailing the pack with reserves
equal to only thirty-eight percent of its LDC debt.1 12 Across the
Atlantic the U.S. lead was followed by all four major British
banks. By mid-1990 the loan loss reserves of the nine largest
U.S. commercial banks and the four large U.K. clearing banks
were on average about fifty percent of their LDC loans. 3 By
year end, two of the four U.K. banks had further increased their
reserves to sixty-five and eighty-five percent of their exposures. 4
25 percent of its current exposure. See generally Gosian, Starting Point, 30 LATINFINANCE
48 (1991); LDC Finance - Brazil: A Long Way to Go, 900 INT'L FIN. REV., Oct. 19, 1991.
109. Hubbard, U.S. Bank Provisions Unsettle LDC Debt Market, REUTERS, Sept. 25,
1989.
110. Id.; Commercial Banks Raise Loan Loss Provisions, 794 INT'L FIN. REV., Sept. 23,
1989, at 28. Among the regionals, Bank of Boston added US$370 million to loan loss
reserves at a time when it was already 100% reserved against all non-trade LDC debts.
111. Secondary Market Report, 795 INT'L FIN. REv., Sept. 30, 1989, at 33.
112. Rea, Citicorp 4th Qtr Operating Profits Poor - Analysts, REUTERS, Jan. 16, 1990.
113. See Santos, supra note 27, at 83; Froman, Still Exposed After All These Years, 20
LATINFINANCE 57 (1990). The level of reserves in the United States ranged from Cit-
icorp's at 31% through to JP Morgan's at 116%. All four British clearing banks had
added to their reserves in mid-1990 to bring their provisions to around 50% of their
LDC portfolios. See UK Clearing Banks, 786 INT'L FIN. REv., July 29, 1989, at 27.
114. Market Slips Further as Year-End Selloff Continues, XIII BANK LETrER, Nov. 13,
1995. In November 1989, NatWest increased its provisions to about 65% of its exposure
and Lloyds increased its provisions to 85% of its exposure. See UK Banks Set Up 1.8 bn
pds Against LDC Debt, 801 INT'L FIN. REv., Nov. 11, 1989, at 36; At the Bank's Bidding?,
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3. Non-Payment of Interest by Brazil and Argentina
Sovereign debtors do not "default," at least not in polite
company. Amongst bankers, borrowers, and financial journalists
the D-word is scrupulously avoided and left only for the likes of
the odd gauche academic.
Under most loan agreements, default is a technical state de-
clared by the lender on the basis of the borrower's breach of a
covenant. Default, in this sense, does not occur automatically
upon the non-payment of interest or principal because lenders
usually do not want such events to trigger cross-default clauses115
in the debtor's other financial agreements.
In this technical sense only, Brazil was not in default on its
loans in this period as its lenders were careful not to declare it in
default. However, Brazil did not repay principal or interest on
its commercial bank loans from July 1989 to April 1991.16 In
April, it agreed to pay one-quarter of its US$8 billion in interest
arrears in 1991 and to capitalize the balance by converting it into
ten-year bonds. 1 7 By mid-1990, Argentina owed US$6 billion in
interest arrears" 8 and was making nominal payments of US$40
million per month. 19 Argentina's non-payment galled bankers
less than Brazil's. Argentina's foreign exchange reserves of
around US$2 billion gave it little room to maneuver. However,
Brazil's reserves of between US$8.5 billion and US$11 billion,
were eyed avariciously by most bankers. 2 °
4. Change in Role of IMF and World Bank
As we have seen, part of the impetus for the Brady Plan was
the breakdown in creditor solidarity between the commercial
banks. 121 Early 1990 witnessed another such breakdown but this
time between official and commercial lenders. The IMF and
World Bank cast aside part of their role as debt policemen and
ECONOMIST, Feb. 3 1990, at 83. Standard Chartered and Barclays did not follow the
lead this time.
115. Cross-default clauses provide that a default in any of a borrower's other finan-
cial agreements will constitute a default under this agreement.
116. See Catching Up, ECONOMIST, April 13, 1991, at 85.
117. Id.
118. Argentina's arrears were on a much smaller total indebtedness than Brazil's.
119. Fraga, Banks in Informational Session, 838 INT'L FIN. REV., Aug. 4, 1990, at 28.
120. Brazil's Debt PrNoposals: 'Ludicrous, 849 INT'L FIN. REv., Oct. 20, 1990, at 27.
121. Lee C. Buchheit & Ralph Reisner, The Effect of the Sovereign Debt Restructuring
Process on Inter-Creditor Relationships U. ILL. L. REv. 493 (1988).
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began, on a selective basis, 122 to advance funds to nations before
they had reached a deal with their commercial banks and
notwithstanding that the nation was in arrears on payments to
those banks. 123 The non-payment of interest by two of the larg-
est debtors, the increasing informal repurchase of debt in the
secondary market by Brazilian state-owned companies, and this
breakdown in creditor support by the official agencies all meant
that 1990 was a particularly galling year for many bankers.
5. Return of the Major Debtors to the Voluntary
Capital Markets
One of the most extraordinary aspects of the entire history
of the 1982 debt crisis was, to this author, the incredibly early
return of the debtors to the voluntary capital markets.
Mexico was the first debtor to return. In 1989, Mexican
companies issued some junk bonds with high yields. 124 These
were primarily vehicles for the repatriation of flight capital. 25
During 1990, however, Mexican companies were able to return
to the mainstream voluntary markets with various offerings in-
cluding one for DM 100 million by Pemex, the state-owned oil
company.126
By February 1991, Mexico was able to issue the first
Eurobond in its own name since 1982. The issue was so well
received that the offering was increased from DM 200 million to
122. The official lenders did not discard their policing role entirely. For instance,
the letter of intent for a US$2 billion IMF loan to Brazil in September 1990 made the
loan conditional on Brazil resuming interest payments to its commercial bank creditors.
Payments Unlikely This Year, 844 INT'L FIN. Rv., Sept. 15, 1990, at 25.
123. Brazil Debt Downgrade on Hold, 831 INT'L FIN. REV., June 16, 1990, at 26. For
instance, the IMF resumed disbursements on a standby credit to Argentina in late 1990
when it was in arrears to its bank creditors and only making nominal debt service pay-
ments, and well before it reached a Brady style restructuring agreement. Argentina Gets
IMF Money: 25% Set Aside for Buybacks, 855 INT'L FIN. REV., Dec. 1, 1990, at 29.
124. Zellner, Mexico Gets Back to Bonds, 18 LATINFINANcE 24 (1990). For instance,
Cemex issued US$150 million of two-year notes in November 1989 which were priced to
yield 16%. See Peagram, Brave New World, EIJROMONEV, Mar. 1991, at 59.
125. W. A. Orme, Jr., Behind the Bond Rush, 20 LATINFINANCE 4 (1990).
126. In November 1990, Pemex issued US$100 million of bonds in a U.S. private
placement and US$150 million of eurobonds at coupons of 11.46% and 11.75%, re-
spectively. Steven Bavaria, Mexico Comes Back to Market; The Miracle Recovery, INVESTMENT
DEALERS DIGEST, Dec. 10, 1990, at 20. Another early offering was of US$100 million by
a Mexican sovereign development bank, BNCE. Pettis Interview II, supra note 47.
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DM 300 million. 127
In April 1990, Venezuela returned to the private capital
markets with a US$40 million Eurobond offering by Sivensa, a
private sector company. 128 Brazil's return was by a US$200 mil-
lion Eurobond issue by Petrobras, the state oil company, on July
10, 1991.129 On the back of strong demand the issue was in-
creased to US$250 million. 3 ° This early return to the interna-
tional capital markets was remarkable as it would be over two
and a half years before Brazil's Brady style restructuring was fi-
nalized. Argentina's return was announced on August 14, 1991,
by way of an issue of eurobonds.13' The issue was initially of
US$100 million but demand was so high it was increased to
US$300 million; quite incredible given that at the time Argen-
tina was over US$7 billion in arrears on interest payments and its
loans traded at thirty-five to thirty-nine percent of face value on
the secondary market. 32
The maturity and coupons of these early bonds differed
from the loans. The bonds, unlike the loans, were being ser-
viced. Nonetheless, to pay three times as much for Argentine
bonds as for Argentine loans strikes this writer as extreme. Can
the perceived "seniority" of bonds133 be the only reason?13 4 Lee
Buchheit put it best, when he penned this dialogue of humour
and insight:
[F]Or the love of Mike... who would ever buy unsecured
127. Peagram, supra note 124, at 59. The Eurobond carried a coupon of 10.5%
and was issued at slightly over par to yield 10.37%.
128. Pettis Interview II, supra note 47.
129. Tracy Corrigan, Banks Seek More Profitable Debts, FIN. TIMES, July 10, 1991, at
31. The eurobond carried a 10% coupon and was discounted upon issue to yield
13.5%.
130. Hubbard, Argentina's Return to Bond Market May Win Applause, REUTERS, Aug.
14, 1991. At the time of the Eurobond issue by Petrobras, oil prices were high and the
bond was for a relatively short two years. Both of these factors increased its attractive-
ness.
131. The two-year bonds were issued by the Republic and priced 5 points over U.S.
Treasury bonds. Two Very Different Latin American Issues, 895 INT'L FIN. REV., Sept. 14,
1991, at 22.
132. LDC Secondary Market Debt Opening of NY Trading on 13/9/91, 895 INT'L FIN.
REv., Sept. 14, 1991, at 23.
133. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
134. The perceived seniority of bonds was given as the rationale for ignoring the
low prices of a nation's bank loans when buying its bonds. See Brazil's Problems Give
Investors Cold Feet, 898 INT'L FIN. REv., Oct. 5, 1991, at 29.
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bonds from a country that hadn't even finished sticking its
creditors with substantial losses?
Well, in the beginning - say 1991-92 - we suspected
the investors were mostly .. .well-heeled expats .... You
know, flight capital returning at a 14 percent coupon, that
sort of thing. By 1992 however everybody wanted to lead
Eurobond issues ... and plenty of folks wanted to buy them.
It was just like the syndicated loan frenzy of the late 1970s.13 5
In 1991, Latin American borrowers raised US$7.6 billion in
bonds and US$4.9 billion in equity in the international capital
markets.1 36 The debt was mostly Eurobonds, issued in bearer
form, predominantly to investors from Latin America.13 7 The
Eurobonds were able to be issued because they: (i) tapped a dif-
ferent market - individuals repatriating flight capital or simply
seeking a high risk, high return investment; (ii) appealed to this
market because they were issued in small denominations, for
short terms, and were bearer bonds and thus attractive for tax
and other purposes; and (iii) enjoyed "de facto seniority over
bank debt ... due in part to the fact that. . . bonds compose a
relatively small portion of a nation's total oustanding debt."'38
The first truly voluntary unsecured sovereign bank loan to
the region after 1982 was, understandably, small and to the best
sovereign credit south of Texas. Chile borrowed US$20 million
from NMB in September 1990.'
6. Securitization of Brady Bonds
"Securitization" generally means the replacement of loans
with bonds. In this case, it was Brady bonds that were securi-
tized. Is that not a little like baptising the local vicar? Surely it
has already happened. Well, yes and no.140 For an interesting
135. Lee C. Buchheit, Deja Vu All Over Again, INT'L FIN. L. REV., Jan. 1992, at 6.
136. Voorhees, Hope Springs Eternal, 34 LATINFINANCE 21 (1992).
137. Clark, supra note 104, at 18.
138. Estabanez, The View From Moody's, 22 LATINFINANCE 47 (1990).
139. Latin America's Return: Chile Gets Loan From NMB, 843 INT'L FIN. REV., Sept. 8,
1990, at 22.
140. It should be noted that while the transformation of loans into bonds pursuant
to the Brady Plan is generally referred to as securitization,
it has not contained the characteristics of securitised markets as these have
unfolded in the developed world. Specifically, while certain LDC debt has
been repackaged into a securitised form and credit enhanced at least in part
... the process has not involved the degree of transformation associated with
the securitisation of mortgages, or other assets, in which obligations from a
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example of such a development, and of the lengths banks were
prepared to go to make Brady bonds attractive to private and
corporate investors, consider the September 1991 private place-
ment by Citicorp of US$50 million of securities collateralized by
Mexican Brady bonds. Citicorp structured the issue in two
tranches. The senior tranche was rated AA and consisted of
bonds with an eighteen month term priced to yield 7.85%. This
tranche represented forty-one percent of the issue. The junior
tranche, which represented the balance of the issue, was unrated
and yielded thirteen percent.' Citicorp had collected all the
collateral of a Brady bond in the one instrument-the interest
on the senior tranche was guaranteed by the rolling interest
guarantee and the principal repaid at the end of the eighteen
month term by selling the stripped out zero coupon bond. 14 2
Accordingly, the senior tranche was an investment grade secur-
ity. The junior tranche was uncollateralized Mexican indebted-
ness paying a substantial premium to regular Brady bonds in the
marketplace. This bond could therefore trade on something the
market readily understood, its high coupon, rather than the dif-
ficult-to-value partial collateral attached to Brady bonds. 143
7. The Advent of LDC Derivatives
Derivatives were initially limited to put and call options.'
Small numbers of these options were written throughout this pe-
riod. In early 1991, the growing liquidity of the Brady bond mar-
ket and the rally in Mexican par bonds led to a demand for op-
tions from investors seeking to lock in their gains. 14  The pri-
large number of borrowers are pooled, placed in separate vehicles, credit en-
hanced and funded through the issuance of rated securities.
Graffam, Introducing Securitisation to the Developing World at 3 (paper on file with the
Fordham International Law Review).
141. Citicorp LDC Debt Issue First of Kind on Market, 4 LDC DEBT REPORT, Sept. 2,
1991, at 1.
142. This was a way to strip out the collateral and realize a certain value for the
rolling interest guarantee which was otherwise impossible to value accurately.
143. Bradies were then priced at about 60 cents on the dollar and yielded about
11%. Citicorp LDC Debt Issue First of Kind on Market, supra note 141, at 1.
144. An option confers the right (but not the duty) to buy or sell a security at a
fixed price within a specified time limit. A put option gives the right to sell, a call
option the right to buy. See Gurmendi, Options in the LDC Debt Market, 27 LATINFINANCE
39 (1991).
145. New Wrinkle in LDC Debt Market: Options on Bonds, Loans, XV BANK LETTER,
Mar. 4, 1991, at 2; Gurmendi, supra note 144, at 40-41.
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mary market in derivatives began to grow.14 6 Initially, there was
no secondary market in derivatives-all option contracts were
non-assignable. 47 As well as being useful for securing profits
made in the bull run of 1991, options facilitated debt-equity con-
versions and privatizations. Potential investors could buy call op-
tions on the debt which would be required if their bid was suc-
cessful, thus insulating their proposed investment from price in-
creases in the debt without having to outlay the capital and take
the risks involved in acquiring the actual debt.14 8
This market was pioneered by Chase Manhattan and Banco
Santander in 1990.14 Banks engaged in issuing put and call op-
tions in 1991 included Bankers Trust, Chase, Chemical, First
Boston, First Interstate, NMB, Nomura, Manufacturers Hanover,
Morgan, Santander, and Swiss Bank. 5 ° The pricing of LDC debt
options was as much art as science and prices varied significantly
between traders. 5 1 The pricing of options on these assets,
which were heavily affected by political and other developments
in the debtor country, was not amenable to the usual precise
option pricing/hedging models152 and was not for the faint
hearted. 5 3
B. Impetus for the Market
The principal impetus for the market in this period was pro-
vided by debt buy-backs and privatization schemes. These and
other factors will be considered.
146. Voorhees, Putting the Call Before the Horse?, 31 LATINFINANCE 1 (1991). It was
estimated that including options being rolled over, options were being written on
US$100 million to US$200 million of assets every month around September 1991. Id.;
see Gurmendi, supra note 144.
147. Putting the Call Before the Horse?, supra note 146, at 21 (quoting Kathy Gal-
braith).
148. Gurmendi, supra note 144, at 41.
149. NMB Postbank - Leading the Field, INT'L FIN. REV. REVIEW OF THE YEAR - 1990,
at 81.
150. Id.
151. Voorhees, Doses of Reality, 40 LATINFINANCE 19, 32 (1992).
152. Id.; see Ephraim Clark, Briefing, EUROMONEY, Feb. 1991, at 73; Ephraim Clark,
Briefing, EUROMONEY, April 1991, at 79.
153. LDC Derivatives Gather Momentum, 867 INT'L FIN. REV., Mar. 2, 1991, at 20.
Another factor was that the background of LDC debt traders was in loans, not bonds,
and so very few understood option pricing parameters. Many wrote options as a way of
placing directional bets on future price movements.
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1. Debt Buy-Backs
The major impetus for the market throughout this period
were formal and informal debt buy-backs by debtor nations. 154
In formal schemes, the Philippines repurchased US$1.3 billion
of debt in January 1990 for 50 cents on the dollar, 15 5 Chile re-
purchased some US$330 million of its commercial bank debt,156
and Costa Rica bought US$990 million of its US$1.5 billion of
debt for sixteen cents on the dollar. 57 Furthermore, formal
buy-back schemes were dwarfed in size by informal arrange-
ments which promoted much activity in the secondary market.
The precise extent of the informal debt buy-backs will never
be known. In 1989 and early 1990, Brazil reportedly encouraged
state-owned companies to buy rescheduled Brazilian govern-
ment loans in the secondary market and use it to pay their ma-
turing local currency debt to the state158 at a time when the
loans traded between twenty-seven and thirty-one cents on the
dollar.1 59  The Economist estimated that in 1989 alone LDCs
purchased some US$30 billion of their own debt informally
through the secondary market.1 60 A large sovereign debtor re-
154. Michael Pettis lists three principal sources of net demand in the market in
this period: buy-backs, bicicletas and debt-equity swaps. See Michael Pettis, Using Mexi-
can Debt Prices as a Proxy for the Economy, COLUM. J. WORLD. Bus. 116, 118 (1991).
155. Brady's Bazaar, supra note 55, at 81; Philippines Buyback Completed, 808 INT'L
FIN. REv., Jan. 6, 1990, at 43. An investor who acquired Filipino debt upon the an-
nouncement of debt buy-backs as one limb of the Brady proposal in March 1989 would
have turned a handy profit when the debt acquired for 36 cents on the dollar was
repurchased by the debtor nation at 50 cents one year later.
156. Looking for Aggressive'Bids in Buyback, 800 INT'L FIN. REv., Nov. 4, 1989, at 35.
157. Costa Rica: Buyback Details, 807 INT'L FIN. REv., Dec. 23, 1989, at 29; Costa Rica's
Buyback at 16 Cents, 817 INT'L FIN. REv., Mar. 10, 1990, at 31; Costa Rican Financing Closes,
828 INT'L FIN. REv., May 26, 1990, at 37. Furthermore, Yugoslavia had a "qualified di-
nars payment plan" under which certain domestic companies were permitted to convert
debt acquired in the secondary market into local currency to pre-pay their own loans.
Secondary Market Report, 777 INT'L FIN. REv., May 27, 1989, at 24; LDC Finance - Yugosla-
via Bright, 779 INT'L FIN. REv., June 10, 1989, at 23-24. US$350 million of debt was
exchanged in the first half of 1989 through this debt buy-back program. Yugoslavia
Tries to Drive Debt Price Down, 781 INT'L FIN. REv., June 24, 1989, at 26.
158. LDC Finance - Buying Debt to Pay OffDebt, 815 INT'L FIN. REv., Feb. 24, 1990,
at 32; LDC Finance, 824 INT'L FIN. REV., April 28, 1990, at 37 (reporting that "there are
debt cancellations being approved, in which local currency obligations are cancelled in
exchange for [Brazilian government rescheduled loans], mostly for public sector com-
panies.").
159. Price Indications for Value Impaired Debt, 810 INT'L FIN. REv.,Jan. 20, 1990, at 32;
Price Indications for Value Impaired Debt, 815 INT'L FIN. REv., Feb. 24, 1990, at 35.
160. Brady's Bazaar, supra note 55, at 81.
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putedly purchased a further US$17 billion of its own debt infor-
mally in mid-1990 partly with funds saved from the interest pay-
ments it had been refusing to make.16'
These buy-backs were mainly by parastatals. Commercially
there is no difference between this and the debtor nation repur-
chasing its own debt directly in the market. The crucial legal
difference is that the debtor would require waivers from its credi-
tors to repurchase its debt whereas state-owned companies, as
separate legal entities, do not.
Defeasing debt for twenty to thirty percent of face value is
highly attractive. The Brazilian government reportedly consid-
ered not resuming regular debt-equity auctions because their
buy-backs (i) allowed them to recapture the entire discount on
the debt and not share it with an investor as in a debt-equity, and
(ii) avoided much of the inflationary impact of the debt-equity
swaps.' 6 2 The opportunity for these informal buy-backs is per-
haps the greatest service the secondary market rendered the
debtor nations.
A fascinating, secret informal buy-back was put together in
1989 between Mexico and JP Morgan. 6 The scheme was
named "Moby Dick," presumably because of its size. Morgan
lent Mexico US$500 million, which Morgan used on Mexico's
behalf to buy Mexican par bonds. At the time, par bonds were
161. Lee C. Buchheit, Moral Hazards and Other Delights, INT'L FIN. L. REV., April
1991, at 11. The unnamed borrower referred to by Buchheit can only be Argentina or
Brazil, and is probably the latter. In October 1990, the Brazilian state oil company,
Petrobras, reportedly bought back some US$600 million of Brazilian debt when it was
trading at around 22% of face value. Indicative Prices for Developing Country Credits, 847
INT'L FIN. REV., Oct. 6, 1990, at 29; Secondary Market Report, 848 INT'L FIN. REV., Oct. 13,
1990, at 33 (reporting amount at US$300 million initially, but later made public that it
was US$600 million). The head of Petrobras resigned over the matter as the govern-
ment had previously issued a decree banning such buybacks. New Petrobras Head Named,
850 INr'L FIN. REv., Oct. 27, 1990, at 28. On one estimate Brazil and its parastatals
retired between US$2 billion and US$3 billion by this means in the first four and a half
months of 1990 alone. Zelia Brings No Comfort for Banks on Interest, 828 INT'L FIN. REv.,
May 26, 1990, at 41. On another estimate Brazil retired between US$13 billion and
US$15 billion in the preceding few years through buy-backs. Brazil Ddebt Downgrade on
Hold, 831 INT'L FIN. REv., June 16, 1990, at 26.
162. Zelia Brings No Comfort for Banks on Interest, 828 INT'L FIN. REv., May 26, 1990,
at 41.
163. There is only one source of information for this scheme but it is highly relia-
ble. Interview with XX (name withheld on request) formerly a trader with JP Morgan
and other trading houses, New York City, April 19, 1993 (XX was an LDC debt trader in
Morgan's employ at this time).
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trading at less than fifty cents on the dollar,'64 so Morgan was
able to purchase over US$1 billion face value of bonds. Mexico
continued to pay the 6.25% coupon each year to Morgan as the
registered owner of the bonds. However, as Mexico enjoyed
beneficial title to the bonds it received a credit for these interest
payments, and as they were substantially greater than the interest
on its US$500 million loan 165 some of the interest Mexico paid
each year on its bonds was refunded to it. It is not known
whether Mexico ultimately defeased the debt by paying off its
loan to Morgan and taking full title to the bonds or whether it
later sold the bonds back into the secondary market at a healthy
profit.1 66 In either event, such a scheme amounted to substan-
tial debt relief for Mexico. Because Mexico's Brady bonds did
not prohibit buy-backs, the scheme was not in contravention of
any covenants, but the scheme was nevertheless kept secret. The
scheme worked so well Mexico extended it, with Morgan's assist-
ance, to cover US$2 billion face value of par bonds. Morgan al-
legedly completed similar arrangements with the Philippines,
Uruguay, and Venezuela. 167
Bankers and commentators like to discuss 'moral hazards'.
The phrase has a certain ring to it, an attractively illicit ring. In
sovereign debt terms, 'moral hazard' describes any situation that
rewards the sovereign debtor for financial misbehavior. 168 Infor-
mal debt buy-backs are a classic example of moral hazards be-
cause the secondary market price of the debt is acutely sensitive
to the actions of the debtor nation.169 Institute a moratorium on
interest payments and the price of one's debt falls through the
floor, as Brazil's did betweenJuly 1989 and early 1991 when Bra-
164. Throughout 1990, Mexican par bonds traded in the 42-46 cents on the dollar
range. See "LDC secondary market debt price" columns in various issues of INT'L FIN.
REV..
165. This was a floating rate loan, with interest at a premium over LIBOR.
166. Perhaps three years later when the bonds were trading at around 82 cents on
the dollar. Indicative Prices for Developing Country Credits as of 10/12/93, 1009 INT'L FIN.
REV., Dec. 11, 1993, at 48.
167. XX Interview, supra note 163.
168. Buchheit, supra note 161, at 10. In mid-1990, bankers were reportedly "grow-
ing increasingly frustrated at the fact that there is not much they can do to Brazil, which
has well over US$8bn in foreign reserves, and has made no attempt to start talks or to
even make a token payment on more than US$5bn of overdue interest." Brazil Debt
Downgrade On Hold, 831 INT'L FIN. REv., June 16, 1990, at 26.
169. Buchheit, supra note 161, at 11; Anayiotos & De Pinies, The Secondary Market
and the International Debt Problem, 18 WORLD DEVELOPMENT 1655, 1657 (1990).
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zilian debt could be acquired for as little as twenty-two cents on
the dollar.17 ° In such a situation two years of unpaid interest not
only deflates the price of one's debt, it also liberates the funds to
purchase it. 7 '
Formal debt buy-backs usually require the consent of the
creditors as such conduct is generally considered to be in breach
of the typical mandatory prepayments clause and sharing clause
in the loan agreement. 172 Consents are only required, however,
if the debtor repurchases its debt itself. In the typical informal
buy-back, the debtor either uses a state-owned company or incor-
porates a financial institution to acquire the debts or appoints a
third party to buy the debts and acquires beneficial ownership of
the debts through a participation.1 71 In neither case is the typi-
cal mandatory pre-payment or sharing clause infringed. Indeed,
in neither case will the banks even know the debtor has effec-
tively extinguished its own debts. The math, if not the morals, of
interest moratoria and debt buy-backs are highly attractive.1 74
Interestingly, Mexico is not prohibited by the terms of its
Brady bonds from repurchasing them on the open market.175
There are four possible explanations for this: (i) the banks and
170. For instance, Brazilian debt traded at 22 cents in March 1990. LDC Secondary
Market Prices, 819 INT'L, FIN. REV., Mar. 24, 1990, at 35; 24 cents in July 1990. LDC
Secondary Market Prices, 835 INT'L FIN. REV., July 14, 1990, at 29; 22 cents again in Octo-
ber. lDC Secondary Market Prices, 847 INT'L FIN. REV., Oct. 6, 1990, at 29; and 24 cents in
January 1991. LDC Secondary Market Prices, 861 INT'L FIN. REv., Jan. 19, 1991, at 23.
171. A further example of moral hazard arose in mid-1989 when Yugoslavia was
accused of attempting to sell US$50 million of its debt on the secondary market to drive
down the price. Yugoslavia Tries to Drive Debt Price Down, 781 INT'L FIN. REV., June 24,
1989, at 26. Yugoslavia's debt buy-back scheme was particularly active at the time and a
lower price would have resulted in less Yugoslavian foreign exchange reserves being
used in the buy-backs.
172. Buchheit, supra note 161, at 11.
173. Id.
174. For instance, consider the hypothetical case in which a debtor declares a two-
year moratorium on repayments of principal or interest. After twelve months or so, in
the case of both Argentina and Brazil, such a moratorium drove the secondary market
price of their debt below 20 cents on the dollar. In our hypothetical, if the price of the
nation's debts falls below 20% and the nation saves all the funds it would have paid out
in interest at, say, 9% p.a., after a year it can begin repurchasing its debt progressively
on the secondary market and over the two years will have saved enough money by not
making repayments to retire effectively all of its outstanding debt. A neat and highly
tempting alternative to the indefinite repayment of interest on the full face value of the
debt. (Of course, not all of a nation's debts will be available for repurchase on the
secondary market as many lenders will not part with their portfolios at that price, but
with respect to the debt which is available the point is made).
175. Junk' of the 1990s?, 823 INT'L FIN. REV., April 21, 1990, at 29.
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their advisors did not appreciate the moral hazard being demon-
strated at the time in the secondary market; (ii) the banks and
their advisers believed the Brady bonds would be immune to
non-payment of interest and price manipulation by the debtor;
(iii) the banks agreed with Dornbusch that there is no moral
hazard as the burden of repaying these loans is not carried by
those who benefited from them, but is carried rather by the
poor;"6 or (iv) the banks gave ground on this point in the nego-
tiations because Mexico was prepared to trade off other issues
for it. Only the fourth explanation is plausible.177 It is sup-
ported by the six weeks spent negotiating, exhaustively, this one
issue. 178
In addition to buy-backs, the major impetus for the market,
particularly as this period drew to a close, was privatizations,
which are discussed in the next section.
2. Privatizations
There was little foreign investment in equity in Latin
America in the 1970s. Development by way of foreign debt
rather than foreign equity ownership of local companies had ap-
pealed to Latin American governments in the 1970s as it ap-
peared to offer the countries control over their economic
destiny. However, paradoxically, equity investment would have
led to less loss of economic sovereignty than did the IMF struc-
tural adjustment programs of the rescheduling years. A major-
ity foreign equity stake in a local company means the loss of do-
176. Dornbusch, Our LDC Debts, NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES No 2138, at 53
(1987) .
177. Consider this statement in 1990, "A direct purchase of debt by a government
has a moral hazard problem embedded in it and would, in general, be refused by
banks": Anayiotos & De Pinies, supra note 169, at 1666. In the late 1980s few commen-
tators noted that the Bradyization of a nation's loans into bonds did not protect them
against non-payment and rescheduling. It was more popular and politically correct to
take the "party" line that the Brady schemes were resolving the debt crisis. There were,
however, voices to the contrary and most market participants were aware that a Brady
restructuring was no guarantee against credit risk. As Scott MacDonald said with re-
spect to the securitisation of bank loans under the Brady scheme: "is the foundation
being established for a new debt crisis, one that involves bonds instead of commercial
bank loans?" Scott MacDonald, A Word to the Wise, 27 LATINFINANCE 43, 44 (1991); see
Martin Schubert, The Risks and Rewards of Investment in the High Yield Latin Ameri-
can Debt Market, a speech delivered at the Latin American High Yield Conference,
New York City, May 30-31, 1990, at 22 [herinafter Schubert Speech I].
178. Junk' of the 1990s, 823 INT'L FIN. REV., April 21, 1990, at 28.
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mestic control of that company. The 1970s lending boom, on
the other hand, resulted in economic policy for most of Latin
America in the 1980s being dictated from Washington, DC. In
the early 1990s, Latin America decided to turn back the clock by
replacing debt with equity. Privatization programs were the
means to this end 179 and Latin American debt was the principal
currency. 80
Privatizations provided significant impetus for the market
especially in the latter part of this period.18 ' Most of the consid-
eration for the privatized assets was debt'8 2 so these privatiza-
tions were, in effect, massive one-off debt-equity swaps.
In Argentina, the first major privatization was of the na-
tional telecommunications authority, ENTel. The prospect of
this privatization, and the "huge amount of paper"'83 it would
require underpinned the secondary market in Argentine debt
for months. The southern division of ENTel was sold for
US$114 million cash and US$2.7 billion in debt to Citicorp and
Telefonica de Espana. 184 The northern division was sold to a
consortium185 for US$100 million cash and US$2.2 billion in
debt." 6 The next major Argentine privatization'1 7 was of Aero-
179. By Citibank's calculations, there were more than 150 privatizations completed
in Latin America in the three years up to April 1992, which raised revenues of some
US$50 billion in either cash or debt. See William Rhodes, The Sea Change in Latin
America, a speech delivered at the Bankers' Association for Foreign Trade, 70th Annual
Meeting, Naples, Florida, April 29, 1992 (on file with the Fordham International Law Jour-
nal).
180. Debt was the principal currency in the Argentine and Brazilian privatizations.
In Mexico, whose economy was generally considered to be more healthy and whose
debt was trading at about twice the price of Argentina's and Brazil's (because it was
being serviced) the buyers in privatizations were more often domestic companies and
the currency more commonly cash. For instance, Compania Minera Cananea was ac-
quired by Mexicana de Cobre for US$468 million in cash. Privatisation Double Take -
Morgan's Mexican Deal, 842 INT'L FIN. REV., Sept. 1, 1990, at 19.
181. See generally Privatisation in Latin America, a Supplement to LATiNFINANCE,
March 1992.
182. Sometimes debt represented the entire purchase price, as in the privatization
of Usiminas considered subsequently.
183. LDC Market Rallies Strongly on Euphoric' Sentiment, 829 INT'L FIN. REv., June 2,
1990, at 25.
184. Froman, Creditor Review - Citibank, 20 LATINFINANCE 65 (1990).
185. The consortium was headed byJP Morgan togeither with the Italian state tele-
phone company, and Cables and Radio of France.
186. W. A. Orme, Jr., The Deal of the Year: Selling Entel, 20 LATINFINANCE 9 (1990);
Entel Again, 22 LATINFINANCE 9 (1990).
187. In 1990 alone privatisations reduced Argentina's debts to commercial banks
from US$35.3 billion to US$31 billion.
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lineas Argentinas, the national carrier. The buyer of the largest
stake, thirty percent, was Iberia of Spain 18 8 for US$683 million in
cash and $2 billion in debt. 89
Mexico's privatization push began with an aggressive plan to
privatize its eighteen state-owned banks. 190 Mexico earned
US$3.1 billion from the sale of state-owned enterprises in 1990
and US$10.7 billion in 1991 as privatizations proceeded on a
massive scale.191
The first major privatization in Brazil was of the country's
largest steel maker, Usiminas, 19 2 on October 24, 1991.19 Few
foreign interests submitted bids.194 In the end, foreigners ac-
quired only six percent of the steel group. Usiminas was sold19
for US$1.17 billion in Brazilian government bonds, obligations,
and loans.'9 6 While the entire price for the steel group was paid
with debt, almost none of Brazil's restructured debt was used,
buyers preferring to use privatization certificates denominated
188. Iberia also acquired controlling stakes in Viasa, the largest of Venezuela's
three airlines, and in Ladeco, a Chilean airline. See Privatisation Update, 30 LA-
TINFINANCE 77 (1991).
189. Out of the Gate, 23 LATINFINANCE 12 (1990); Aerolineas Finally Gets Off the
Ground, 854 INT'L FIN. RIv., Nov. 24, 1990, at 25. There is a disparity in reports of how
much cash Iberia paid for its stake. The former source gives the figure in the text, the
latter source, gives a figure of US$260 million. The sources agree on the amount of the
debt. The US$2 billion was comprised of US$1.6 billion in loans and US$400 million of
unpaid interest. Latin American privatizations were full of paradox. Argentina's first
two major privatizations resulted in the telephone monopoly being "privatized" to,
among others, the state telecommunications companies of Spain and Italy and the na-
tional airline being "privatized" to the national airline of Spain.
190. Not all privatized corporations were sold to foreigners for debt. The first
three of Mexico's banks to be privatized, Multibanco Mercantil, BancPais and Banca
Cremi, as well as Mexico's largest bank, Banamex, were sold to Mexican interests for
cash. See Mercantil Sets the Pacefor Bank Privatisations, 882 INT'L FIN. REv., June 15, 1991,
at 29. This trend was encouraged by regulations which prevented any one foreign bank
from holding more than 10% of a Mexican bank and limited the non-Mexican share-
holding in any Mexican bank to 30%. See Recio, Setting a Standard, 29 LATINFINANCE, at
60-61 (1991).
191. The Privatisation Process in Mexico, 1 MExico - ON THE RECORD 3 (1992).
192. The full name is Usinas Siderugicas de Minas Gerais.
193. Griffith, Epic Sale, 33 LATINFINANCE 63 (1991).
194. Potential foreign shareholders were put off by dramatic falls in the price of
Brazilian debt in the weeks preceding the auction and by violent protests outside the
Rio de Janeiro stock exchange and other domestic opposition to the sale of the state
steel-maker to foreign interests. Id.
195. That is, the 75% of Usiminas that was put up for sale, was sold.
196. For a breakdown of the "currencies" used in the acquisition, see Griffith,
supra note 193, at 64. The one currency not used in the acquisition was cash.
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in local currency.197 The Brazilian privatization program was im-
portant in the reduction of public debt, which was a precondi-
tion to the IMF approval needed for a Brady style restructur-
ing.'9 8 If selling national assets for national debt strikes you as
strange, consider the sale of Babeto, a Brazilian footballer. An
Italian businessman paid Babeto's Brazilian club US$4.2 million
in cash and US$1.5 million in Brazilian debt for him with the
intention of on-selling him to an Italian club.'9 9
3. Debt-Equity Swaps
With virtually the only active debt-equity program in 1989
being Chile's, debt-equity swaps certainly did not drive the mar-
ket in 1989 as they did in 1988.200 Chile's program provided
some impetus to market activity but, in the words of a report in
September 1989, "a dearth of [the] debt-equity conversion
programmes that helped fuel last year's record volume has had a
dramatic effect on the market".211 In 1990 demand was created
for Mexican debt by two debt auctions which Mexico had agreed
to hold as part of its Brady restructuring. In July banks bid for
the right to convert US$851 million into equity in Mexican com-
panies. 20 2 Bankers were unhappy with the first auction because
Mexico managed to recapture fifty-two percent of the discount
for par bonds. 20 3 At the time, par bonds were selling for around
197. The privatization certificates had been issued early in the Collor administra-
tion in return for confiscated deposits. See Usiminas Sale: The Winners and the Losers, 901
INT'L FIN. REV., Oct. 26, 1991, at 20.
198. Brazil's Privatisation Delays Widen Credibility Gap, 897 INT'L FIN. REV., Sept. 28,
1991, at 20.
199. On the Ball, 812 INT'L FIN. REV., Feb. 3, 1990, at 25.
200. Secondary Market Gets Bullish, 768 INT'L FIN. REV., Mar. 25, 1989, at 21.
201. Secondary Market Report, 791 INT'L FIN. REV., Sept. 2, 1989, at 22. Having said
this, one study puts dollar inflows from debt-equity conversions into Latin America at
US$3 billion in 1987, US$5 billion in 1988, and US$3.7 billion in 1989. Back to the
Future, 16 LATINFINANCE 24, 26 (1990). Argentina, Brazil, Ecuador, and Mexico sus-
pended their programs in late 1988 or 1989 while the Philippines, Nigeria, and Yugosla-
via established new, relatively small, debt-equity programs. See Martin Schubert, The
Secondary Market in LDC Debt - 1990 and Beyond, a speech delivered at the Third Annual
Latin America Financial Forecast Conference, Miami, Sept 29-30, 1989 (on file with the
Fordham International Law Journal) [hereinafter Schubert Speech II]. Venezuela also
established a small program in November with an auction of US$150 million of debt for
conversion into equity. See Secondary Market Report, 800 INT'L FIN. REV., Nov. 4, 1989, at
38.
202. Mexico's First Debt Auction, 20 LATINFINANCE 14 (1990).
203. The discount rate was 26.23% for discount bonds and 52.05% for par bonds.
See Mexico's First Debt Auction, 20 LATINFINANCE 14 (1990).
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43.5 cents on the dollar so the debt-equity process provided a
premium of only ten percent, in return for which investors had
to settle for restrictions on their investment. All of the successful
bids were by Mexican entities, some with foreign partners, is no
wholly foreign bids were prepared to accept such a high dis-
count.2 04 The second and final auction was in October. US$2.5
billion of debt was converted into equity at effectively the same
discount as the earlier auction. 20 5 As earlier, debt-for-nature ex-
changes continued to contribute insignificantly to market de-
mand for debt 2°6 and a few debt-for-development swaps were
also implemented. 20 7
4. Swaps Between Debtors
During this period, the secondary market made possible a
new style of transaction-the mutual exchange of each other's
debt between two debtor nations. In 1989, Brazil agreed that
Paraguay could discharge its indebtedness to it through the
204. Mexico Gets 52% on Swap, 836 INT'L FIN. REV., July 21, 1990, at 25.
205. The discount rates were 26.15% and 52% for discount and par bonds respec-
tively. Mexico's Swap Program is Over, 22 LATINFINANCE 14 (1990); see Mexico Auctions
$2.5billion of Debt, 848 INT'L FIN. REV., Oct. 13, 1990, at 3. Interestingly, 65% of the
successfully tendered debt in the first auction was par bonds, whereas in the second
auction par bonds accounted for only 21% of the successfully tendered debt, the bal-
ance being discount bonds. Of course, all the tendered debt had to be Brady bonds as
there were no longer any outstanding eligible loans.
206. W. A. Orme, Jr., The Greening of Latin Debt, 16 LATINFINANCE 52 (1990). Debt-
for-nature swaps were typically implemented in countries the debt of which traded at
very large discounts for this made such swaps more worthwhile. The typical price paid
for debt used in these swaps from 1987 to early 1990 was 12 to 16 cents on the dollar.
The largest swap in this period was funded by Sweden and saw the retirement of
US$24.5 million of Costa Rican debt. Mexico had its first debt-for-nature swap in early
1991 - Conservation International Foundation paid US$1.8 million to acquire US$4
million in debt. This was retired in return for Mexico's promise to spend US$2.6 mil-
lion on protecting the Lacandon Rain Forest in Chiapas. See Mexico's Nature Swap, 25
LATINFINANCE 8 (1991). In Ecuador environmentalists acquired US$9 million of debt
for about 12 cents on the dollar and converted it into local currency to use protecting
Ecuador's rain forests. Madagascar also arranged the first African debt-for-nature swap.
See Debt-For-Nature Swaps in Ecuador and Africa, 787 INT'L FIN. REV., Aug. 5, 1989, at 24; see
also Debt-For-Nature Swaps, 840 INT'L FIN. REV., Aug. 18, 1990, at 26; BankAmerica Donating
$6m for LDC Debt for Nature Projects, 882 INT'L FIN. REv., June 15, 1991, at 34.
207. In one deal, US$30.3 million of Ecuadorian debt was acquired by a Roman
Catholic priest with funds raised in Scotland and swapped into local currency. Of the
proceeds, the equivalent of US$28 million was used for a nutrition program in Quito
and US$2.3 million to provide running water to 60,000 people in the shanty town where
the priest lived and worked. Ecuador: We're Going to Heaven on This Deal, 849 INT'L FIN.
REV., Oct. 20, 1990, at 29.
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tender of an equal face value of Brazilian debt acquired on the
secondary market. 28  In May 1990, Brazil agreed to accept its
own indebtedness in exchange for US$300 million owed to it by
Bolivia. Bolivia acquired the Brazilian paper on the secondary
market at its then price of 25.5 to 27.5 cents on the dollar. This
enabled Bolivia to discharge US$300 million of indebtedness for
about US$80 million.2 °9 Mexico and Venezuela also used similar
arrangements to facilitate payment of oil debts by poorer Cen-
tral American states. 210
5. Portfolio Adjustment
Portfolio adjustment by way of swaps was only a minor stim-
ulus to market activity.211 As the period progressed, many banks
for the first time since 1982 had full provisions against their LDC
loans.2 12 As a result, sales for cash were the usual form of market
transaction. 213
6. The Revision of Japan's Tax Rules
Japan provided funds to Mexico to facilitate its acquisition
of the collateral for its Brady bonds. 214 Its other principal contri-
bution to the Brady plan was to begin the relaxation of its re-
markably tight tax rules for LDC debt. In early 1990, the Japa-
nese Ministry of Finance increased the maximum loan-loss provi-
sions which Japanese banks could take on their US$30 billion of
LDC debt from fifteen percent to twenty-five percent, thereby
laying the groundwork for the participation, to albeit a limited
extent, of the Japanese banks in selling their LDC credits.215
208. Schubert Speech II, supra note 201, at 19.
209. Bolivia and Brazil Reach Accord on Plan to Cut $300 Million of Each Other's Debt,
supra note 89.
210. Schubert Speech II, supra note 201, at 19.
211. Banks did from time to time swap equal face amounts of one nation's debt for
that of another in 1989 and 1990 with a cash fee to compensate for different values.
Hence a bank might have given Brazilian debt plus 6 percent cash for Venezuelan debt.
See Martin Schubert, The Secondary Market for LDC Debt - The Expected Impact of a Brady
Type Initiative, an address delivered at the Latin American Financial Strategies Confer-
ence, New York City, June 20-21, 1989, at 14 [hereinafter Schubert Speech III].
212. In the sense that their loan loss reserves equalled the difference between the
book value and secondary market price of their LDC debt portfolios.
213. Corrigan, supra note 129, at 31.
214. See Buckley, supra note 1.
215. Brady's Bazaar, supra note 55, at 81. This 25% limit on reserves was lifted in
early 1991.
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7. The Supply of Debt
Throughout this period there was an abundant supply of
debt as a result of the selling programs of most U.S. regional
banks and some major U.S. and U.K. banks. 216 For instance,
Chase-Manhattan reduced its portfolio in 1990 by US$2.5 bil-
lion, principally through sales.217
C. Market Characteristics
The principal characteristics of the market in the previous
period were the hand-crafted nature of the transactions, the ab-
sence of a formal market structure and confidentiality. The
principal characteristics in this period were as follows:
a. The change to the new, and current, name for the
market;
b. The greater efficiency of the market;
c. The advent of quotation screens;
d. The introduction of Brady bonds;
e. The longest sustained rally in the market's history; and
f. Price volatility.
The effect in this period of the three characteristics that
were previously most significant will be considered first and fol-
lowed by a consideration of the above six factors.
1. Nature of Transactions
During this period, transactions became simpler in two
ways. First, the usual form of loan transaction was a cash sale
which is far easier to price, negotiate, and document than a swap
of assets. Second, as Brady bonds progressively replaced bank
loans, trading and transfer procedures were further simpli-
fied. 18 While the market would have to await the implementa-
tion of Brady schemes for Brazil and Argentina before it began
216. For instance, from the end of 1988 to late 1991 Natwest reduced its LDC debt
exposure from US$4.4 billion to around US$600 million. See Westlake, Bulls Buoyed by
Brady Bonanza, BANKER, Oct. 1991, at 50, 54.
217. LDC Reserve Hike Mooted forJapanese Banks, 862 Ir'L FIN. REv.,Jan. 26, 1991, at
19. Citibank reduced its portfolio by about US$1 billion per annum but mostly through
conversions into equity, not secondary market sales. US Banks Continue to Reduce LDC
Portfolios, 861 INT'L FIN. REv., Jan. 19, 1991, at 23.
218. The advent of Brady bonds also reduced the number of different credits is-
sued by a debtor and thus further simplified trading.
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to resemble other security markets in its day-to-day operation,
the trend in that direction was now clear.
2. The Formal Market Structure
One of the first steps of the new LDC Debt Traders Associa-
tion was to promulgate a series of market practices.2 19 As the
Association had no supervisory power, these were merely recom-
mended practices. Nonetheless, they were a welcome move to-
wards more orderly market conduct. The practices were
promulgated in June 1991 and dealt with matters such as prepa-
ration and execution of confirmations, retroactive interest rate
adjustments, the passing on of interest payments on transferred
credits, and a standard settlement period of three weeks for stan-
dard loan assets. 2 20
3. Confidentiality
Confidentiality became a dead letter during this period.
The old niceties of not wishing to be seen to be selling a cus-
tomer's loans were irrelevant in an environment in which more
and more banks were finding new money requests to be "per-
fectly resistible invitations." 22' Furthermore, the secondary mar-
ket prices of loans and bonds were now public and were pub-
lished in each edition of International Financing Review, LDC Debt
Report and LatinFinance, as well as in newspaper and journal arti-
cles.
4. A New Name for the Market
One of the more obvious changes to the market in this pe-
riod was its name. The units within banks which traded LDC
debt had traditionally had names like the "Loan Transactions
Unit," "Asset Swap Group," or "LDC Debt Trading Group." In
1990, along with Brady bonds, came the birth of a new name,
"Emerging Markets:" a name more positive, more suggestive of
growth and development, more pro-active222 than any used
219. Memorandum from Nicolas S. Rohatyn, Chairman, to the Members of the
LDC Debt Traders Association, June 27, 1991 (copy on file with the Fordham Interna-
tional Law Journal). Debt Traders Association Adopts Market Practices, 4 LDC DEBT REPORT,
July 15 1991, at 3 (discussing practices).
220. Rohatyn, supra note 219.
221. Buchheit, supra note 161, at 14.
222. That quality close to the heart of all investment bankers.
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before, and a name which stuck. 2 2 1 In May 1992, the Interna-
tional Financing Review changed the title of its regular weekly fea-
ture from "LDC finance" to "Emerging markets" 224 and in June
1992 the LDC Debt Traders Association became the Emerging
Markets Trading Association.225
5. Greater Market Efficiency
One measure of a market's efficiency is the narrowness of
the spread between bid and offer prices. By late 1991, the
spreads for the most heavily traded debts, such as those of Mex-
ico and Venezuela, were as narrow as 1/4th to 3/8ths of a
point.2 26 Only five years earlier, spreads of two to three percent
had been common.227
6. Advent of Quotation Screens
In 1991, three inter-bank brokerage firms began to post buy
and sell prices for LDC debt on Reuters' screens.228 Tullett &
Tokyo had offices in both New York and London, Tradition was
based in New York, and InterCapital Brokers in London. The
prices on their screens were indicative only-the actual transac-
tions were still negotiated over the telephone and there was no
sanction for resiling from posted prices except one's reputation
in the market. 229 This softness of posted prices allowed traders
to try to deliberately push prices one way or the other.230 None-
theless the advent of screens was an important step in the matu-
ration of the market.
223. See David Gillen, Prices Adrift in Featureless Trading; Morgan Stanley Forms LDC
Debt Unit, THE BOND BUYER, Sept. 21, 1990, at 3 ("At the top end of this group are
countries that are getting everything right - we don't even call it LDC, we call it
'emerging markets"' (statement of Jay Newman of Morgan Stanley)).
224. See, e.g., 930 INT'L FIN. Rev., May 23, 1992, at 26.
225. Traders Group Prepares Rules of Conduct, 934 Ir'L FIN. REv., June 20, 1992, at
30. This association is universally known as EMTA.
226. More Bad News for Junk: LDC Market Grows Efficient, 1 JUNK BOND REPORTER,
Feb. 25, 1991, at 4.
227. Schubert Speech I, supra note 177, at 23.
228. Talking Screens, 30 LATINFINANCE 8 (1991).
229. Id.
230. Michael Scharfenberger of Euro Brokers Capital Markets cited this as the ma-
jor reason that this fourth inter-bank broker declined to introduce screens. Id.
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7. Sustained Rally in Prices
The Brady Plan had a fundamental effect on prices of LDC
debt in the secondary market. Secondary market prices had con-
sistently moved in only one direction, downwards, from the mar-
ket's inception until March 1989. The announcement of the
Brady proposal in March 1989 appears to have halted that
trend.231 The prices of some nation's debts declined after that
date. But overall, the Brady Plan appears to have effected a
structural change within the market since which the general
price trend has been either flat or positive.232
The trend reversal is shown by the Lehman Brothers price
index of secondary market LDC debt, which between mid-Janu-
ary and early August 1991 rose by over thirty percent.233 The
Brady bond rally is likewise reflected in the Salomon Brothers'
Brady Bond Index which recorded a sixty-six percent return
from April 1990 to September 1991.234 The sustained rally in
prices persisted into October 1991. In the words of The Banker in
October 1991, "even the optimists could not have expected this
year's bull run in LDC debt. 235
Prices were further buoyed from June onwards by the pros-
pect that the Brady scheme for the biggest debtor, Brazil, would
be passed 236 and by the glowing reports some of the major Latin
American countries were receiving from the economic ana-
lysts. 237 However, all bull runs turn bearish. As we shall see, the
231. In June 1990, it was reported that "overall, there is a sense that the secondary
market's long decline is at an end." LDC Market Rallies Strongly on 'Euphoric' Sentiment,
829 INT'L FIN. REv., June 2, 1990, at 25. For the first time since 1983, most banks'
reserves equalled the discount on the debt in the secondary market and speculative
investors were entering the market in significant numbers and a 'senior participant'
noted that "we now have a realistic market and that the bottom may have been reached
for the time being." Id.
232. Lee & Sung, supra note 72, at 17-18.
233. Westlake, supra note 216, at 50. In this period, Argentine debt increased in
value by 56%, Brazilian debt by 62%, and Mexican debt by 32%.
234. Peter Truell, Latin American Debt Holders Scored Big Gains, Index Shows, WALL
ST. J., Oct. 2, 1991; KLAFFKV, ET AL., Introducing the Salomon Brothers Brady Bond
Index - A Performance Benchmark for Developing Country Bonds (1991) (Salomon
Brothers) (copy on file with the Fordham International Law Journal).
235. Westlake, supra note 216.
236. Previous Brady schemes had resulted in large increases in the price of the
debt. See Brazil Rises On Optimism That Term Sheet Will Pass, 4 LDC DEBT REPORT, June
17, 1991, at 2.
237. See, e.g, Robert S. Gay, SPECIAL ECONOMIC STUDY - MEXICO: ON THE MENn,
(Morgan Stanley 1991).
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extraordinary bull run of 1991 was to end in a mauling for inves-
tors.
8. Price Volatility
One of the standout characteristics of this period of the
market's development was extreme price volatility.238 In 1989,
the market was periodically illiquid and volatile. In March 1990,
Brazilian debt fell by over fifteen percent on one day, from
thirty-three to twenty-eight cents on the dollar. 23 9 The fall was
attributed to a story in Gazeta Mercantil that the new head of the
central bank had some reservations about debt-equity swaps and
debt buy-backs. 24" Brazil was not paying interest at the time, so
these deals were the primary source of demand for the debt.
Within two weeks Brazilian debt had fallen a further thirty per-
cent to as low as 19.75 cents on the dollar,2 41 and the worst was
still to come. In October 1991, Brazilian debt went into a
breathtaking freefall.
This volatility was a product of a number of factors. In the
preceding years the secondary market had permitted many of
the U.S. regional, Canadian, and continental European banks to
divest their LDC debt holdings. Accordingly, the remaining
debt was more concentrated in the hands of the U.S. money
center banks242 and two of the large U.K. banks.243 As a result,
the market was thinner and volatile.244
238. For instance, in two days in mid-June, 1989 the price of Argentine debt rose
from 11.5% to over 15.5% - an increase of over 35% in 48 hours. See Schubert Speech
III, supra note 211, at 12.
239. Brazil Prices Crash 5 Points Ahead of Inauguration, 817 INT'L FIN. REV., Mar. 10,
1990, at 35.
240. Id.
241. Secondary Market Report, 819 INT'L FIN. REV., Mar. 24, 1990, at 37.
242. UNITED NATIONS ECONOMIC COMMISSION FOR LATIN AMERICA AND THE CAR-
RIBEAN & UNITED NATIONS CENTRE ON TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS, TRANSNATIONAL
BANK BEHAVIOUR AND THE INTERNATIONAL DEBT CRISIS 17, (]989) [hereinafter ECLAC/
CTC].
243. Lloyds and Midland Banks. Barclays Bank had pursued a strategy in 1989 of
selling off much of its LDC portfolio in the secondary market and Natwest, from the
end of 1988 to late 1991, had reduced its LDC debt exposure by some 86%. See West-
lake, supra note 216.
244. Schubert Speech III, supra note 211, at 11. For instance, the nine largest U.S.
banks held 63% of U.S. exposure to troubled LDCs at year-end 1982 and 70% by mid-
1988. See Statement of Robert L Clarke, Comptroller of the Currency, before the
House Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, Washington DC, January 5,
1989, 8 OCCQJ 63 at 64. As one example of the flight from LDC lending of the less-
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As Martin Schubert said,
prices oftentimes move on a small amount of tangible deal
demand and lots of anticipation of real purchase demand...
or, inversely, on anticipation of no demand stemming from
political shut-downs of the debt/equity window .... A tiny
trend may produce an avalanche one way or the other, which
makes for volatile conditions. Economics and intrinsic value
play less of a role than politics and expectations of demand,
or rumours that a bank is preparing to move an asset or a
government authority change [a] regulation. 24 5
That all securities implicitly include option positions is a
major recent development in finance theory which offers an ex-
planation for this volatility. The "delta" of an option measures
the sensitivity of the value of the option to changes in the price
of the underlying asset.246 Applying this concept to debt, re-
searchers have concluded that the delta of the debt of a credit-
impaired corporation can have a value approaching or even ex-
ceeding the delta of the equity of that corporation.247 The value
of equity is usually thought to be highly sensitive to the earnings
of the issuer. In this situation, when the debt of a credit-im-
paired issuer is as sensitive as equity to the issuer's earnings, it
makes sense to say that the debt has "equity-like" characteristics.
9. Market Volume and Debt Traded
As the market became ever larger, so did the disparity be-
tween estimates of its volume. Estimates of volume for 1989 were
consistently between US$60 billion and US$75 billion. 241 Most
exposed banks consider the case of Royal Bank of Scotland. Between October 1989
and March 1990, it sold most of its LDC debt reducing its portfolio from US$404 mil-
lion to US$71 million. See Royal Bank of Scotland Sharply Reduces LDCDebt, REUTERS, May
2, 1990.
245. Schubert Speech III, supra note 211, at 13.
246. Pettis & Gross, What Does It Mean To Say That Debt Can Have Equity-like Returns?,
CAPITAL MARKET STRATEGIES, June 1995, at 6.
247. Id.
248. See Brady's Bazaar, supra note 55, at 81; Back to the Future, 16 LATINFINANCE 24
(1990) (estimating US$60-70 billion given for 1989). Lee & Sung cite 1989 volume at
US$108.1 billion, but they have calculated that figure by adding together the individual
reported trading volume figures for the top 16 traders. While this ignores the contribu-
tion of the smaller traders, it nonetheless almost certainly overstates the market's vol-
ume as most trades would be counted twice in two traders' figures and it makes no
allowance for the incentives for individual trading houses to inflate their figures. See
Lee & Sung, supra note 72, at 29. Martin Schubert initially estimated trading volume
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commentators put the total volume of the market for 1990 at
around US$100 billion,249 although some put it as low as US$75
billion. 250  By way of comparison, the turnover through
Euroclear and CEDEL of the secondary market in eurobonds in
1990 was some US$6 billion.25 '
The market continued to expand dramatically in 1991 and
estimates of total trading volume varied widely, ranging from
US$150 billion252 to a wildly optimistic US$500 billion. 25 '3 The
consensus seems to be that volume for the year was between
US$200 billion and US$250 billion.254 The major reason for the
increase in market activity was the securilization of Mexico's
debt into easily traded bonds and the price support afforded
LDC loans by negotiations for Brady-style restructurings for
other debtors.255 In February 1991, the transfers of almost
US$13 billion of Mexican and Venezuelan Brady bonds256 were
processed through Euroclear.257 The market in Brady bonds was
proving itself much broader and deeper than virtually anyone
had anticipated.258
for 1989 at US$60 billion, but then, one week later, revised his estimate to US$75 bil-
lion. See Martin Schubert, a speech delivered at the Hospitality Industry Investment
Conference, New York City, June 3-5, 1990, at 1 (copy on file with the Fordham Interna-
tional Law Journal) (hereinafter Schubert Speech IV).
249. Brian O'Reilly, Cooling Down the World Debt Bomb, Fortune, May 20, 1991, at
124; Voorhees, supra note 151, at 26. Lee & Sung's estimate of 1990 trading volume is
US$137.5 billion, but this is subject to the caveats identified above.
250. NMB POSTBANK - LEADING THE FIELD, INT'L FIN. REV. Review of the Year -
1990, at 78 (spec. supp).
251. SCOTT &WELLONS, INTERNATIONAL FINANCE - TRANSACTIONS, POLICY AND REGU-
LATION 653 (1995).
252. Voorhees, supra note 151, at 26.
253. See Clark, supra note 32 (estimating US$300 billion); Evans, Brazilian Debt
Takes a Pounding; Price Hits 20 Cents as Hope Fades for MexicoStyle Pact, AM. BANKER, Nov.
5, 1991, at 10 (estimating US$500 billion).
254. Fast Growing Debt Market Tries Some Self Regulation, 4 LDC DEBT REPORT, Nov.
11, 1991, at 1 (estimating $200 billion); Tracy Corrigan, Debt - Bigrise in Turnover, FIN.
TIMEs, April 6, 1992.
255. Brady's Bazaar, supra note 55, at 81.
256. A Trading High, LATINFINANCE 20 (1991).
257. Euroclear is a Brussels based clearer, owned by the JP Morgan group, which,
along with CEDEL, serves as the clearing house for most Euro issues of debt and equity.
258. A Trading High, supra note 256. Some traders would, I am sure, prefer not to
be reminded of their predictions upon the inception of Brady bonds. For a small sam-
ple, consider "the market will be almost totally illiquid" (Stephen Dizard, Salomon
Brothers), "I doubt if more than 10% of the new bonds will be traded over the next
three years" (John Purcell, Salomon Brothers), "When they do trade they'll probably
trade in the capital markets divisions of banks" (Martin Schubert). That the expecta-
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In the earlier part of this period most loan trades were of
amounts between US$5 million and US$20 million. 259 As Brady
bonds began to trade heavily in 1990, the average size of each
transaction fell significantly at the same time as total volume in-
creased dramatically.
260
In 1990, the debt of a new obligor came on to the market in
small amounts. Borrowers from the Soviet Union were falling
behind in payments-past due Soviet loans totalled around
US$2 billion in mid-1990. 26 1 As Soviet payments arrears ap-
proached 90 to 120 days, some banks, rather than wait and hope,
sold the loans and trade credits into the secondary market at
discounts between five and fifteen percent. 262 Buyers included
Soviet state banks and investors interested in converting the
loans into local currency.263 By September 1991, Soviet loans
with three to four year maturities were trading at discounts
around forty-five cents on the dollar.264 It is highly unlikely
many of these transactions would have occurred without a devel-
oped secondary market. During this period a broad range of
credits began to be traded more regularly including loans to Mo-
rocco, Nigeria, Poland, and Yugoslavia. 265 By the end of this pe-
riod the debt of some twenty-six nations was traded regularly in
this market.
2 6 6
tions of such experienced, senior traders could have been so totally inaccurate empha-
sizes the whole new era that Brady bonds brought to the market. Peter Geraghty, of
NMB, was prescient: "the new bonds, and a host of derivative instruments spun off the
bonds... will trade actively. They should add depth to the market and attract a whole
new class of investor." Ioannou, Banking on a Better Future, EUROMONEY, Sept. 1989, at
251.
259. Peter Truell, New Clues Surface to Security Pacific's Closing of Debt Unit - Credit-
Trading Operation Was Shut Down in 1989, Puzzling Many Traders, WALL ST. J., June 19,
1990, at A22.
260. Kelash, LDC Debt Traders Viefor Top 1990 Ranking, 4 LDC DEBT REPORT, Feb. 4,
1991, at 1.
261. Siegel, Soviet Trade Finance Woes Spark Debt Trading By Banks, XIV BANK LET-
TER, July 30, 1990, at 1.
262. Id.; see MORGAN, SECONDARY MARKET FOR SOVEREIGN DEBT 12 (1991) (on file
with the Fordham International Law Journal).
263. Siegel, supra note 261.
264. LDC Sovietology, 31 LATINFINANCE 12 (1991).
265. Morgan, supra note 262. Bulgarian debt was also traded, to a significantly
lesser extent. See Shortened Week Keeps Trading Activity Light, 4 LDC DEBT REPORT, April
1, 1991, at 2.
266. The 26 nations include Algeria, Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia,
Costa Rica, Ecuador, Honduras, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Mexico, Morocco, Nicaragua, Ni-
geria, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Poland, South Africa, Senegal, Sudan, Uruguay, Ven-
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10. Brady Bonds in the Secondary Market
Debt traders were initially disappointed with the Brady
bonds because they had been crafted without reference to those
who would have to make markets in them. 67 Investors like sim-
ple investments for which yield calculations can be made accu-
rately and easily. "Brady bonds" met neither of these criteria 26
and tended to trade at an under-value due to pricing difficul-
ties.26 9 The market convention in the early years at least was to
value the interest guarantee as if it were only in place for the first
eighteen months of the bond's life;270 thereby understating the
true value of the bond by ignoring the rolling nature of the guar-
antee.2 7 1
Brady bonds benefited from, and traded upon, the per-
ceived "seniority" of bonds over bank loans. The broad range of
bond holders may make a debtor less likely to default as one or
two bond holders are more likely to sue than a homogeneous
group of banks272 subject to pressure from each other and their
respective central banks. Furthermore, a successful bondholder
is entitled to retain the proceeds of its litigation whereas the
sharing clause in loan agreements means a successful bank plain-
tiff has to share the proceeds of litigation ratably with the other
ezuela, Yugoslavia, and Zaire. See LDC Secondary Market Debt Prices 19/9/91, 896 INT'L
FIN. REV., Sept. 21, 1991, at 30.
267. Ioannou, supra note 258, at 252.
268. Id.; Mexico terms are out, 794 INT'L FIN. REV., Sept. 23, 1989, at 24 ("bonds
should be simple and clear and these are neither. They will suffer from illiquidity and
difficult pricing."). Many traders believed the deal had been over-designed.
269. Because it is impossible to predict when a debtor may default, it is impossible
to determine the precise value of the rolling interest guarantee. See Ioannou, supra
note 258, at 252.
270. Orlanski, Valuing Credit Enhancements, 27 LATINFINANCE 37-38 (1991). A guar-
antee for the first eighteen months would have cost the debtor only half as much as a
rolling guarantee. The extra cost would appear, at least in the early years of the trading
of these bonds, to have been totally wasted. See Ioannou, supra note 258, at 252.
271. The guarantee was a rolling guarantee in that it was available until called
upon, that is, the bondholders had the benefit of the guaranteed payment of 18 months
of interest if, at any time during the life of the bond, the debtor should default on
interest payments and the guarantee had not previously been called upon. It is thought
that the need for the guarantee was driven by accounting considerations. Once interest
repayments were over ninety days in arrears banks were required to put the loan on a
non-accrual basis and make provisions for it. The rolling interest guarantee effectively
converted this ninety day grace period (from the bank's perspective) into 21 months
and removed the bargaining power the debtor's gained from not having paid interest
for, say, 60 or 70 days. Pettis' Interview II, supra note 47.
272. Schubert Speech I, supra note 201, at 9.
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banks in the syndicate. The major disincentive to solo litigation
by banks is absent.273 These factors, however, are hardly a guar-
antee. In the 1980s, otherwise recalcitrant debtors like Argen-
tina and Brazil had an excellent record servicing their bonds.2 74
From this record arose the supposed "seniority" of bonds over
loans. The record, however, was a mere accident of history. Ar-
gentina, Brazil, and other debtors stayed current on their bond
debt in the 1980s because there was so little of it-it simply was
not worth going into arrears on interest payments. 2 75 A less my-
opic view of history would have revealed a consistent default on
bonds by Latin American borrowers between the 1820s and the
1940s when bonds were the principal source of foreign fi-
nance.
2 7 6
Nonetheless, at the end of this period, while Brady bonds
273. MacMillan, supra note 7, at 346-49.
274. "Developing countries have an excellent record for servicing [sovereign
bonds], in stark contrast to their dire efforts to pay off bank debt." The Acceptable Face of
Junk, EcoNoMisT, Feb. 17, 1990, at 94.
275. Lee C. Buchheit, Deja VuAll Over Again, INT'L FIN. L. REv.,Jan. 1992, at 7. For
the four largest Latin debtors, Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, and Venezuela, the costs of
servicing their bonds in 1989 was only about 5.5% of the their total debt-service burden.
In 1989, Argentina owed private bondholders US$13.8 billion, Brazil US$2.2 billion,
Mexico US$3.9 billion, and Venezuela US$2.2 billion. MacDonald, A Word to the Wise,
27 LATINFINANCE 43 (1991). As Estabanez wrote, "bond debt has de facto seniority over
bank debt ... due in part to the fact that, currently, bonds compose a relatively small
portion of nations' total outstanding debt." Estabanez, The View from Moody's, 22 LA-
TINFINANCE 47 (1990).
276. In the words of Martin Schubert: "From the private investor perspective, the
new sovereign bond instruments are senior to other bank held indebtedness since bor-
rowers are supposed to hold their bonds in greater esteem and are under more pres-
sure to service bond issues than commercial bank debt . . .this has proven to be a
historical fallacy." Martin Schubert, The Latin American High Yield Debt Market - A Vehi-
cle for the Long Term Investor, the Short Term Speculator, or the Buyer of Cheap Assets - A
Provocative Analysis, a speech delivered at the Fourth Annual Latin America Financial
Forecast Conference, Miami, Sept 28-29, 1990, at 17 [hereinafter Schubert Speech V].
Latin American nations (except Brazil) issued £19 million of bonds in London in the
1820s. By 1828 all were in default. See MARICHAL, A CENTURY OF DEBT CRISES IN LATIN
AMERICA 43 (1989). The next lending boom was in the 1860s which culminated in the
first three years of the 1870s with close to 75 million pounds of bonds issued. The
bubble burst in 1873 as the European stock markets crashed and worldwide trade de-
clined precipitously. DELAMAIDE, DEBT SHOCK 94-99 (1984). The next major payment
interruption on Latin America's foreign obligations was in the 1930s in the aftermath of
the Great Depression. By the mid-1930s, almost 70% of national Latin American gov-
ernment dollar denominated bonds and almost 90% of municipal, provincial and cor-
porate bonds were in default. See Skiles, Latin American International Loan Defaults in the
1930s: Lessons for the 1980s?, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Research Paper No
8812, April 1988, at 1, 15 & 17; and Marichal, supra at 212-13.
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represented only twenty percent of total LDC debt, they ac-
counted for a majority of market trading.277 The most actively
traded debt in late 1990 and 1991 was the Brady bonds of Mex-
ico and Venezuela.278
D. Participants
1. Traders
At the beginning of this period, in early 1989, there were
perhaps a total of sixty trading units engaged in this market.279
The three most active traders in the market at this time were
Citicorp, NMB, and Morgan Guaranty, in that order.280 Cit-
icorp's trading volumes were aided by its own active program of
reducing its exposure to the region, principally by conversions
into equity.
By year-end 1989, the ranking had changed somewhat. A
survey placed Morgan first with a volume of US$14 billion, NMB
next with US$13.6 billion, and Libra Bank third with US$11.5
billion.28 1 Libra Bank was a consortium bank established by ten
other banks28 2 and based in London where it was the most active
trader.283
In 1990, Morgan continued to lead in the volume stakes by
trading US$16 billion, face value, of debt. Manufacturers Hano-
ver was second with US$14.5 billion and Chase Manhattan third
with US$14.3 billion.2 4 The next three most active traders were
Bankers Trust with US$12.5 billion, Citibank with US$10.7 bil-
lion, and NMB with US$10.5 billion. 28 5 The other major traders
in 1990, in descending order, were Chartered West LB, First Chi-
cago, Samuel Montagu, Salomon Brothers, and Chemical
277. Latin American Debt Holders Scored Big Gains, Index Shows, supra note 234.
278. Corrigan, supra note 129, at 31.
279. Schubert Speech II, supra note 201.
280. Peter Truell, Treasury Plan Should Benefit Some Banks, WALL ST. J., Mar. 16,
1989.
281. Evans, LDC Debt Market Facing Oversupply of Latin Paper, AMERiCAN BANKER,
Mar. 14, 1990, at 1.
282. The banks include Chase Manhattan, National Westminster, Royal Bank of
Canada, Swiss Bank Corp, Westdeutsche Landesbank, Mitsubishi Bank, Bancomer,
Banco Itau, Credito Italiano, and Banco Espirito Santo e Commercial de Lisboa. Id.
283. London accounted for perhaps 20% of trading in the market at this time.
284. Murphy, Moving Up, 25 LATINFINANCE 55, 56 (1991).
285. Id. at 56.
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Bank.286
In 1991, Chemical led in the trading stakes, benefiting from
its merger with Manufacturers Hanover, with a trading volume
of US$31 billion.287 JP Morgan was next, followed by Chase
Manhattan, Citibank, Morgan Grenfell,288 NMB, Merrill Lynch,
Salomon Brothers, Bankers Trust, and Banco Santander, in that
order.
289
All of the above trading volume figures are from each
bank's own reported volumes. 290 The absence of any central ex-
change or recording facility for trades rendered independent
verification impossible. 291 Accordingly, all figures have to be ac-
cepted with the proviso that self-interest may have figured in
their compilation and competition amongst traders for promi-
nence in these market rankings was fierce. For instance, in the
1990 survey in which traders were asked for their trading
volumes, they were also asked to rank the five market leaders in
terms of trading volume. Positions one to three and five were
occupied by the same banks as in the self-reporting survey. How-
ever, as judged by their peers, NMB bank jumped from sixth
place to fourth, and Bankers Trust fell from fourth place out of
the top ten. 292
There are many ways to inflate trading figures. Counting
both sides of the debt exchanged in a swap is an easy way of
increasing trading volume and somewhat justifiable if a trader
wishes to classify its trades by volume of debt traded, i.e., a swap
of Brazilian for Polish obligations appears under the amount of
Brazilian debt traded and also under the amount of Polish debt
traded. Some brokers included trading into and out of their
own portfolios.29  Others included new issues in the primary
286. Id.; see Kelash, supra note 260.
287. Voorhees, Fasten Your Seatbelts, 35 LATINFINANCE 57, 58 (1992).
288. Morgan Grenfell hired the entire Libra Bank trading team upon Libra being
disbanded and thus rapidly acquired a substantial market presence. Pettis Interview II,
supra note 47.
289. Id. This order is the one determined by peer assessment of each other's per-
formance and has been preferred on the grounds of likely accuracy over the order
based on the traders' own reported volume figures from which it differs slightly.
290. Murphy, supra note 284, at 55.
291. Ten Market Leaders, 20 LATINFINANCE 37 (1990) ("There is no neutral, factual
source, for secondary market LDC debt trading volume or profits.").
292. Murphy, supra note 284, at 56. Chartered West LB, ranked seventh on its own
figures, was also not placed by its peers in the top ten.
293. Voorhees, Documentation Concerns - Mas o Menos, 30 LATINFINANCE 42 (1991).
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market or trades in securities in local Latin American stock ex-
changes.294 Indeed, in the words of Kathy Galbraith, "It is very
questionable. People inflate their numbers. They include every-
thing but the kitchen sink. Some figures are grossly, ridiculously
exaggerated. 29
5
The LDC Debt Traders Association considered the issue
and concluded there were no widely observed guidelines to be
applied in determining volume. The Association chose not to
implement its own survey in 1991 considering hard figures too
scarce.296 This in-built bias towards inflation presumably had a
similar impact on the volume figures for the market given above,
which must be read subject to the same qualifications.
The explosive growth in the market attracted many new
traders: Dillon Read, First Boston, and Bank of Tokyo in
1989,297 Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley in 1990,298 and an
Austrian bank, Osterreichische Landerbank, in 1991.29 Some
were however leaving the business. Libra's closure in 1990 sur-
prised many in the market. 00 The new reserve levels set by the
Bank of England required a 450 million pound capital contribu-
tion from shareholders. Dissolution of the bank and transfer
back to the shareholders of their respective proportions of its
loan book was seen as the more palatable option. 0 1
As new traders joined the market, established trading units
294. Id.
295. Id.
296. Id.
297. Third World Debt, XIII BANK LETTER, Dec. 25, 1989, at 4.
298. Goldman Set to Launch LDC Trading Desk, XIV BANK LETTER, Aug. 6, 1990, at 4;
David Gillen, Prices Adrift in Featureless Trading; Morgan Stanley Forms LDC Debt Unit, BOND
BUYER, Sept. 21, 1990, at 3:
299. LDC Debt Trading Unit Formed By Austrian Bank, 4 LDC DEBT REPORT, April 1,
1991, at 6.
300. Libra's Disappearance, 16 LATINFINANCE 6 (1990); Shareholders Wind Down Libra,
818 INT'L FIN. REv., Mar. 17, 1990, at 32. Of far less significance, Scandinavian Bank
Group shut down its LDC debt trading units in New York & London in 1989. Third
World Debt - Watch out securitisation is on its way, 703 INT'L FIN. REv., Dec. 12, 1987, at
3876. It had been in the business for less than two years and was also a consortium
bank owned by banks in Sweden, Denmark, Norway, Finland and Iceland. See Scandina-
via Bank Pulls Out of LDC Trading, XIII BANK LETTER, Oct. 30, 1989, at 4.
301. Shareholders wind down Libra, 818 INT'L FIN. REv., March 17, 1990, at 32. Libra
was also closed because the era of consortium banks was coming to an end. Libra had
been formed to spearhead the member's international expansion and by 1990 most
banks were ready to expand internationally themselves. Pettis Interview II, supra note
47.
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grew larger. For instance, in 1986, Salomon Brothers had only a
few people in its LDC debt trading unit. By the end of 1990,
Salomon had fifteen traders supported by a research and sales
team. 02
The advent of Brady bonds began to shift the balance of
power among traders. In this period, the major commercial
banks, such asJP Morgan, Chase, and Chemical, had the advan-
tage of trading their own bank's portfolio of LDC credits and
commercial banks were more comfortable in the world of loans,
not securities. Brady bonds traded as conventional debt securi-
ties-a field in which the investment banks such as Salomon and
Merrill Lynch were traditionally expert. Brady bonds presented
the investment banks with an opportunity to take market share
from their commercial banking brethren. °3
The history of NMB tempts the pen. Until 1989, as Neder-
landsche Middenstandsbank, NMB was a minnow among whales
trading with the likes of Morgan, Citibank, and Salomon. In
1989, it merged with Postbank, Europe's largest postal savings
bank, which more than doubled its assets and made it the third
largest bank in The Netherlands. 30 4 In 1991, another merger,
this time with The Netherlands' largest insurer, Nationale-
Nederlanden, again almost doubled its assets.305 This time the
merger came with an entirely new name - the Internationale
Nederlanden Groep, and the group became universally known
as ING.3 ' 6 Whether in its current or earlier incarnations NMB/
ING exhibited a commitment to innovation and a willingness to
back its judgments. Its early, critical judgment was that there
were profits to be earned in Latin America. Nothing innovative
in that one could say, the international financial community be-
lieved it almost en masse in the 1970s. NMB, however, took this
view in 1983. Unburdened by a portfolio of loans to the region,
NMB moved into Latin America. 0 7 In 1983, it was the first non-
Latin American bank to begin trading LDC loans in New York.
302. Steven Bavaria, Mexico Comes Back to Market; The Miracle Recovery, INVESTMENT
DEALERS DIGEST, Dec. 10, 1990, at 17.
303. Brady's Bazaar, supra note 55, at 81.
304. NMB Postbank - Leading the Field, INT'L FIN. REV. REVIEW OF THE YEAR - 1990,
AT 78 (spec. supp.).
305. Nat-Ned NMB Postbank Merger Approved, 864 INT'L FIN. REV., Feb. 9, 1991, at 22.
306. NMB Postbank - Leading the Field, supra note 304.
307. Id.
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Subsequently, it acquired offices, branches and brokerages in
Latin America at bargain basement prices from banks fleeing the
region. °8
Two men guided NMB in these years. By the late 1980s,
Gerrit Tammes was vice-chairman of the bank. By background
he was a trader who knew Latin America, having spent eight
years in Surinam and Brazil. Tammes was prepared to back his
judgments and go against the tide. His man on the ground in
this market was Peter Geraghty, head of LDC trading in New
York, and widely recognized as one of the market's most astute
traders. The Dutchman and American made a strong team. In
1990, the International Financing Review appointed NMB its "LDC
Debt Trading House of the Year."' 9
The year 1989 was highly profitable for most traders
notwithstanding a severe price slide towards year-end 310 partly
in response to provisioning by major U.S. and U.K. banks. Many
of the major traders reportedly made massive profits in the first
half of 1990 as the market went through a long rally in prices
and trading volume increased dramatically.311 In 1991, the
trend of record profits continued with the longest bull run in
the market's history. The trading of LDC debt was proving to be
a much better business than the lending of it had been.
2. Brokers
A major new form of participant entered the market in 1988
as Tullet in New York established a LDC debt brokerage opera-
308. NMB bought the Chilean operation of JP Morgan, the Argentine branch of
Barclays, a large brokerage house in Brazil, and a branch and joint venture to serve the
Venezuelan market. The only other major bank to increase its presence in Latin
America in the 1980s was Citibank and they didn't begin their build up as early as did
NMB. US Banks Continue to Reduce LDCPortfolios, 861 INT'L FIN. REv. Jan. 19, 1991, at 23.
309. NMB Postbank - Leading the Field, supra note 304. However, change is the only
constant in this market and in February 1988, ING Barings (as it then was) stopped all
dedicated equities research, sales and trading for Latin America. Shortly thereafter,
Peter Geraghty resigned. See Weever & Newton, Barings to Suffer Massive Cutbacks, SUN-
DAY TELEGRAPH, Mar, 8, 1988, at 1.
310. Market Softens with Start of End-of-year Selling, XIII BANK LETTER, Nov. 6, 1989;
Market Slips Further as Year-End Selloff Continues, XIII BANK LETrER, Nov. 13, 1995. The
price softness continued into 1990. See The Next Secondary Market, INT'L REPORTS, Jan.
15, 1990.
311. Siegel, Money Centers Make Big Bucks Trading Distressed Country Paper, XIV BANK
Letter, June 25, 1990, at 1.
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tion headed by Michael Scharfenberger. 112 In January 1990,
Scharfenberger and his team left Tullet to set up an LDC brok-
ing unit within Eurobrokers Capital Markets313 and, in July, Mar-
tin Quintin-Archard joined Intercapital Brokers Ltd to head the
independent brokerage service they were establishing?' 4 These
were the first operations set up specifically to act as brokerages,
as middlemen with no loan portfolios and without taking posi-
tions. 15 Scharfenberger said customers principally used brokers
for two reasons: "They want to remain anonymous to the market
at large and they want an overview as to where the market actu-
ally is." 316 Confidentiality was maintained by the identities of
counterparties being disclosed only when a deal had been done.
Brokers charged much lower fees than the traders.' v In 1990,
Intercapital charged three basis points on each side of a transac-
tion for Brazilian or Mexican debt and four basis points on other
trades?' The lowest regular fee of traders at the time was 1/8th
percent, or 12.5 basis points.3 19 After 1990, the increasing role
of brokerages contributed significantly to the reductions in trad-
ers' margins.
This innovation by Quintin-Archard at Intercapital was to
have profound implications for the market. Over time, the dra-
matic reduction in the cost of trading increased liquidity in the
market markedly and the brokerages came to serve as clearing
houses. 320 Although few realized it at the time, Martin Quintin-
Archard in characteristically flamboyant style, had ushered in a
new era in the market's growth.32'
3. Sellers
The major sellers early in this period were the regional U.S.
banks. Most of these banks continued the policy begun in 1988
312. LDC Players: the Broker, 825 INT'L FIN. REv., May 5, 1990, at 36.
313. Eurobrokers were well known for their worldwide operation in Eurodollar
time deposits, and interest rate and currency swaps.
314. Intercapital in LDC Broking, 834 INT'L FIN. REV., July 7, 1990, at 29.
315. LDC Players: the Broker, 825 INT'L FIN. REv., May 5, 1990, at 36.
316. Id.
317. Id.
318. Attracting Attention, 852 INT'L FIN. REV., Nov. 10, 1990, at 34.
319. Pettis Interview II, supra note 47.
320. Id.
321. Id.
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of liquidating their LDC loan portfolios. 3 22 As one commentator
wrote in September 1990, "The big U.S. regional banks uni-
formly followed the same strategy for dealing with LDC debt dur-
ing the past 18 months. They kept running like hell. ' '3 23 Fur-
thermore, the major U.S. banks, for the first time, began to sell
loans and Brady bonds, once issued, into the secondary market.
For instance, Bank of America swapped or sold some US$1.16
billion of LDC loans in 1989.324 JP Morgan, likewise, reduced its
exposure by US$1 billion in 1989.325 In this period, Japanese
banks started to sell significant amounts of debt for the first time
in the market's history.3 26 As had been the case with the U.S.
banks, the larger Japanese banks were much slower to get in-
volved in selling their portfolios. 3 27 The early sales activity from
Japan involved smaller Japanese banks that saw asset sales as a
relatively painless way to meet the new capital adequacy stan-
dards.328
In summary, in this period, the sellers fell into two catego-
ries. The first were the U.S. regionals most of whom were follow-
ing a 'sell at all costs' policy. The second came into prominence
as the period progressed and consisted of the major U.S., Euro-
pean, and Japanese banks. Their approach was to reduce expo-
sure gradually through considered sales.329
4. Buyers
In 1990, the market began to see more high-yield inves-
322. By August 1990, Wells Fargo, Security Pacific and First Interstate had disposed
of virtually their entire exposures to Latin America and many other regional banks,
such as Mellon, First Chicago and Bank of New York, had aggressively reduced their
exposures. Froman, Creditor Review - Color Me Gone, 20 LATINFINANCE 58 (1990).
323. Id.
324. Froman, Creditor Review - Bank of America, 20 LATINFINANCE 66 (1990).
325. Froman, Creditor Review -JP Morgan, 20 LATINFINANCE 69 (1990); see Froman,
Creditor Review - Citibank, 20 LATINFINANCE 65 (1990).
326. Brazil, Argentina Loans Offered By Japan Bank, 4 LDC DEBT REPORT, June 3,
1991, at 2 (reporting the offering for sale of US$80 million of Brazilian loans and
US$36 million of Argentine loans by "major Japanese bank"); Japanese Selling Mexican
Exposure, 4 LDC DEBT Report, Feb. 18, 1991, at 12. Japanese banks wrote their Mexican
debt down to market value shortly after the issuance of Mexico's Brady bonds in March
1990. Siegel, Are theJapanese Ready to Sell?, XIV BANK LETrER, April 9, 1990, at 1;Japanese
Selling Mexican Exposure, supra at 12.
327. Id. at 12.
328. Id. Sales of LDC loans realised cash which could be used to boost capital as
well as removing an asset for which capital would have to be held.
329. Pettis, supra note 154, at 118.
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tors." ° The decline in the U.S. domestic junk bond market in
1989 had left a body of investors with an unsatisfied appetite for
high yields.3" 1 LDC debt, particularly the debt of oil-producing
LDCs, was seen as an attractive high-yield investment.33 2 The
Brady bonds of Mexico and Venezuela gave traders a salable se-
curity and many were active in seeking private investor buyers.
Salomon Brothers, for instance, produced a bound, twenty page
report promoting the benefits of investing in LDC sovereign
bonds.3 3 The report mentioned the "seniority" of bonds over
bank debt and the excellent record of debt service on bonds
seven times in the first eight pages.334 The fact that the recent
historical advantages of bonds were disappearing as Brady and
other 3 5 bonds replaced bank loans was mentioned once, on
page nine, and against this were arrayed three countervailing
factors.33 6 Banks were particularly interested in marketing sover-
eign bonds to Latin American private investors who knew the
debtor nations and were interested in investments for flight capi-
tal.33
7
Numerous high-yield LDC debt funds were also beginning
to appear which offered investors a share in a portfolio of LDC
bonds or loans.338 As Salomon Brothers wrote in a promotional
330. Id. at 117.
331. Junk'ofthe 1990s?, 823 INT'L FIN. REv., April 21, 1990, at 28; Lee C. Buchheit,
Return of the Living Debt, INT'L FIN. L. REV., May 1990, at 28.
332. Kelash, supra note 260.
333. JOHN PURCELL ET AL., DAMRAu & FRANKLIN, DEVELOPING COUNTRY SOVEREIGN
BONDS: OPPORTUNITY IN A NEW ASSET CLASS (April 1990) (on file with the Fordham Inter-
national Law Journal).
334. Id. at 1-2, 5-8.
335. The return of these borrowers to the voluntary capital markets has almost
invariably been through the issuance of either eurobonds or bonds in the domestic U.S.
market usually by way of a private placement.
336. The countervailing factors mentioned in the report were that (i) bondholders
could take legal enforcement action more easily than bank lenders, (ii) rescheduling of
bonds would harm debtors' reputations more than the rescheduling of bank debt, and
(iii) banks appeared ready to grant explicit seniority to Brady bonds over loans. PUR-
CELL, DAMRAU, ET AL., Supra note 333, at 9.
337. Schubert Speech V, supra note 276, at 16; PURCELL, CHANG, ET AL., DEVELOP-
ING COUNTRY SOVEREIGN BONDS: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN A NEW ASSET CLASS 8
(1991) (24 pg booklet produced by Salomon Brothers) (copy on file with the Fordham
International Law Journal).
338. Schubert Speech V, supra note 276. One of the first funds designed to invest
in Latin American government bonds was entitled The Sovereign High-Yield Investment
Company. It was formed in November 1989 to invest in U.S. dollar denominated bonds
of countries such as Mexico, Brazil, Argentina, and Venezuela. As such, the fund aimed
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booklet, "During the latter part of 1990 and early 1991, nonbank
institutional investors entered the market in a serious way."339
The uptick in prices in Mexican bonds in mid-December 1990
was significant because it was caused by demand from institu-
tional investors. As Pettis said, "In the past, prices have moved
largely because of demand for debt-equity ... it is significant in
that we have never seen institutional investors move prices in this
market. ' 340
In 1991, an entirely new group of high-yield buyers entered
the market in significant numbers, a group of buyers with impli-
cations for the degree of regulation required for this market.
U.S. pension funds and insurance companies and European
non-bank institutions and retail buyers began acquiring LDC
debt, principally the Brady bonds of Mexico and Venezuela.141
to benefit from the superior repayment record of bonds over loans. It was managed by
Scudder, Stevens & Clark and underwritten by Merrill Lynch and was the precursor to
many such funds which were formed after the issuance of the first Brady bonds. See
Foreign Investment Funds -Directory, 18 LATINFINANCE 49, 50 (1990); Hughes, The Current
Stage of the Overall Debt Situation, TENTH ANNUAL REVIEW OF BANKING LAW 335, 342-43
(1991); A. C. Quale Jr., Tapping the International Capital Markets Using Sophisticated Asset
Securitization Techniques, a paper delivered at the Latin High Yield Conference, May 30-
31, 1991, New York City, 9-10. Other examples of early investment fund arrangements
were the private placement in December 1989 of shares in five special purpose compa-
nies incorporated in Guernsey to acquire and hold LDC debt and benefit from the
exceptional yields of this debt, and the trust structure created by Merrill Lynch which
issued fixed-rate securities backed by floating-rate Venezuelan debt conversion bonds.
These synthetic securities were targeted at retail and institutional investors. See Secondary
Market for Venezuelan Bond Swaps Gets Underway, XV BANK LETTER, Sept. 2 1991, at 4.
Some funds formed to invest primarily in equities in Latin America would also put a
slice of their capital into debt. See Funds are the way to go in Latin America, 834 INT'L FIN.
REv., July 7, 1990, at 33. For a general analysis of the securitization of LDC loans. See
Quale, supra.
339. PURCELL, CHANG, ET AL., supra note 333, at 8.
340. Secondary Market Report: Mexican Bonds Up Sharply, 857 INT'L FIN. REv., Dec.
15, 1990, at 29. Martin Schubert described the market in 1990 as "now being aimed at
non-bank and private individual investors solely on the basis that the credit at its huge
discount after being repackaged, is now fully priced." Schubert Speech V, supra note
276, at 8.
341. Richard Waters, Brazilian Debt Back On The Defensive, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 31, 1991,
at 29; Michael Pettis, The Emergence of the Latin American Debt Market, in THE NEW HIGH
YIELD BOND MARKET - INVESTMENT OPPORTUNITIES STRATEGIES AND ANALYSIS (Lederman
& Sullivan, eds.). This move into LDC debt investment was part of the marked trend of
U.S. pension funds to invest abroad - from 1980 to 1990 overseas investments by U.S.
pension funds grew from US$21 billion to US$250 billion. See Welles & Roman, The
Future of Wall Street: Why Our Financial System Will Never Be the Same, Bus. WEEK, Nov. 5,
1990, at 122.
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E. Impact of the Market
The principal impact of the market in this period was that it
facilitated the Brady plan. The essence of the Brady plan, the
securitization of loans into discounted bonds, could have been
developed and implemented without a developed secondary
market.34 2 It would have been far more difficult, however, and
less likely. 43 The secondary market afforded the prototype for
these loans being traded as bonds. The market proved there was
a market for, and investors to buy, more liquid instruments.344
The secondary market laid the groundwork without which the
Brady plan would have been a far greater step into the unknown.
Indeed, this greater degree of risk probably would have miti-
gated against the involvement of the U.S. government in advo-
cating the plan in this form.
Whether the Brady plan was a positive or negative develop-
ment is open to debate. Many bankers and some other com-
mentators believe that debt relief was unnecessary for the major
Latin American borrowers. Many others believe that the debt
relief afforded by the plan was far too limited and that the daily
suffering caused by servicing the Brady bonds is intolerable.
What is clear is that the Brady plan owes a real debt to the secon-
dary market and the plan allowed the granting of limited debt
relief in a politically palatable form. A straight reduction in prin-
cipal outstanding or interest rates owing would have provoked
far more of a political backlash in North America than did the
same steps undertaken within the context of the securitization of
the loans. 45
The next most significant impact of the secondary market in
this and the preceding period was the manner in which it as-
sisted the collapse of creditor solidarity. 46 As we have seen, the
market permitted the smaller, less burdened U.S. and European
342. Schubert Interview I, supra note 177.
343. Interview with Michael Chamberlin, Executive Director of EMTA, New York
City, December 8, 1994.
344. Id.
345. There was strong popular opinion against any use of taxpayer funds to "bail
out" the banks from the debt crisis and the use of IMF and World Bank funds to assist
with the acquisition of the bonds' collateral can be seen as such a use of taxpayer funds.
Furthermore, there were strong voices raised against debt relief for these "profligate"
debtor nations, voices which were strangely quiet in opposition to the entire Brady plan
package.
346. MacMillan, supra note 7, at 328-29.
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banks to liquidate their holdings of LDC debts. No longer were
the interests of all creditors alike. Creditors with smaller expo-
sures now had an alternative to advancing new money as part of
debt restructurings and took it. This collapse of creditor solidar-
ity and involuntary lending made debt relief essential and her-
alded the Brady Plan.347
Another principal impact of the secondary market during
this period was in facilitating informal debt buy-backs by debtors.
Formal debt buy-back schemes can proceed independently of a
secondary market as repurchases are made from the original
lenders, although without a market there is no objective pricing
mechanism.348 Informal schemes require a secondary market as
the purchaser of the debt is an entity separate from the bor-
rower. Informal schemes appear to have retired far more debt
than formal schemes in this period and at substantially greater
discounts349 than were part of the securitization of these loans
under the Brady plan. Informal buy-backs were a major source
of debt-relief for debtor nations such as Argentina and Brazil.
Indeed, over a number of years, the amount of debt relief af-
forded by informal buy-backs may have exceeded the relief
granted as part of the eventual Brady-style securitization of those
nations' loans. 5 °
The advent of LDC derivatives owes a debt to this market.
The options themselves could have been issued without a market
but the purposes for which they were typically issued would have
been absent and the banks and brokers which issued the options
would not have had the expertise in these assets to do so. Like-
347. David C Mulford, as Treasury Undersecretary, is generally credited as being
one of the architects of the Brady Plan. In his words, "It was not only becoming harder
to get the banks to put up new money, they were beginning to withdraw from the re-
gion. Banks were beginning to sell their positions in the market, take losses, it was clear
that [the Baker] plan would have to be substantially revised." Tobin, Reaping the Bene-
fits, INT'L FIN. REV. INTER-AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK REPORT, Mar. 1993, at 18.
348. Pettis Interview II, supra note 47.
349. The discounts ranged from 50% to 80% depending upon the price of the
debt in the secondary market.
350. The actual volume of debt retired by informal buy-backs is not known but
would appear substantial. As is the norm in this field, there are those who believe debt
buy-backs do not benefit the debtors and are an inappropriate use of their reserves.
The popularity of buy-backs mitigates against this view and this writer does not sub-
scribe to it. Debt-equity swaps attracted both proponents and opponents in the litera-
ture and this was eventually reflected in their declining popularity with debtor govern-
ments. Such has not been the pattern with debtors' attitudes to buy-backs.
19981 1855
1856 FORDHAMINTERNATIONALLAWJOURNAL [Vol. 21:1802
wise, the reciprocal exchanges of debt between debtor nations,
which proved a simple and cost-effective way for the poorer
Latin American countries to satisfy their obligations, to their bet-
ter-off neighbors would have been impossible without the secon-
dary market.
In this period, for the first time, the market began to fulfill
its clearing function. In theory, this is one of a market's more
important roles for investors will avoid a market with a perceived
overhang of sellers. Once the market was able to absorb the sup-
ply of debt the greater involvement of institutional investors was
predictable. A persuasive case can be made that the main reason
the crisis lasted throughout the 1980s and the prices of the debt
eventually fell so low was the absence of a large, active secondary
market in the first five years of the debt crisis. The market had
to become large enough to fulfill its clearing function before it
could play its significant role in the resolution of the crisis from
the bank's perspective.351
The two principal impacts of the secondary market identi-
fied in the previous period continued in this one. Debt-equity
swaps were made possible for investors who had not been lend-
ers35 2 and, in this period, exchanges of debt for equity facilitated
privatizations throughout Latin America. Banks with smaller
LDC exposures were able to liquidate their portfolios and banks
with major exposures were able to reduce them.
Finally, the first few days of the next period were to witness
the market having a broader impact than ever before. Pension
funds in Massachusetts, the rainforest in the Amazon basin, and
bank shareholders in Peoria, Illinois, all were to be affected by
the developments to follow.
II. THE MARKET'S YOUNG ADULTHOOD: OCTOBER 1991 TO
DECEMBER 1993
A. The Major Events in This Period
1. The Brazilian Collapse of 1991
The price of Brazilian debt increased throughout the bull
351. Pettis' Interview II, supra note 47.
352. Creditors are able to participate in debt-equity conversions without recourse
to a secondary market as Citicorp, Bankers Trust, and Manufacturers Hanover did ex-
tensively in the Late 1980s. Other investors, however, require a secondary market from
which to acquire the debt for conversion.
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run of 1991. In early January it traded at 26.5 cents on the dol-
lar3 53 and by September had reached 40 cents.3 5 4 Throughout
October the market for Brazilian debt was jittery and in the last
week of October plunged to 20 cents before steadying at around
24 cents.3 55 Argentina was the other major debtor awaiting a
Brady style restructuring and its loans fell from 41 cents to 27
cents before stablilising at around 34 cents. 356 The debts of
countries as diverse as Morocco, Poland, and the Philippines
were also affected.357 The only debts to withstand the initial fall
were those of nations with a Brady style restructuring in place,
such as Mexico and Venezuela 358 - and Venezuela's debt was,
in any event, affected by the subsequent general market skittish-
ness.
359
On Monday October 28, 1991, the price of Brazilian loans
plummeted 22.2%.36o This compares to the twenty-three per-
cent fall in the value of the Dow Jones Industrial Average 361 on
'Black Monday,' October 19, 1987.362 The 1987 New York stock
market crash was studied in great detail and depth36 3 and no
single cause has emerged. In its report to Congress, the SEC
noted that "we may never know what precise combination of in-
vestor psychology, economic developments and trading technol-
353. LDC Secondary Market Debt Prices, 859 INT'L FIN. Rxv., Jan. 5, 1991, at 31.
354. Brazilian Debt Takes a Pounding; Price Hits 20 Cents as Hope Fades for Mexico-Style
Pact, supra note 253.
355. Id.
356. Id.
357. Richard Waters, Brazilian Debt Back on the Defensive, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 31, 1991,
at 29; see Bears Hold LDC Debt Market As Uncertainty Prevails, 4 LDC DEBT REPORT, Nov. 11,
1991, at 2.
358. Waters, supra note 357.
359. Venezuelan Coup Rumours Upset Market Briefly, 4 LDC DEBT REPORT, Nov. 25,
1991, at 2; Contrary to Rumor, 33 LATINFINANCE 11 (1991).
360. The price dropped from 27 cents on the dollar to 21 cents. This followed a
fall of 18% on Friday, October 25 (from 33 cents on the dollar to 27 cents). See Voor-
hees, Brazilian Meltdown, 32 LATINFINANCE 12 (1991).
361. The Dow Jones Industrial Average measures the movements in the 30 major
industrial stocks listed on the New York Stock Exchange.
362. The Dow fell some 508 points on this day of the "Crash." See Regulation for the
Securities Markets?, 10 ANN. REv. BANKING L. 379 (1991).
363. SeeJames V. Feinerman, Internationalizing U.S. Capital Markets in Global Context:
Problems and Prospects, 28 L. AND POL'Y IN INT'L Bus. 605, 607 (1997) (discussing causes
of New York stock market crash and declines occurring on London, Tokyo, and Hong
Kong exchanges); Jerry w. Markham, Federal Regulation of Margin in the Commodities Fu-
tures Industry-History and Theory, 64 TEMP. L. REv. 59, 140 (1991) (detailing possible
causes of stock market crash of 1987).
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ogies caused the events of October. 364
October seems a bad month for financial markets. No de-
tailed study of the October 1991 collapse in the LDC debt mar-
ket has been done, yet it appears that its causes are more readily
indentifiable than was the case for the 1987 Crash.
Causes of the October 1991 Collapse
As with the 1987 Crash there were a multitude of causes of
the 1991 LDC debt collapse, with the following four the most
commonly cited:
1. A gathering economic storm broke in Brazil in October:
fears of hyper-inflation and growing antagonism between the
government and business drove the currency down on the
black market,365 official exchange rates were devalued by fif-
teen percent, and adverse export figures were released for
September. 66 Furthermore, Brazil's economic fundamentals
were not good367 and it had flooded the new issues market by
issuing over US$1 billion of debt in the preceding two
months.36
8
2. The Usiminas privatization was postponed in September
until October 15, 1991, after a court held that rescheduled
Brazilian foreign loans could not be used in the privatiza-
tion.3 6 9 This decision was then reversed two days later by a
higher court.3 7' Nonetheless, the market softened with the
postponement of the privatization auction; investor interest
cooled and some large positions, taken in anticipation of the
loans being used to acquire a stake in the steel group, were
liquidated.3 71 There was another extension before the priva-
364. The Division of Market Regulation of the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion ("SEC"), The October 1987 Market Break, reprinted in Fed Sec L Rep (CCH), Spe-
cial Rep No 1271 (Feb 9, 1988) at xi.
365. Waters, supra note 357; Voorhees, Brazilian Meltdown, 32 LATINFNANCE 12
(1991).
366. Subdued Secondary Market Takes a Breather, 903 INT'L FIN. REV., Nov. 9, 1991.
Brazil's exports fell 25% between August and September and the US$35 million bal-
ance of trade for September was the smallest of 1991.
367. Id.
368. Brazil's Problems Give Investors Cold Feet, 898 INT'L FIN. REv., Oct. 5, 1991, at 29.
The principal issuers of the debt had been parastatals like Petrobras and Telebras. Bra-
zil: A Long Way to Go, 900 INT'L FIN. REV., Oct. 19, 1991, at 21.
369. Brazil's Privatisation Delays Widen Credibility Gap, 897 INT'L FIN. REV., Sept. 28,
1991, at 20.
370. Id.
371. Belgo-Minera, a Belgian metals group, withdrew from the bidding to acquire
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tization eventually went ahead on October 24. Even then, the
low participation rate of foreign investors3 72 reduced confi-
dence in foreign investment in Brazil's proposed privatization
programme3 73 and thus in the sustained demand for Brazil-
ian debt.
3. As with the Crash of 1987, technical factors contributed to
the fall. Early in the sell-off, some traders were simply realiz-
ing year-end gains. During the long bull run, put options had
been sold at out-of-the-money strike prices to banks for expo-
sure limitation purposes and were now exercised. 7 4 Further-
more, margin calls played their usual significant role in a sell-
off and forced sales by those who had acquired loans on mar-
gin.3
75
4. The major cause of the collapse was probably that most
traders were long 376 on Brazilian loans in August and Septem-
ber in expectation of price rises on the long-awaited Brady
style restructuring for Brazil.3 77 This strategy had proven
Usiminas, and sold a large holding of Brazilian debt acquired in anticipation of the
debt-equity auction. James Krause, Fed Probes Third World Debt Trades At Top Banks, AM.
BANKER, Jan. 17, 1992, at 1.
372. Foreign investors accounted for only 6 to 7% of successful bids in the priva-
tization auction. One of the reasons for this was that very little Brazilian foreign debt
was tendered in the auction. Investors were prepared to bid higher prices using priva-
tization certificates. These certificates, held principally by domestic companies, had
been issued earlier in return for confiscated bank deposits and would have begun to
decline in value if not used reasonably quickly. Usiminas Sale: The Winners and the Losers,
901 INT'L FIN. REV., Oct. 26, 1991, at 20.
373. Waters, supra note 357; Voorhees, Put Out, 32 LATINFINANCE 12 (1991). Little
foreign participation in Brazil's privatization program would mean a major reduction in
anticipated demand for Brazil's debt and consequently lower longer-term prices.
374. Banks Study Debt Market in Brazil Led Crash's Wake, 4 LDC DEBT REPORT, Nov.
11, 1991, at 1.
375. Id. With respect to the realization of end of year gains, Michael Pettis has a
theory that there is a regular annual sell-off in this market as traders prepare for the
calendar year end and bank management calculates the amount of profits it is willing to
forgo in the name of reducing exposure to LDC debts. Interview with Michael Pettis,
now a Managing Director at Bear Stearns & Co., New York City, April 24, 1993 [herein-
after Pettis Interview I]; Pettis, supra note 154, at 118. The theory is borne out by events
in 1989. Market Slips Further as Year-end Selloff Continues, XIII BANK LETTER, Nov. 13,
1989, at 3. And, to a much lesser extent, 1993. In 1993 a major price slump in the first
week of November accompanied a selling spree in which many assets fell in value 5-6
points. See Savage Secondary Selling Spree, 1004 INT'L FIN. REV., Nov. 6, 1993, at 41. But
overall the institutional investors sustained the demand for debt through ajittery Octo-
ber and year-end and there was not a repeat of earlier end-of-year crashes. See The
Making of a Market, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, April 1994, at 66.
376. Waters, supra note 357.
377. Corrigan, supra note 254.
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highly profitable in the case of Mexico and Venezuela.
3 7 8
Once it became clear Brazil and the banks could not agree on
terms and the restructuring would not occur soon, traders
sold these positions.
2. Brady Restructuring Agreement with Argentina
Argentina and its bank advisory committee announced their
agreement in principle on this long-awaited restructuring on
April 7, 1992. 37' The terms were close to the Mexican model
with the banks being given the choice between thirty-year fixed
interest par bonds, 8 0 thirty-year discount bonds, 38 ' and new
money loans.3 2
Interest rates decreased after this preliminary agreement
with the result that the overwhelming majority of creditors chose
par bonds.383 The restructuring was then delayed while Argen-
tina tried to persuade its creditors to take thirty-five percent of
their debt in discount bonds.384 Because par bonds leave princi-
378. Id.
379. Voorhees, Betting on Brady, 37 LATINFINANCE 14 (1992); Argentina: Lots of Work
Remains on Agreement, 924 INT'L FIN. REv., April 11, 1992, at 30. In January 1992, before
Argentina's restructuring, Nigeria had implemented a simplified Brady scheme under
which it repurchased a portion of its loans and transformed the balance into par bonds.
The Salomon Brothers Brady Bond Index: Impact of Recent Events and Return Prospects, Mar.
26, 1992, at 2 (copy on file with the Fordham International Law Journal). The Nigerian
Brady restructuring was unusual in that it did not result in a perceived improvement in
Nigeria's economic prospects (as reflected in secondary market prices for its debt) and
the country did not subsequently return to the voluntary international capital markets.
Clark, supra note 32, at 53.
380. The par bonds paid interest at 4% in year one rising progressively to 6% in
year seven and thereafter. There was full collateral for principal and a 12 month rolling
interest guarantee.
381. The discount bonds had the standard 35% discount of principal, paid Libor
plus 13/16% and had the same collateral as the par bonds.
382. Voorhees, Betting on Brady, 37 LATINFINANCE 14 (1992). Argentina remained
some US$8 billion in arrears on its interest payments. Under this restructuring propo-
sal the great majority of these arrears would be converted into past-due interest bonds.
These unsecured bonds pay a floating interest rate above Libor and have a term of
twelve years. Earlier versions of the proposed Argentine restructuring were far more
complex and unconventional but these were discarded in favor of simplicity. See Evalu-
ating the Argentina Brady Exchange Proposal, Mar. 2, 1992 (copy on file with the Fordham
International Law Journal).
383. Argentina's creditors initially opted about 80% for par bonds and 20% for
discount bonds. Argentine Brady Deal, 942 INT'L FIN. REv., Aug. 15, 1992, at 24. Other
reports put the ratio at 90:10 in favour of par bonds. Banks Get Behind Argentina, 948
INT'L FIN. REV., Sept. 26, 1992, at 22.
384. Argentinean Debt Negotiations, 944 INT'L FIN. REv., Aug. 29, 1992, at 30.
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pal unreduced, they require more funds for the acquisition of
the zero coupon bonds as collateral for the principal than do
discount bonds and Argentina could only afford the collateral if
at least thirty-five percent of the bonds had discounted princi-
pal.Y Argentina was eventually able to persuade its creditors to
take thirty-five percent of their exposure in discount bonds in
time for a December 1992 signing of the restructuring.386 The
restructuring was finally completed in April 1993 with the issu-
ance of the Brady bonds.3 8 7 The bonds were held in escrow until
reconciliation of the ownership and consequential interest enti-
tlements of the loans could be completed. Reconciliation re-
quired recreating the ownership history of each piece of debt,
some of which had been traded hundreds of times.388 This was
particularly important because, for a number of years, Argentina
had either made no or only partial payments of interest.3 89 To
further complicate matters Argentine loans had traded both
with and without past due interest for about three years before
the issuance of the Brady bonds. The last interest to be recon-
ciled was the overdue interest on Argentina's bank loans. Some
US$6.6 billion of bonds were issued and US$636 million of cash
paid for eighty-five percent of this interest in October 1993.9 °
In December, a further US$1.2 billion of bonds and cash were
distributed leaving less than four percent of past due interest still
to be reconciled in 1994."l'
3. Preliminary Brady Restructuring Agreement with Brazil
Brazil and its creditors reached agreement on the terms of
the long-awaited Brady style restructuring in mid-1992. 392 At the
385. Argentina received around US$2 billion in loans from the IMF, the World
Bank, and the Inter-American Development Bank to purchase the collateral for the
Brady bonds. Emerging Markets - Argentina Gets Brady Moncy, 961 INT'L FIN. REv., Jan. 9
1993, at 42.
386. Banks Get Behind Argentina, 948 INT'L FIN. REV., Sept. 26, 1992, at 22; Argen-
tina: 'Went as Expected', 950 INT'L FIN. REv., Oct. 10, 1992, at 31; Argentina's Brady Signed,
959 INT'L FIN. REv., Dec. 12, 1992, at 29.
387. Argentina Issues its Bradys, 974 INT'L FIN. REV., April 10, 1993, at 25.
388. Id.
389. Argentina FRBs Issued, 1003 INT'L FIN. REv., Oct. 30, 1993, at 41.
390. Id.; Argentina - FRBs Near, 999 INT'L FIN. REv., Oct. 2, 1993, at 50.
391. Argentine- US$1.lbn FRBs Released, 1011 INT'L FIN. REv., Dec. 31, 1993, at 30.
392. Q&A: William Rhodes, 39 LATINFiNANCE 87 (1992); Brazil Signs $44bn Brady
deal, 937 INT'L FIN. REv., July 11, 1992, at 28. The menu brazil agreed with its creditor
banks included: 30-year discount bonds at LIBOR plus 13/16th%, with collateral for
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time, leading bankers were optimistic of a relatively rapid com-
pletion of the restructuring39 3 - an optimism which was utterly
misplaced. Again, as with Argentina, interest rates declined after
the terms of the restructuring were set and before the banks
were required to select their options from the menu. As a result,
the selections were heavily biased in favor of par bonds and the
acquisition of collateral required more funds than Brazil had
available.394 Brazil sought to have creditors rebalance their se-
lections of restructuring instruments; a process which proved to
be very time-consuming: agreement on new options was not
reached until July 1993. 31' Even then, the process was not over
as Brazil was unable to obtain an IMF accord and funding by the
November 30 deadline. 396 A new deadline of April 15 was set for
the completion of the rescheduling. Unlike other debtors, Bra-
zil did not need the IMF funds to be able to acquire the collat-
eral for the Brady bonds.397 The U.S. Treasury was not willing to
sell the zero coupon bonds needed as collateral to Brazil, how-
the principal and a 12-month rolling interest guarantee; 30-year par bonds paying 4%
in year one rising progressively to 6% for years 7 to 30 and with the same collateral as
the discount bonds; 15-year front-loaded interest reduction bonds ("FLIRBs") paying
4% for years one and two, 4.5% for years three and four, 5% for years five and six, and
LIBOR plus 13/16% thereafter, and collateral only for a 12-month rolling interest guar-
antee for the first six years; 18-year new money bonds equal to 18.18% of a bank's
exposure and paying Libor plus 7/8%; new money loans with a tenor of 20 years, the
same interest rate as the FLIRBs, and progressively higher repayments of principal; and
20-year capitalisation bonds with the same interest rates as FLIRBs except that for years
seven on the rate is 8% fixed, not a floating rate, and the difference between the lower
interest rates for years 1 to 6 and 8% will be capitalised (these bonds have no collat-
eral).
393. Q&A: William Rhodes, 39 LATINFINANCE 87 (1992).
394. The commercial banks elected for almost 60% of the debt to be converted
into the two available classes of par bonds, and for almost 20% to be converted into
discount bonds. Brazil sought a maximum of 40% of par bonds and a minimum of 35%
of discount bonds. See Brazil Asks to Extend Deal Closing to Nov 30, LDC DEBT REPORT,
May 31, 1993, at 1.
395. Brazil Brady on the Way, 988 INT'L FIN. REv., July 17, 1993, at 45. Brazil had
requested creditors to take no more than 40% of their debt in par bonds and no less
than 35% in discount bonds. Brazil: Rebalancing Update, 981 INT'L FIN. REv., May 29,
1993, at 60.
396. Brazil Requests Brady Extension, 997 INT'L FIN. REv., Sept. 18, 1993, at 47.
397. Id.; Brazil - Under Pressure, 998 INT'L FIN. REv., Sept. 25, 1993, at 47; Brazil -
Collateral at Issue, 991 INT'L FIN. REv., Aug. 7, 1993, at 40. By the end of October, 1993,
Brazil's foreign exchange reserves were about US$29 billion. Brazil - Critical Mass
Reached, 1010 INT'L FIN. REv., Dec. 18, 1993, at 48. This was up from US$7 billion in
November 1991. Market Down on Thin Volume, 905 INT'L FIN. REv., Nov. 23, 1991, at 22.
IMF funds were needed only for the vote of confidence they represented.
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ever, without an IMF deal and the restructuring agreement had
been made conditional upon an IMF accord being in place. 98
Cross-conditionality of official and commercial bank lending was
alive and well. At the eleventh hour in March 1994, however,
when the IMF would still not commit its funds,39 9 Brazil revealed
it had purchased the necessary U.S. Treasury zero-coupon bonds
in the open market and intended to proceed with the reschedul-
ing anyway. 400 Brazil then promplty obtained waivers of the term
which made the IMF agreement a condition of the closing401
and Brazil's Brady restructuring was the first to proceed without
the formal support of the IMF.40 2
After the completion of Brazil's Brady scheme, Brazil's
bonds represented thirty-seven percent of the total, Mexico's
twenty-five percent, Argentina's twenty-four percent, and Vene-
zuela's fourteen percent.40 3
4. Debtor Nations Sued
In 1990, Paraguay instituted a program to repurchase, on a
confidential basis, its debt in the secondary market through Fi-
nance Consult40 4 and First Boston & MG Emerging Markets40 5
and had reduced its outstanding commercial bank debt to only
US$230 million. At the time, Paraguay was refusing to meet pay-
ments on interest or principal, despite relatively healthy foreign
exchange reserves. This classic instance of moral hazard 40 6 gal-
led bankers. 4 7 Banque de Gestion Privee, a part of the Credit
Agricole group of France, acquired some US$20 million of
Paraguayan debt in the secondary market and sued to enforce
398. Id.; Brazil - Under Pressure, 998 INT'L FIN. REv., Sept. 25, 1993, at 47.
399. The IMF said no "in the nicest possible way" by taking notice of Brazil's "sig-
nificant record of progress" in addressing its inflation problem. No IMF Letter for Brazil,
1022 INT'L FIN. REv., Mar. 19, 1994, at 49.
400. Id.
401. Brazil - Waiver Approved, 1023 INT'L FIN. REV., Mar. 26, 1994, at 46.
402. No IMF Letter for Brazil, 1022 INT'L FIN. REv., Mar. 19, 1994, at 49.
403. Krengel, Brady Bonds and Their Message for Equity Markets, LATIN AMERICAN Bi-
WEEKLY BULLETIN 3 (1994).
404. Banque de Gestion P-ivee - SIB v Republica de Paraguay and Banco Central del
Paraguay, 787 F. Supp 53.
405. Interview with YY (name witheld on request) formerly a senior trader with
one of the major trading houses, New York City, April 1993 [hereinafter YY Interview].
406. For further consideration of such moral hazards, see text accompanying note
168.
407. Attaching Paraguay, 34 LATINFINANCE 14 (1992).
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the terms of the loan agreements.4"' In 1992, it received sum-
mary judgment and a court order attaching assets of the Central
Bank of Paraguay held by Swiss Bank Corporation in New York
to satisfy the debt.40 9
In September 1993, a small trading house, Pravin Banker
Associates, received summary judgment against Peru for non-
payment of its debts. 410 The boutique had sued Peru for the full
face value of US$1.4 million of Peruvian loans it had acquired in
the secondary market in December 1990 for 27 cents on the dol-
lar.411 At the same time, a Swiss emerging markets boutique
sued Ecuador for US$30 million based on the face value of loans
and unpaid interest. This suit was settled for an undisclosed
amount. The proceeds of the settlement were for the Swiss bou-
tique alone and did not accrue to other creditors.41 2
The final law suit against a debtor nation in this period war-
rants special consideration.41 In 1993, the Dart family were Bra-
zil's fourth largest creditor with an exposure of US$1.4 billion
under the Multi-Year Deposit Facility Agreement dated as of Sep-
tember 22, 1988 ("MYDFA"). 4 14 In March 1993, as part of the
restructuring, the Darts elected to have all of their MYDFA debt
converted into capitalization bonds, so-called C-bonds, which
had a tenor of twenty years, and paid reduced interest rates for
the first six years and eight percent thereafter, with the differ-
ence between the lower interest rates and eight percent to be
408. Banque de Gestion Privee - SIB v Republica de Paraguay and Banco Central del
Paraguay, 787 F Supp 53.
409. Attaching Paraguay, 34 LATINFINANCE 14 (1992).
410. Pravin Banker Associates Ltd v Banco Popular del Peru and The Republic of Peru,
895 F. Supp 660 (S.D.N.Y. 1995); Pravin Banker Associates Ltd v Banco Popular del Peru and
The Republic of Peru, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2730 (93 Civ 0094 (RWS) (March, 1995 per
Sweet, DJ).
411. Suits Against Ecuador, Peru Could Shake Up Debt Market, 6 LDC DEBT REPORT,
Aug. 2, 1993, at 1; Pravin Banker Presses Suit to Recover Peruvian Debt, 6 LDC DEBT REPORT,
Sept. 7, 1993, at 5; Pravin Banker Associates v. Banco Popular del Peru, 93 Civ. 0094, 165
Banker 379, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2003, decided Feb 24, 1994.
412. Suits Against Ecuador, Peru Could Shake Up Debt Market, 6 LDC DEBT REPORT,
Aug. 2, 1993, at 1.
413. CIBC Bank and Trust Co (Cayman) Ltd v Banco Central do Brasil, 886 F. Supp
1105 (SDNY 1995).
414. See Preliminary Offering Memorandum dated September 30, 1996 for
US$1,281,699,755.40, The MYDFA Trust, Trust Certificates due September 15, 2007 at
A-1 (copy on file with the Fordham International Law Journal); and A pointed issue 1001
INT'L FIN. REv. Oct 16, 1993, 45.
THE FACILITATION OF THE BRADY PLAN
capitalized.41 As with par bonds, C-bonds involved no discount
of principal. Unlike par bonds, C-bonds were not collateralized
and therefore didn't require the expenditure of foreign ex-
change on zero coupon bonds. Nonetheless, Brazil wanted to
rebalance the Darts' selection to achieve a balance among the
options. Under the terms of the refinancing, the Darts were en-
titled to make the election they had made, and refused to resile
from it,416 i.e., they elected to hold Brazil to its agreement. As
the Dart debt represented only four percent of Brazil's total debt
and all other creditors had consented to the restructuring, Brazil
was able to proceed with its Brady restructuring without the
Dart's consent.417 The loans held by the Darts in the MYDFA
remained as loans, while the balance were converted into Brady
bonds. On June 28, 1990, the Darts instituted proceedings
against Banco Central do Brasil and others for failure to pay
some US$60 million of interest when due and other claims.
These proceedings were eventually settled on March 18, 1996, by
Brazil giving to the Darts some US$52.3 million of bonds and
US$25.3 million in cash on account of past due interest.418
In summary, these sporadic law suits by minor lenders, in-
vestment boutiques, and the Dart family had no effect on the
broader market - no wave of litigation followed the efforts of
these pioneers.
5. Return to Voluntary Markets
The vigorous return of the major debtors as borrowers on
the international capital markets continued strongly in this pe-
riod. Most of these capital flows were through direct and portfo-
lio investment in the equity and securities markets, and were
415. The C-bonds paid 4% for years one and two, 4.5% for years three and four,
and 5% for years five and six.
416. Interview with Lee C Buchheit, of Cleary, Gottlieb, Steen & Hamilton, New
York City, December 6, 1994.
417. Brazil - US$160m payment made, 1011 INT'L FIN. REv., Dec. 31, 1993, at 33.
418. Power, Sovereign Debt: The Rise of the Secondary Market and Its Implications for
Future Restructurings, 64 FoRDHAM. L. REv. 2701, 2745-54 (1996); Preliminary Offering
Memorandum dated September 30, 1996 for $1,281,699,755.40, The MYDFA Trust,
Trust Certificates due September 15, 2007, at A-5. As the MYDFA loans remained as
relatively illiquid loans, the Darts transferred them to a trust, The MYDFA Trust, which
issued Trust Certificates due September 15, 2007, which were then offered to qualified
institutional buyers under Rule 144A of the Securities Acts of 1933 by the above Prelimi-
nary Offering Memorandum.
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principally funded, at least initially, by the repatriation of flight
capital. Commercial bank syndicated lending did not resume on
a significant scale.419 In words which this author endorses, Clark
said, "one of the more remarkable recent developments in the
international financial arena has been the explosion of private
capital flows to borrowers, especially Brady countries, that were
once credit constrained."4 20
As early as March 1992, Moody's was warning that "debt is
rising rapidly again.''421 The rating agency continued,
The old boom-bust model seems still prevalent, judging by
the rapid increase in credit, the steep rise in current account
deficits, and the return to reliance on external indebtedness.
Heavy external capital flow.., could magnify the size of the
eventual reversal. If the fight for redistribution [of wealth]
remains the fundamental factor of Latin America's political
economy, the current improvement could prove fragile in-
deed.422
This return to the capital markets was aided by the low in-
terest rate environment in the United States and Japan in the
early 1990s. Higher yields were available in LDC bonds, a fact of
which Latin American borrowers were quick to take advan-
tage. 4 2 3
B. Impetus for the Market
Debt-for-nature swaps, as before, continued on a scale of lit-
tle significance to the market but of real significance to environ-
419. Clark, supra note 32, at 52. The first loan to Mexico since the inception of
the debt crisis was made in February, 1992 by Chase Manhattan. Lee C. Buchheit, You'll
Never Eat Lunch In This Conference Room Again, INT'L FIN. L. REv., April 1992, 11, at 12.
420. Clark, supra note 32, at 52. Much of the demand for Brazilian eurobonds as
late as mid-1993 came from flight capital. In contrast, by that time the principal de-
mand for Mexican eurobonds was from industrial country investors, particularly from
the United States. The difference reflects Mexico's earlier return to the international
capital markets and the size of the enormous pool of Brazilian flight capital.
421. Ongoing Risks of Latin American Sovereign Debt, Moody's Special Comment
- Industry Group: Sovereign, Mar. 26, 1992, at 1 (Moody's Investor Services) (copy on
file with the Fordham International Law Journal).
422. Id. at 5.
423. Financial Market Developments, BANK OF ENG. Q. BULL. 469, 471 (1993), repro-
duced in SCOTT7 & WELLONS, INTERNATIONAL FINANCE - TRANsACTIONS, POLICY AND REGu-
LATION 659-60 (1995). For instance, Mexican entities issued US$4 billion of bonds in
the international markets in 1992 and US$7 billion in the first ten months of 1993. Id.
at 660.
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mental protection efforts in the relevant debtor countries.424
Debt-equity swaps, particularly in the form of privatization auc-
tions, provided substantial impetus to the secondary market, es-
pecially early in this period. Debt buy-backs likewise were a sub-
stantial impetus to the market.425 However, the principal impe-
tus for the market in this period was the activity of the trading
houses and institutional investors.4 26 The sustained bull runs of
1991 and 1993 made debt trading a highly lucrative business
and, as we shall see, trading houses began to take large positions
in the debt and were a major source of demand throughout this
period.
This represented a sea change in the market. For the first
time in the market's history, its principal impetus was no longer
the use of the debt in buy-backs, privatizations, or debt-equity
swaps but was the demand from plain, old-fashioned investors,
albeit mainly wealthy Latin American individuals and institu-
tional investors such as mutual funds. The Brady process was
seen to have improved the quality of the credits by coupling debt
relief to partial collateral for the bonds. By mid-1993, institu-
tional investors were reported to be coming into the market "in
droves" and to be holding "assets to maturity rather than
trade."4 27 Options aided this process - whereas before partici-
pants might have sold into a rising market to take their profits,
now more participants were buying put options to secure their
profits and retaining the asset.4 28 Furthermore, as LDC funds
were now being offered with minimum investments as low as
US$1,000 to US$1,500, a whole new class of investor was being
424. BankAmerica Donates LDC Loans, REUTERS, July 29, 1993. The World Wildlife
Fund completed a US$19 million debt-for-nature swap in the Philippines in August
1993 with funds provided by the U.S. Agency for International Development. Philip-
pines - Debt-for-Nature Swap, 992 INr'L FIN. REv., Aug. 14, 1993, at 40.
425. In August 1993, Brazil requested that the amount of collateral for its Brady
bonds be reduced from US$3.2 billion to US$2.8 billion because the stock of debt for
conversion was US$5 billion less than had been estimated. This unanticipated reduc-
tion in debt almost certainly resulted from informal debt buy-backs and this figure sug-
gests buy-backs had been popular in 1992 and 1993. Brazil's total debt for its Brady-
style restructuring was US$35 billion rather than the US$40 billion widely expected.
426. Interview with Martin Benegas-Lynch, International Treasurer, Banco Santan-
der, New York City, April 22, 1993 [hereinafter Benegas-Lynch Interview].
427. Secondary Market - Prices to Remain Stable, 983 INT'L FIN. REv., June 12, 1993,
at 55.
428. Id.
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brought into the market.
4 29
There was evidence that towards the end of this period the
role of the institutional investors was beginning to have a greater
impact on the market than that of the trading houses."' Fur-
thermore, Mexican par bonds had been tracking U.S. Treasury
bonds since 1992 and by late 1993 the Brady bonds of Venezuela
and Argentina were also tracking U.S. Treasuries.4"' In short,
the market was beginning, finally, to behave like a mature securi-
ties market.
C. Market Characteristics
1. Market Structure
The market in this period had an unusual three part struc-
ture. The most actively traded part of the market were the Brady
bonds - a large pool of highly liquid securities. 43 2 The largest
part in terms of total debt remained the bank loans but these
were substantially less liquid than the bonds. The third part of
the market were the new issues: eurobonds, Yankee bonds, and
Rule 144A offerings.433 Unlike the other two parts of the mar-
ket,43 4 the new issues were not discounted, and are beyond the
scope of this work.
429. Id. For instance, the Emerging Markets Income Fund II launched by Oppen-
heimer in June 1993 raised US$285 million to be invested primarily in dollar-denomi-
nated Brady bonds and emerging markets loans of Latin American countries. Funds -
All the Rage, 985 INT'L FIN. REV., June 26, 1993, at 48.
430. Market Charges to New Highs, 994 INT'L FIN. REv., Aug. 29, 1993, at 36; Bradys
Rally, 995 INT'L FIN. REv., Sept. 4, 1993, at 38 (reporting investor saying that "the mar-
ket no longer is controlled by dealers, it is a customer driven market ... All during the
summer the traders begin to bid it down and then the investors would come in and
buy.").
431. Secondary Market - Quiet and Mixed, 999 INT'L FIN. REv., Oct. 2, 1993, at 53;
Secondary Market - Treasury-driven, 998 INT'L FIN. REv., Sept. 25, 1993, at 47.
432. JOHN CLARK, THE STRUCTURE, GROWTH AND RECENT PERFORMANCE OF THE
LATIN AMERICAN BOND MARKET, Federal Reserve Bank of New York Research Paper
Number 9416, Oct. 1994, at 2 [hereinafter Clark paper no. 9416].
433. Yankee bonds are bonds issued in the U.S. domestic market and therefore
must satisfy the SEC rules. Because such compliance is onerous, the majority of the
bonds issued in the United States were placed with Qualified Institutional Buyers under
the provisions of Rule 144A. This rule allows such buyers, which have met minimum
net worth and other tests designed to insure their size and sophistication, to trade pri-
vately placed securities freely without meeting the onerous SEC requirements. See
Clark paper no 9416, supra note 454, at 19-21.
434. The bank loans, of course, traded at substantial discounts and the Brady
bonds traded at a discount to face value which was in addition to the discount involved
in their creation from bank loans.
THE FACILITATION OF THE BRADY PLAN
2. The Growth in Bond Trading
After Brazil's Brady restructuring was completed in April
1994, there were about US$200 billion of LDC bonds outstand-
ing. These consisted of about US$150 billion of Brady bonds
and US$50 billion of new issues, principally eurobonds. 43  The
secondary market turnover of the most active of these bonds "ri-
val [led] that of all but the most liquid industrial country govern-
ment bond markets and exceed[ed] that of the U.S. corporate
and junk bond markets" 436 and the stock of LDC bonds at
US$200 billion was comparable to the U.S. junk bond market at
US$290 billion. 3 v
Meanwhile, between 1989 and mid-1994, Latin American
debtors placed some US$60 billion of new-issue bonds on the
international capital markets of which some US$50 billion were
still outstanding at the time of Brazil's Brady scheme in April
1994.438 There are many differences between the Brady and
new-issue bonds. Most Brady bonds issuances were in massive
amounts exceeding US$10 billion 439 with 30-year bullet maturi-
ties and the repayment of principal secured by zero-coupon
bonds held in escrow. 4 " And Brady bonds were, of course, is-
sued to the debtor's existing creditors. In contrast, new issue
bonds were typically placed in amounts between US$100 million
and US$250 million and their average maturity at the end of the
1993 was five and a half years. 4 '
The high liquidity of Brady bonds is the result of the size of
the issues, their duration, and the nature of the underlying
risk."42 Their long duration means the prices of Bradies are par-
ticularly responsive to changes in perceptions of country risk and
435. Id. at 4-7.
436. Id. at 7.
437. Id. at 4.
438. Id. at 6. The leading underwriters of these bond issues, in order, were: Credit
Suisse First Boston, JP Morgan, and Chase. Other major underwriters, in no particular
order, were: Merrill Lynch, Salomon Brothers, Swiss Bankcorp, Goldman, Citibank and
Bear Stearns. See YY Interview, supra note 405.
439. For instance, as part of their restructurings, Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico
issued US$12.6 billion, US$10.5 billion, and US$22.4 billion of par bonds respectively.
Clark paper no. 9416, supra note 432, at 7.
440. Id.
441. Id.
442. Id. at 10.
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of interest rates.443 The nature of the underlying risk means the
bonds are subject to the continual stream of political and eco-
nomic developments in Latin America,4"4 each of which may
give grounds for the sale or purchase of bonds. This high liquid-
ity and volatility is precisely what contemporary finance theory
would predict.445 Notwithstanding this high liquidity, it appears
that the majority of Brady bonds were still held by the commer-
cial banks in their loan portfolios at the end of 1993.446
The market appears to regard new issue bonds as having a
de facto senior status over Brady bonds - a view with which the
ratings agencies concur.447 The reasons generally given for this
supposed seniority are the large share of total indebtedness rep-
resented by Brady bonds together with their long maturities and
connection with previously distressed credits. In addition, Brady
bonds were generally registered bonds and thus more readily re-
structured than the new issues which were usually in bearer
form."48 Brady bonds in turn were perceived as enjoying de
443. Id.
444. Id. These events occur far more frequently than do changes in the affairs of a
major corporate bond issuer, for instance.
445. See supra note 246 and accompanying text.
446. This is a testament in part to the massive amount of Bradys issued. See Clark
paper no. 9416, supra note 432, at 21. Peagram, writing in September 1994, said that,
"it's generally believed that banks in some countries such as Italy and Canada have not
yet sold any of their Brady bonds and that banks in general remain the largest holders
of these instruments." Peagram, How Safe Are Those Bradys?, Euromoney 50 (1994).
Lehman Brothers wrote that "although the investor base has diversified over the past
five years, commercial banks as a group still appear to be large holders of Brady Bonds.
Through mid-year 1994, the Brady plan closure had not led to a significant drop in
asset exposure of banks.., to individual Brady countries. In the absence of new syndi-
cated lending, this would seem to indicate a fair amount of Brady Bond retention." See
LEHMAN BROTHERS, OVERVIEW OF THE BRADY MARKET - BRADY BOND HANDBOOK 5 (Leh-
man Brothers 1995) (copy on file with the Fordham International Law Journal).
447. Several types of Argentine, Mexican, and Venezuelan Brady bonds were, in
this period, rated a one half letter grade below the countries' respective sovereign bond
issues. The rating agencies perceived these bonds as more likely to be rescheduled for
the reasons given in the text. See Clark paper no. 9416, supra note 432, at 28.
448. Id. at 12. As the holders of registered bonds can be contacted by a financially
troubled debtor regarding rescheduling, such bonds are often considered more likely
to suffer that fate than bearer bonds. However, bearer bonds are not immune from
rescheduling or restructuring. A debtor does not need to know its creditors to be able
to defer or rearrange payment. In the words of MacMillan, "the sovereign debtor could
either unilaterally reschedule its debt by simply announcing the new terms to bond-
holders, or it could negotiate with them. Although a unilateral rescheduling is an un-
desirable policy choice for a sovereign debtor, it may become necessary if a negotiated
rescheduling is not forthcoming." MacMillan, supra note 7, at 334.
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facto seniority over bank loans, although, in this writer's opin-
ion, this is more problematic. 449
3. Profitability of Brady Bonds for Investors
This period is the first in the market's history when being
consistently long was a good strategy. The appreciation in Mexi-
can bonds between their issuance in March 1990 and 1993 was
exceptional. Mexican par bonds traded at 42 cents on the dollar
shortly after issuance and discount bonds at 63 cents. By year-
end 1993 the par bonds were trading at around 84.5 cents and
the discount bonds at around 96 cents4 5 ° - a 100% capital ap-
preciation on the par bonds, which had paid 6.25% interest in
the meantime, and a 50% capital appreciation for discount
bonds which had paid Libor plus 13/16th%.
4. Location of Market
The market had began in New York City and traditionally
had operated out of New York and London. With increasing ma-
turity it also spread its geographic and time zone coverage with a
number of traders operating also out of Frankfurt, Tokyo, Mex-
ico City, Rio de Janeiro, and Buenos Aires. 45' Not all market
makers and traders felt obliged to service, or limit their opera-
tions to, these centres. In 1993, ING Bank (formerly NMB) had
five units trading emerging markets debt and these were in New
York, London, Tokyo, Sao Paulo, and Manila.4 52 While banks
found it profitable to service the investors in a range of centers,
449. There appears to be a clear perception in the market that Brady bonds are
more secure than the loans of a country yet to have a Brady style restructuring. To the
extent that being granted a Brady scheme is a mark of approval from the IMF and the
international financial community (and to the extent one accepts that IMF policies lead
to sustainable economic growth) then there may be some substance to such a percep-
tion. However, the substance derives only from this factor, not the form of the debt as
either bonds or loans. Against this, countries which have undergone a Brady style re-
structuring have very few medium and long-term bank loans which almost certainly
confers some seniority upon the loans. It is the situation of the 1980s reversed. In the
1980s bond exposures were so small it was not worth alienating a source of funds to save
the relatively small amounts due on them. In the 1990s it is the loan exposures which
are so small as to make default not worthwhile. In the 1990s, ironically, LDC bank loans
are probably more secure than the Brady bonds.
450. Ldc Secondary Market Debt Opening Of Ny Trading On 29/12/93, 1011 INT'L FIN.
REV., Dec. 31, 1993, at 30.
451. Fast-Growing Debt Market Tries Some Self-Regulation, LDC DEBT REPORT, Nov. 11,
1991, at 1.
452. Voorhees, The Bull Run of 93, 50 LATINFINANCE 28 (1993).
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the great bulk of the trading, and all the market making,453 still
occurred in New York and London. In 1993, market partici-
pants and commentators estimated that about 80-85% of trades
were done in New York and the balance of 15-20% in London.
4 54
New York tended to dominate trading in Latin American debt
whereas London was stronger in the trading of Polish and other
Eastern European, and Morrocan debt.4 55
5. Screen Trading
In 1992, the trading screens remained indicative only. 4 5 6
The prices did not have to be honored by the traders posting
them and trades could only be concluded over the telephone.
This facilitated the making of bogus quotes for the purpose of
moving the market rather than effecting a transaction. During
1993, there was a marked trend towards 'live' screens. 45' These
screens indicated by a symbol which quotes were live, and capa-
ble of acceptance, and which were only indicative. Live quotes
first became common in the heavily traded instruments such as
the Brady bonds of Argentina, Mexico, and Venezuela.458
The move towards live screens was significant, both for the
reduction it brought in the opportunities for abuse and as a sign
of the final stages of maturation of the market into adulthood.
453. Interview with Felix Robyns, Managing Director, Emerging Markets, Bankers
Trust, London, May 5, 1993 [hereinafter Robyns Interview].
454. Martin Benegas-Lynch estimated that 80% of market activity was in New York
with the balance in London. Benegas-Lynch Interview, supra note 426. Mary Tobin
estimated that 85% of market activity occurred in New York with the balance in
London. Interview with Mary Tobin, Senior Staff Writer, International Financing Review,
New York City, April 21, 1993.
455. Interview with Martin W. Schubert, Chairman European InterAmerican Fi-
nance Corporation, New York City, April 22, 1993 [hereinafter Schubert Interview I].
Michael Pettis estimated that in New York up to 90% of Latin American trading and
only about one-third of Eastern European trading occurred. Pettis Interview II, supra
note 47.
456. Voorhees, Doses of Reality, 40 LATINFINANCE 19, 22 (1992).
457. Voorhees, Shooting the Bull; Debt Markets, 55 LATINFINANCE 30 (1994); Secondary
Market - Still Worth Preserving, 980 INT'L FIN. REV., May 22, 1993, at 31.
458. Interview with Giacomo de Filippis, Chairman of Giadefi, Inc., New York City,
April 22, 1993 [hereinafter De Filippis Interview]. The fact that a price is firm is usually
signaled by an asterisk next to it on the screen. By 1993, however, prices without the
asterisk for debt of the principal debtors posted by reputable traders were far more
often than not honoured by the traders, i.e. when another trader called on that quote
the trader who had posted it would sell at the price indicated.
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6. Derivatives
The growth in the debt market in this period was outstrip-
ped by the growth in options on the debt. In 1992, according to
EMTA's survey, options were sold on US$15 billion face value of
debt.4 59 In 1993, this figure increased dramatically to between
US$80 billion46 ° and US$100 billion of debt.461 Apart from risk
management and speculation, options continued to provide a
real service to potential investors in privatizations who, for the
price of the option, could secure the right to acquire debt at a
certain price should it be required to exchange for equity in the
privatized corporation.4 In 1992 warrants were created on the
debt of Brazil and Poland, among others, and afforded investors
the opportunity to speculate on these assets.46 3 The leading issu-
ers of options in 1992 were Merrill Lynch, Chase Manhattan,
and JP Morgan. First Boston, ING, and Chemical were also ac-
tive. 4 6 4
An active secondary market in options developed in this pe-
riod. EMTA assisted this development with the adoption in May
1993 of six market practices for the trading of options.4 65 Mar-
459. Clark paper no. 9416, supra note 432, at 23.
460. Id. In 1992, call options reportedly outnumbered put options by five to one.
In 1993, calls remained more popular but the demand for eafch type of option was far
more balanced.
461. John Clark put the volume of options trading in 1993 at US$60 billion with a
further US$20 billion of 'structured transactions' such as those in which fully collateral-
ised investment-grade securities are created out of Brady bonds. Michael Fuhrman esti-
mated the annual volume for 1993 as between US$80 and US$100 billion. See Voor-
hees, Shooting the Bull: Debt Markets, 55 IATINFINANCE 30 (1994).
462. Richard Waters, Risk and Reward: Derivatives Rush to Catch Up with Emerging
markets, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 29, 1992, at 18. These options tended to be expensive, up to 3
or 4 cents on the dollar, because they were extremely difficult for the bank issuer to
hedge. Pettis Interview II, supra note 47.
463. Id. It was reported in October 1992 that there were US$500 million of public
warrants based on Latin American debt. See Schmerken, Latin American OTC Derivatives:
Made in the USA, 10 WALL ST. & TECHNOLOGY 29 (1992).
464. Waters, supra note 462. Other commentators exclude ING and Chemical and
include Bankers Trust, Salomons, Swiss Bank Corp, Paribas, and Banco Santander as
active writers of options at this time.
465. EMTA, Vol 2 No 3 Bulletin, May/June 1993, 2 (on file with the Fordham Inter-
national Law Journal). In 1994, EMTA further assisted this process by producing the
Master Agreement for Options on Emerging Markets Instruments and a 15 page Mar-
ket Practice Guide explaining the Master Agreement (also July 11, 1994). The Master
Agreement was designed to allow parties to enter into one agreement covering all op-
tions transactions between them. Separate subsequent transactions then need only be
evidenced by a relatively simple form of confirmation. Alternatively, parties could exe-
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ket activity in options and warrants increased dramatically in
1993. The normal size of options was in the US$5 million range
with trades of US$10 million becoming increasingly common.4 6 6
Forward contracts are another common type of derivative
but were not written in the true sense in this market. 46 7 Some
traders would engage in quasi-forwards with Latin American in-
vestors by agreeing to extend the settlement period for a Brady
bond for more than the customary seven days.468
An interesting, related form of derivative in this market was
the "when-and-if" trading of Brady bonds prior to their issuance.
Argentine bonds traded on this basis for an extended period
prior to their issuance.469 Brazilian Brady bonds commenced
trading on this basis in mid-1993 and continued until issuance in
April 1994.47' These trades were agreements for the purchase of
bonds to be executed upon issuance of the bonds provided issu-
ance occurred before a specified date.47 a In effect, these when-
and-if trades were futures and the precipitous decline in LDC
debt prices in early 1994 meant they were exceedingly expensive
futures for many purchasers.4 7 2 Other derivatives, as we have
seen, divided Brady bonds into tranches of securities in so-called
structured transactions. One tranche, with all of the stripped
out collateral from the Bradies, would attract an investment-
grade rating. The other tranche, with no collateral, traded
purely on its higher yield.473 In this, and other ways,47 4 banks
cute a Stand-Alone Confirmation which incorporated the terms of the Master Agree-
ment by reference and operated for that one transaction only.
466. OTC Options Catching On, 1000 INT'L FIN. REV., Oct. 9, 1993, at 44.
467. Clark paper no. 9416, supra note 432, at 24.
468. Id. For instance, if the settlement period is extended to 28 days for the sale of
a Brady bond by a customer to a trading house, the customer can then acquire the
bond in the market 21 days later and, with the usual seven day settlement, satisfy its
obligation to provide the security. In effect, the customer has taken a 21-day forward
contract on the Brady bond.
469. The Argentine bonds were issued on April 7, 1993 and EMTA helped facili-
tate the smooth trading of the when-and-if issued bonds by recommending an April 14
date for the settlement of when-and-if trades with real bonds. See Argentine Debt Issues
Rally On When-Issued Exchange, LDC DEBT REPORT, April 12, 1993, at 1.
470. Clark paper no. 9416, supra note 432, at 44.
471. EMTA issued draft forms to facilitate the trading of when-and-if issued Brazil-
ian Brady bonds and new market practices for Brazilian debt trading in August 1993.
See EMTA, Vol 2 No. 4 Bulletin, July/August, 1993, at 1 (copy on file with the Fordham
International Law Journal).
472. Clark paper no. 9416, supra note 432, at 44.
473. See id. at 25.
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were able to reshape emerging markets debt to suit investors
permitted to invest only in investment-grade securities.475
7. The Metamorphosis of LDC Trading Desks into Emerging
Markets Desks
One interesting aspect of the heavy new issuances of bonds
by LDCs is that the eurobonds typically traded in the Emerging
Markets divisions of the trading houses side-by-side with the
Brady bonds and bank loans of debtors which had not yet had a
Brady style restructuring. As Eurobonds are securities under the
U.S. securities laws, this hastened the movement of LDC trading
units into the registered broker-dealer subsidiaries of the respec-
tive banks and thus under the regulation of the securities laws.
These new bond issues also supported the name change from
LDC debt to "Emerging Markets" as bankers sought to distance
these new issues from the taint of the debt crisis.
4 7 6
8. Efficiency of Market
Research into prices in the secondary market confirms that
the market continued to grow more efficient over time.4 7 The
reasons for this trend were not identified in the research but the
most likely reasons for this trend are higher trading volume and
general market maturity. 478
9. Market Volume and Debt Traded
The conversion of an ever increasing proportion of the out-
standing loans into bonds continued to transform the market
from a heavily negotiated one into something looking more like
a standard securities market. The bonds settle on Euroclear with
simple transfer documentation. This means bond trades are
474. See Argentina - BIG Trust 1 Launched, 990 INT'L FIN. REv., July 31, 1993, at 35.
475. Voorhees, Shooting the Bull; Debt Markets, 55 LATINFINANCE 30 (1994).
476. The term "emerging market" was coined in about 1984 by the International
Finance Corporation (a part of the World Bank group) while in the process of seeking
a title for a less developed country investment fund. The IFC had previously promoted
the Third World Investment Trust, but its acronym, TWIT, was considererd unhelpful.
The Emerging Markets Growth Fund, on the other hand, was a marketable name. See
Alain Soulard, The Role of Multilateral Financial Institutions in Bringing Developing Compa-
nies to U.S. Markets, 17 FoRDHAM INT'L LJ. S145, S147 (1994).
477. LEE, SUNG & URRUTIA, supra note 72.
478. Id. at 553.
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both cheaper and quicker than loan trades.4 79  Many institu-
tional investors are proscribed from investing in loans so conver-
sion into bonds made LDC debt accessible to a broader range of
these major investors. 480 Interest rates in developed countries
were low from mid-1990 until early 1992 which made Brady
bonds, especially par bonds, appear relatively more attractive.4 l
Furthermore, a Brady restructuring was seen as a stamp of ap-
proval for a nation's economic policies48 2 and its Brady bonds
typically benefited from the perceived improvements in
creditworthiness.488
For all of these reasons, market volume continued to in-
crease dramatically. In 1992, the Emerging Markets Traders As-
sociation ("EMTA") conducted its first survey of trading
volumes. The total volume for emerging markets was US$773
billion. 484 This figure was somewhat in excess of other estimates
which were in the US$500 billion485 to US$600 billion 486 range.
The Association's volume figure includes the double counting
involved in the one transaction being recorded as a sale on one
trader's books and as a buy on the counterpart trader's books
and being counted in the trading volume of each.487 Discount-
ing the double counting and considering the estimates of others,
this author's best estimate is that about US$500 billion face value
of LDC debt in fact changed hands in 1992.488 By way of com-
479. Voorhees, Starting the Day Right, 35 LATINFINANCE 73 (1992).
480. Id.
481. Interview with Felix Robyns, Managing Director, Emerging Markets, Bankers
Trust, London, May 5, 1993.
482. The completion of a Brady restructuring was often perceived as a strong
green light for foreign direct and portfolio investment. Interview with Professor Rior-
dan Roette of the Johns Hopkins University, Washington, DC, April 29, 1993. The abil-
ity of Argentina and Brazil to reaccess the international capital markets well before
their Brady restructurings casts some doubt on the accuracy of the perception.
483. Voorhees, Starting the Day Right, 35 LATINFINANCE 73 (1992).
484. Emerging Markets Traders Association ("EMTA"), Vol 2 No 5 "Bulletin",
Sept/Oct 1993, at 1 (copy on file with the Fordham International Law Journal). The most
actively traded debt was that of Brazil, with a volume of US$209 billion, followed by
Mexico at US$189 billion. Latin American debt represented over 80% of trading vol-
ume and the volume of bonds traded exceeded that of loans.
485. Holland, The LDC Debt Market: It's a Jungle Out There, Bus. WEEK, Mar. 15,
1993, at 86.
486. Clark, supra note 32, at 11 (estimating just below US$600 billion).
487. Voorhees, Shooting the bull; debt markets, 55 LATINFINANCE 30 (1994).
488. A reduction of about one-third of total volume traded would seem appropri-
ate as only trades between traders would be counted twice. Transactions of traders with
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parison, some US$1.7 trillion of stocks were traded on the New
York Stock Exchange that year.48 9 For the first time in 1992 the
volume of bonds traded exceeded that of bank loans.49 °
The size of EMTA's membership also gives some idea of the
scale of the market - in 1992, it exceeded 100 institutions for
the first time.491
Market volume continued to accelerate. EMTA's annual
volume survey estimated that US$1.978 trillion4 9 2 of debt traded
in 1993. 41' This figure is again higher than the other estimates
which ranged from US$1 trillion494 to US$1.5 trillion.495 Once
again, the best estimate after eliminating double counting is that
perhaps US$1.3 trillion of debt in fact changed hands in 1993.
According to EMTA's survey, trading volume in Brady
bonds in 1993 was US$1.02 trillion, some fifty-two percent of to-
tal market volume. 49 6 Typical trading sizes towards the end of
this period were in the US$10 million to US$15 million range.497
In 1992, the most heavily traded debt was that of Brazil,
which accounted for 29.8% of total debt traded.498 It was fol-
lowed by the debt of Argentina (23.6%), Venezuela (17.1%),
and Mexico (16.2%)." 9 The balance of the trading comprised
some 3% of other Latin American debt and 10.2% of the debt of
buyers, such as mutual funds, or with sellers, such as commercial banks without their
own LDC debt trading desks, would not be counted twice.
489. Holland, supra note 485, at 86.
490. Emerging Markets: A Trillion Dollars in 1993?, 1002 INT'L FIN. REV., Oct. 23,
1993, at 40.
491. Nicolas Rohatyn, Remarks to the EMTA 1992 Annual Meeting, Dec. 14, 1992,
at 7 (copy on file with the Fordham International Law Journal).
492. This is a trillion in the U.S. sense of 1,000 billion (i.e., 1,000,000,000,000).
493. 1993 Debt Trading Volume Near U.S.$2 Trillion, EMTA Bulletin, 1994, No. 4, at 1
(copy on file with the Fordham International Law Journal); Fidler, Washington Opposes Suit
Over Brazil Debt, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 20, 1994, at 9.
494. The annual LATINFINANCE survey showed a total self-reported volume of the
traders surveyed of US$1.365 trillion and concluded that "the consensus was that US$1
trillion of emerging market debt changed hands." See Voorhees, Shooting the bull; debt
markets, 55 LATINFINANCE 30 (1994).
495. See Tracy Corrigan, Picking up the pieces of an emerging market, FIN. TIMES, April
5, 1994, at 17.
496. Peagram, How safe are those Bradys?, EUROMONEY, Sep. 1994, at 50.
497. Survivors Tackle Unchartered Waters, EUROMONEY, Sep. 1994, at 48.
498. Clark paper no. 9416, supra note 432, at 11.
499. Id. Different figures have been cited elsewhere: US$209 billion of Brazilian
debt being traded in 1992, US$189 billion of Mexican, US$156 of Argentine and US$94
billion of Venezuelan debt. See Emerging Markets: A Trillion Dollars in 1993, 1002 INT'L
FIN. REV., Oct. 23, 1993, at 40.
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other countries.5 0° In 1993, the apportionment of debt traded
was quite different. Argentine debt was by far the most heavily
traded at 28.2% of the total volume,50 1 reflecting the activity as-
sociated with its Brady restructuring in that year. It was followed
by the debt of Mexico (20.1%), Venezuela (18.7%), and Brazil
(15.1%).502 The balance was comprised of 4.4% for other Latin
American debt and 13.5% for the debt of other countries.50 3
Among other countries the debt of Morocco, the Philippines,
and Russia appears to have been the more heavily traded.
There was an extraordinary bull run in 1993. The Salomon
Brothers Brady Bond index registered a total return for the year
of nearly 44%504 and the JP Morgan Emerging Market Bond In-
dex posted its tenth consecutive monthly gain in September.50 5
These healthy returns were however eclipsed by the returns from
some of the exotics. From December 31, 1992, to December 31,
1993, Bulgarian debt rose from 13 cents on the dollar to 41
cents, Ecuadorian debt from 28 cents to 51.75, Panamanian debt
from 29 cents to 61.75, Peruvian debt from 18.5 cents to 69.5,
and Russian debt from 15 cents to 49.5 cents.5 0 6 Those figures
produce a return of 375% for the year on Peru's loans and 330%
for Russia's loans.
The veritable explosion in market volume in this period,
from perhaps US$250 billion in 1991 to US$1,300 billion in 1993
is principally attributable to the following factors.
1. The huge surge in international liquidity in 1992 and 1993
seen in the rapid growth of bond funds and mutual funds. 50
7
2. The securitization of the loans into Brady bonds.
3. The stronger economic performance and policy reforms
of the debtor nations improved the perceived quality of the
credits.50 8
500. Clark paper no. 9416, supra note 432, at 11.
501. Id.
502. Id. EMTA's volume survey for 1993 shows that the following amounts of debt
(bonds and loans) were traded in 1993: Argentina, US$544 billion; Mexico, US$465
billion; Venezuela, US$287 billion and Brazil, US$259 billion. See Peagram, supra note
124, at 50.
503. Id.
504. Voorhees, Shooting the bull; debt markets, 55 LATINFINANCE 30 (1994).
505. Secondary Market - Trading up, 1000 INT'L FIN. REv., Oct. 9, 1993, at 42.
506. Voorhees, Shooting the bull; debt markets, 55 LATINFINANCE 30 (1994).
507. Pettis Interview II, supra note 47.
508. Clark paper no. 9416, supra note 432, at 46.
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4. The exceptional bull runs in this period which made debt
trading and investment extremely lucrative.
5. The rediscovery of Latin America by the international cap-
ital markets. 50 9
Whether this rediscovery of Latin America proves to have
been based on the sound economic prospects of the region or
whether it is yet another case of the short-term memory of inter-
national finance markets, history will establish. 10
D. Participants
1. Traders
In both 1992 and 1993, the market's highest volume trader,
as identified by its peers, was JP Morgan. In 1993, the top eight
traders and their self-reported trading volumes in billions were
as follows: JP Morgan (US$225), Salomon Brothers (US$154),
Lehman Brothers (US$150), Chemical (US$130), 511  Chase
(US$123), Morgan Grenfell (US$118.5), Citibank (US$116),
and Merrill Lynch (US$85). The next four were: Bankers Trust
(US$54), Credit Suisse First Boston (US$52), Banque Paribas
(US$47), and Samuel Montagu (US$30).
This list is instructive. A comparison with the trading
volumes in the year in which Brady bonds were first issued, 1990,
shows that the top eight traders in that year were all commercial
banks.512 In 1993, four of the top eight traders were commercial
banks and the other four investment banks. This change is at-
509. Id. Private sector debt and equity flows to Latin America trebled in 1991, up
from US$13.4 billion in 1990 to over US$40 billion in 1991. See PURCELL, CHANG, ET
AL., PRIVATE CAPITAL FLOWS TO LATIN AMERICA: VOLUME TRIPLES TO $US40 BILLION IN
1991 (Salomon Brothers 1992) (copy on file with the Fordham International Law Journal).
In 1992, private-sector debt and equity finance to LDCs increased dramatically to $102
billion exceeding official loans and grants, at $54.6 billion, for the first time. In the
words of the chief economist of the World Bank, Bruno, "There has been a remarkable
turnaround in private capital flows to the middle-income countries." See Third World
Turns to Private Finance, AUSTRALIAN, Dec. 17, 1993, at 25. In May 1993, the finance
ministers of developing countries gathered together and called upon the leaders of the
G-7 countries to "do all they can to encourage private capital flows, including foreign
direct investment, portfolio investment and commercial bank lending." See Emerging
Countries to G-7: Let Money Flow More Freely, LDC DEBT REPORT, May 17, 1993, at 5.
510. This author hopes it is the former and believes it will be the latter.
511. Early in this period two major traders, Chemical Bank and Manufacturers
Hanover, merged, and retained the Chemical name. Voorhees, Hope Springs Eternal, 34
LATINFINANCE 21, 25 (1992); Chemical's Team, 34 LATINFINANCE, Jan/Feb 1992, at 6.
512. See supra note 285.
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tributable to three factors. First, Brady restructurings trans-
formed the loans into securities and thus from the types of in-
struments in which commercial banks had expertise to the type
in which investment banks had expertise. Second, as the size of
the market grew dramatically, the advantage for commercial
banks in being able to sell from their own portfolios was greatly
diminished. Third, and most significantly, as institutional inves-
tors became increasingly important buyers of the debt, invest-
ment banks took increasing shares of the business as selling se-
curities to institutions is their traditional business.1 3
The market had become a substantial source of profits for
some trading houses. For the twelve months from mid-1991 to
mid-1992, Salomon Brothers reported profits of US$110 million
on US$33 billion of trades and Chemical profits of US$80 mil-
lion on US$40 billion of trades. 14 Traders began to promote
LDC debt heavily as an attractive investment. Salomon Brothers,
in particular, produced a great deal of literature promoting in-
vestment in Brady bonds.51 5
In an interesting move, Merrill Lynch and ING Bank an-
nounced at roughly the same time, but apparently quite inde-
pendently, that they would stop making markets in LDC debt.516
ING said the interbank market now had sufficient market mak-
ers and its energies were better directed to monitoring its own
trading and creating investor flows. It stressed the market re-
mained important to it. Merrill said it would make markets to
clients but not to the street.517 It seems making markets in this
513. Pettis Interview II, supra note 47. In this regard, while in form a commercial
bank, JP Morgan functions more like an investment bank.
514. Voorhees, Doses of Reality, 40 LATINFINANCE 19, 24 (1992).
515. See LATIN AMERICA - THE PROBLEMS FADE, Feb. 12, 1992 (Salomon Brothers)
(copy on file with the Fordham International Law Journal) (including statements such as
"We believe that investors now need to focus on the opportunities for new revenue
generation on this continent during the 1990s."); RELATIVE VALUE OF MEXICAN SOVER-
EIGN BONDS: NEW ISSUES VERSUS EXCHANGE BONDS, Mar. 3, 1992 (Salomon Broth-
ers) (copy on file with the Fordham International Law Journal) (concluding that Brady
bonds offered better value than newly issued bonds); NIGERIAN PAR BONDS: THE POWER
OF ARITHMETIC, Mar. 1, 1993 (Salomon Brothers) (copy on file with the Fordham Interna-
tional Law Journal) (concluding that Nigerian Brady bonds offered "attractive invest-
ment opportunity."); EVALUATING SOVEREIGN CREDIT RISK: A HIGH-YIELD ANALYSTS
GUIDE, Mar. 16, 1993 (Salomon Brothers) (copy on file with the Fordham International
Law Journal).
516. ING, Merrill stop market making, 979 INT'L FIN. REV., May 15, 1993, at 29.
517. Id.
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debt was not as profitable as other aspects of the business.
While the major trading desks were now powerhouses earn-
ing massive profits, the small trading houses which were there at
the beginning continued to play a role. Let us revisit the three
boutiques which pioneered this market: Eurinam, Giadefi, and
Turan Corp. Martin Schubert at Eurinam continued to work
hard to gain exposure for himself and his company. Jack de Fil-
ippis repositioned Giadefi to be principally a proprietary trader
trading for its own account. Turan Corp. specialized in the
debts of rarely traded countries and avoided the heavily traded
credits. For the twelve months from mid-1991 to mid-1992 each
had remarkably similar trading volumes. Based on their own re-
ported figures, Eurinam traded US$1.5 billion of debt and
Giadefi and Turan US$1.4 billion each.518 Giadefi reported net
profits of US$4 million on this trading519 - a healthy return for
an enterprise owned by its founder. The four largest traders
each traded about US$40 billion of debt520 in this period and
these figures placed the boutiques between 20th and 25th in
trading volume.
In the early years of the market, LDC debt trading was not
regarded as a way to build a promising career in a bank.521 Now
the "emerging markets" divisions were major profit centers and
many traders occupied senior positions in their respective banks.
The market must have offered financial and/or personal re-
wards throughout its history because the traders who were there
in the early days have in the main stayed the distance. The same
names appear consistently in articles about the marker over the
years: Stephen Dizard, Peter Drittel, Kathy Galbraith, Peter Ger-
aghty, Michael Pettis, Alexis Rodzianko, Nicolas Rohatyn, and
Susan Segal. As the market grew rapidly in the 1990s new names
abounded, but the market rewarded those who were there
early522 and all the abovenamed traders were in senior adminis-
trative positions.5 23 The people at the forefront of trading and
518. Voorhees, Doses of Reality, 40 LATINFINANCE 19, 20 (1992).
519. Id. at 24.
520. Id.
521. See text accompanying note 16 in Buckley, supra note 1.
522. For instance, two of Salomons' original traders, Mark Franklin and Stephen
Dizard, are now managing directors and co-lead its highly respected global trading
group, and Nicolas Rohatyn, whose entire career with JP Morgan has been in LDC debt
trading and Emerging Markets, is a managing director.
523. For instance, Drittel was co-head of Bear Steam's International Division, Gal-
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research in this period include the following. In trading: En-
rique Boilini (First Boston), Daniel Canel (JP Morgan), Americo
da Corte (ING), Pierre Durand (Bankers Trust), Mark Franklin
(Salomon Brothers), Con Egan (Lehman Brothers), Raoul
Ponte (JP Morgan), and Miguel White (Manufacturers Hano-
ver). In research: Joyce Chang (Salomon Brothers), Gary Evans
(Barings Securities), Frank Fernandez (Merrill), and John Pur-
cell (Salomon Brothers).524
2. Sellers
The principal suppliers of the debt in this period were, for
the first time, the U.S. money-center banks as net sellers from
their own books. 5 Japanese banks were also for the first time
heavy sellers. 526 By the beginning of this period most major U.S.
banks had substantial loan loss provisions for these assets which
made cash sales relatively painless. Indeed during the bull run
of 1991 it appeared that many banks had over-provisioned, as
assets could be sold for substantially more than their book value
less provisions. In addition; for the first time in the market's
history, the trading desks had sufficiently large inventories of
debt to be able to serve as sources of supply in periods of higher
than usual demand.
3. Buyers
Early in this period mutual funds became significant buyers
of LDC debt. In May 1992 Salomon Brothers estimated that
non-bank institutions held about US$10 billion of LDC debt.527
LDC debt represented about fifteen percent of the assets of most
global mutual funds528 which were attracted by its high yields.
braith was head of Chase's global trading operation, and Geraghty was head of ING's
securities operation in London.
524. These trading and research personnel are listed as working for the party for
which they worked predominantly in this period. For the record, although strictly be-
yond the scope of this work, the leading bankers in new bond issues in this period were:
Maher Alhafer (Citibank), Emilio Camar (Merrill),JorgeJasson (Chase), Michael Pettis
(First Boston), and Gabriel Politzer JP Morgan).
525. Clark paper no. 9416, supra note 432 at 14.
526. From March 1992 to March 1993, Japanese banks reduced their exposure to
emerging markets by 30%, particularly to Argentina and Brazil, principally by debt
sales. Secondary Market, 986 INT'L FIN. REV. 62, 63 (1993).
527. Pollock, Funds Liven Performance with Latin Debt, WALL ST. J., May 14, 1992.
528. Id.
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The involvement of institutional and Latin American inves-
tors was "crucial to the growth and performance of the Latin
American bond market. '5 29 By the end of this period, the major
buyers of the debt were the LDC debt trading houses, Latin
American investors, mutual funds, hedge funds, insurance com-
panies, and pension funds.5 30 The mutual and hedge funds and
Latin American investors had aggressively increased their expo-
sure in 1993. The involvement of all of these parties, except the
traders, had been greatly facilitated by the securitization of the
loans under the Brady Plan.531
In the late 1980s traders carried fairly small inventories of
debt. Around US$40 million per trading desk was perhaps typi-
cal in 1988.532 The securitization of loans under the Brady Plan
and the resulting bull market changed that. Early in this period
the market was described as one in which "a primary group of
trading houses basically sell to each other all day for their own
account and for account of an increasing [number] of private
investors in Latin America. ''53 3 In 1992, participants in the an-
nual EMTA survey reported that proprietary trading by trading
desks accounted for two-thirds of annual market turnover.534 By
1993 traders, as a matter of course, would take major positions
for speculative reasons and to cater to bond customers.535 At the
end of 1993 position limits typically ranged from US$500 million
to well over US$1 billion and the 20 major traders held perhaps
529. Clark paper no. 9416, supra note 432, at 12.
530. Id.at 14. Participants in the EMTA survey in 1992 reported that 30% of their
customer transactions involved investors from Latin America. Presumably the majority
of this Latin American investment was former flight capital. This major role for private
investors from the region reflects the investors' superior knowledge of policy reforms
and economic and political conditions in the debtor countries.
531. Id. at 14.
532. Id.
533. Martin Schubert, The Debt Crash of October 91 - Lessons to be Learned, a
speech delivered at the Argentina Investment Conference, New York, Nov. 25-26, 1991,
at 15 (copy on file with the Fordham International Law Journal). In the same speech,
Schubert also described the market thus: "the structure of the market can be described
as... a giant fish bowl housing a handful of two way market makers nudging the price
up or down, and investors on the outside placing bets, more based on how the market
makers will react to a new condition, than fundamentals." In September 1993, Daniel
Canel of JP Morgan was quoted as saying, "Three years ago, the secondary debt market
was about 90% dealers and 10% clients. Now it is 65% dealers and 35% clients." See
Voorhees, The bull Run of 93, 50 LATINFINANCE 28 (1993).
534. Clark paper no. 9416, supra note 432, at 16.
535. Idat 14.
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US$15 billion of debt.5" 6
While pension funds and insurance companies entered the
market as early as 1991, they only began to make significant
purchases in the second half of 1993.5a7 These investors were
constrained 538 by the failure of most issuers539 to attract an in-
vestment-grade rating for their bonds.5 4 0 Mutual funds were not
usually limited to investing in investment-grade bonds and by
1993 had "come to be viewed as the key players in the mar-
ket."' 54 ' The most significant mutual funds were those formed to
invest entirely in Latin American debt followed by funds formed
to invest in a range of international government securities.
There were also substantial purchases by junk-bond funds. 4 2
As a result of the heavy involvement of institutional inves-
tors the fundamental nature of the market shifted in 1993 from
being a supply-driven trader's market to being somewhat of an
investor's market that was, to at least a limited extent, demand
driven.543 In the words of one trader, "Since the summer of
1993 the [institutional investors] have been there, and it's
changed the psychology of the market. When an asset drops
three points, they're there to step in. 5 4 4
The institutional investors were drawn to this market by the
536. Id. at 18.
537. Id. at 15. See Voorhees, The Bull Run of 93, 50 LATINFINANCE 28 (1993).
538. Insurance companies typically have strict limits on their holdings of specula-
tive debt. Public pension funds are likewise constrained by state regulations. Private
pension funds are less strictly regimented but are still required to exercise prudence.
Many such companies and funds are further constrained by limitations in their constitu-
ent documents.
539. While Chile and Colombia did obtain investment-grade ratings, they never
securitised their loans into Brady bonds. Pension funds and insurance companies were
not usually permitted to purchase loans and there were only ever small amounts of
Chilean and Colombian bonds on the market (at least until the new issues began to hit
the market in the 1990s).
540. Rating Agencies Stick to Guns on Latin Credit Assessment, LDC Debt Report, April
12, 1993, at 5.
541. Clark, supra note 32, at 16.
542. Id.
543. Voorhees, Shooting the bull; debt markets, 55 LATINFINANCE 30 (1994).
544. Id. The same trader, Jeremy Smith of Morgan Grenfell, said further, "a
number of the sophisticated investors - hedge funds, pension funds, money managers,
insurance companies - have $1 billion positions each ... they have a lot of clout. It's
not the traders moving the markets, it's the clients. What you see is a big New York
dealer coming in and buying $100 million of debt - $60 million for clients and $40
million for themselves."
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following factors: 545
1. Low interest rates in the U.S. and Europe made the real
returns on low-risk securities like U.S. Treasury bonds ex-
tremely slim. 5 4 6
2. The economies of many Latin American countries, partic-
ularly Argentina and Mexico, had begun to improve dramati-
cally.
3. Argentina completed its Brady restructuring and issued a
massive amount of new Brady bonds.
4. Brazil's restructuring was likely to be put in place soon and
many countries were beginning preliminary negotiations on
Brady style restructurings.547 The substantial capital gains
made by debt holders after previous Brady restructurings
were attractive.
The presence of these investors providing a sustained de-
mand for the debt represented an important step in the evolu-
tion of the market. With this development. the market may fi-
nally be able to move towards the relative stability of a mature
securities market.
E. Impact of the Market
In this period, the market facilitated the wave of privatiza-
tion programs which swept Latin America. Whether the sale of
public assets in exchange principally for these debts was good
for the debtor nations is highly contentious but, whether positive
or negative, the privatizations would have been far less attractive
to investors if debt could not have been used.
Somewhat paradoxically, however, in this period of explo-
sive growth the market had very little effect on matters outside
itself. In the prior period the market had had profound effects
on the breakdown of creditor solidarity (which made the Brady
Plan both achievable and necessary) and on the viability of the
Brady Plan itself. In this period, the final one in the market's
first decade, the market grew, and grew, and grew, but its exter-
nal effects were limited.
545. Voorhees, Shooting the bull; debt markets, 55 LATINFINANCE 30 (1994).
546. See Waters, supra note 358, at 18.
547. Countries such as Bulgaria, Ecuador, Jordan, Panama, Peru, Poland, and Rus-
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CONCLUSION
In this period of the market's development, the face value
of debt traded in the market increased twenty times from about
US$65 billion to US$1,300 billion. This dramatic growth was sup-
ported by major changes in the nature of the market. Brady
bonds meant ever increasing proportions of the trades closely
resembled conventional securities trading - rapid transactions
of readily transferable assets at fine margins. Brokers entered
the market and screens bearing a mix of binding and indicative
quotes appeared on trader's desks. Institutional investors
brought a degree of depth and stability to what was still a volatile
and unpredictable market. The nature of the top traders also
changed. At the beginning of this period, all of the major trad-
ers were commercial banks. At the end, investment banks
ranked equally with their commercial brethren in the trading
stakes. The development of the market towards a conventional
securities market had assisted those with expertise in trading se-
curities.
In its first decade the market had five principal effects and
consequences.548 It forced banks to increase their loan loss pro-
visions; facilitated the exit of certain banks from LDC lending
and facilitated debt-equity swaps, privatizations, debt buy-backs
and other debt exchanges. These effects of the market were
considered in the predecessor Article.5 4 9 The breakdown in
creditor solidarity which flowed from the exit of certain banks
from LDC lending made the Brady Plan necessary and the mar-
ket's further facilitation of the Brady Plan is the fourth principal
effect of the market. The final effect is the impact of the market
on direct investment in the debtor nations. The latter two ef-
fects will now be considered.
The secondary market facilitated the Brady Plan in four
ways:
(i) The market provided the prototype. As the relevant par-
ties could see the loans trading like bonds each day, it was a
small step to conceive of their securitization into bonds.
(ii) The market provided a secondary market for the bonds.
The existing secondary market for sovereign loans could
readily adapt to trade Brady bonds and so the existence of
548. These effects are listed in no particular order.
549. Buckley, supra note 1.
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this market meant the banks knew there would be a market
into which to sell their bonds.5"'
(iii) The market established there was investor appetite for
such securities. The active trading of loans on the secondary
market was a strong indication that there would be investors
to purchase LDC loans which had been converted into
bonds. 55
1
(iv) The market discounts afforded a strong argument for
debt relief. It was difficult for banks to resist the arguments
for a degree of debt relief in the securitization process when
most banks had been selling their loans at steep discounts in
the secondary market.
The combined effect of these four factors was so significant
that without the secondary market the Brady Plan may have
been too large a step into the unknown to attract the support of
the U.S. Treasury and without the support of, and persuasion of
bankers by, the U.S. Treasury, the Brady Plan would not have
come to pass. It is generally accepted that the securitization of
the loans under the Brady Plan served the international banks.
Securitization gave the banks liquid bonds, rather than relatively
illiquid loans. It triggered a turnaround in secondary market
prices that improved the values of the banks' portfolios dramati-
cally. It opened the door for the debtors to return to the volun-
tary capital markets by bond issuances from which the banks, as
underwriters, profited. And, above all, the Brady Plan, in per-
mitting broader ownership of the debt, signalled the end of the
1982 debt crisis as a threat to the stability of the international
financial system. 2
However, the seeds of the next sovereign debt crisis may
have been planted by the failure of the Brady Plan to reduce
debt and debt service levels in a meaningful way. Furthermore,
these seeds may have been watered and fertilized by the return
550. Interview with Michael Chamberlin, Executive Director of EMTA, New York
City, December 8, 1994 [hereinafter Chamberlin Interview]. Martin Schubert believes
the banks would not have agreed to the securitisation of the debt with debt relief with-
out a sure market into which they could sell the resulting bonds. Schubert Interview,
supra note 455.
551. Chamberlin Interview, supra note 550.
552. Securitization permitted banks to sell the debt to a broad cross-section of in-
vestors and not simply to each other. Thus, for the first time since the inception of the
crisis, it was possible for the major U.S. money-centre banks to liquidate their entire'
portfolio of LDC debts, if they wished to do so.
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to the voluntary credit markets that the Brady Plan made possi-
ble. The secondary market, in facilitating the Brady Plan, may
have put the world on track for another debt crisis. Only history
will be able to judge.553 The securitization of the loans into
Brady bonds and the use of bonds to raise most of the new
money in the 1990s mean that the next debt crisis is unlikely to
threaten the stability of the international financial system as did
the 1982 crisis. However, because the debt of the 1990s has been
piled on top of the Brady bonds, and because history suggests
strongly the next debt crisis will be in the life of the Brady bonds,
it will probably damage the debtor nations even more than did
the 1982 crisis.5 54
In summary, the international banking community collec-
tively, and its constituent banks individually, benefited from the
transactions which the secondary market made possible55 and
will continue to do so provided the whole edifice does not col-
lapse in another debt crisis.
Throughout the late 1980s and early 1990s the market's
prices on LDC debt were regularly published and widely known.
Especially in the 1980s, these prices were unrelated to the eco-
nomic fundamentals of the countries. 5 56
Upon one view, these large discounts throughout the late
1980s and early 1990s sent an overly negative message to poten-
tial investors in LDCs. On this view, the discounts were much
larger than were warranted by the long-term prospects of repay-
ment of the debt and reflected the thinness of the market and
the lack of buyers rather than economic fundamentals.557 If the
prices were taken by many potential investors as an indicator of
the economic health of the country, the size of the discounts
may have kept potential investors away.558 If investors inter-
553. On this topic generally, see MacMillan, supra note 7, at 305.
554. History certainly suggests that a debt crisis will grip Latin America, and thus
the world, before todays' Brady bonds mature after 2020.
555. This is not surprising given the banks' influence over the early development
of the secondary market and the banks' control over the resolution of the debt crisis.
556. It is generally accepted that the market did not price debt upon the basis of
the economic fundamentals of the debtors: Interview with Professor Riordan Roette of
Johns Hopkins University, Washington, DC, April 29, 1993.
557. Id.
558. Interview by telephone with Professor Manuel Pastor, Professor of Economics,
Occidental College, Los Angeles, April 21, 1993 [hereinafter Pastor Interview]. This
message, if sent, appeared to persist until the vote of confidence of the IMF and inter-
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preted market prices in these terms, this was certainly a disser-
vice the market rendered the debtors. 9
The countervailing view is that the discounts in the market
in the late 1980s were not large enough as the prices were
propped up by the artificial accounting treatment of the loans
on the books of the banks. Larger discounts would have enabled
equilibrium to be reached between supply and demand and the
market to fulfill its clearing function, as considered previously.
560
On this view, deeper discounts were desirable as they would have
led to the earlier resolution of the crisis and benefited both
banks and debtors.56'
In summary, the money-center banks should be grateful
their strong resistance to the market in the early years562 did not
stifle its growth severely for they have benefited from the market
in numerous ways. Unlike the banks, the debtors did not enjoy
multiple benefits from the market but overall they should also
be grateful their initial mild resistance did not stifle the market's
growth significantly 6 ' as they too have benefited from this mar-
ket, principally because debt buy-backs were to provide their ma-
jor source of debt relief and buy-backs would have been impossi-
ble without the market. The market was a generally positive de-
velopment for all parties, in stark contrast to the uniformly
negative effects of the debt crisis. Indeed, one could say the de-
velopment of the secondary market turned the debt crisis from
an unmitigated, into a mitigated, disaster.
national banking community implicit in a Brady style restructuring. A Brady style re-
structuring was invariably seen as a very positive sign by international investors: Roette
Interview, supra and Pettis Interview I, supra note 375.
559. Pastor Interview, supra 558.
560. Pettis Interview I, supra note 375.
561. In debt-equity swaps, privatisations, formal and informal buy-backs and, pre-
sumably, in larger discounts on discount bonds and lower -interest rates on par bonds in
the Brady-style restructurings to come.
562. The bank's resistance was due to the fear the market would expose the true
value of the loans held on their books at full face value.
563. The debtor's resistance was due to the fear that creditors who acquired loans
in the secondary market would be less amenable to advancing new money than original
creditors.
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